7 novembre 2023 | International, C4ISR
5G seen as ‘critical’ enabler for Pentagon’s simulation, VR needs
The Pentagon is pouring money into video game-like simulation and virtual reality for training, planning, logistics and maintenance purposes.
4 janvier 2019 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR
Here’s the Army’s latest electronic warfare project
By: Mark Pomerleau
Europe's increasingly contested environments have required increasingly complex electronic warfare planning tools. Vehicles, however, can't house the power of command posts, so the Army is adapting an existing system for the tactical edge.
The Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool, or EWPMT, is a command-and-control planning capability that allows commanders and soldiers to visualize on a screen the effects of electronic warfare in the field. As part of efforts to provide soldiers additional capabilities for EWPMT ahead of the program's scheduled add-ons — an effort dubbed Raven Claw — the Army received feedback that troops at the vehicle or platform level don't need the full application required at command posts.
This feedback coincided with other observations from the Raven Claw deployment, which officials said were mixed.
“It does what it's supposed to do, but it requires a lot of computing capacity and also it requires a lot of inputs from the [electronic warfare officers] right now,” Col. Mark Dotson, the Army's capability manager for electronic warfare, told C4ISRNET in a November interview.
In response, a new effort called Raven Feather “will address both processing consumption and critical EW tasks required at the vehicle/platform level,” Lt. Col. Jason Marshall, product manager for electronic warfare integration at Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, told C4ISRNET in response to written questions. “Raven Feather will provide a more tactically focused Graphical User Interface as part of the EWPMT Raven Claw system mounted in the vehicle or loaded into the Mounted Family of Computer Systems (MFoCS).”
Dotson added that the Army is eyeing lighter versions of the capability that could be available for lower echelons that may not need as much modeling and simulation.
“We're looking at ways to tailor it specifically to the echelon, and then that will help us with the platform we need to put it on,” he said. The modeling and simulation might be important at the staff officer level, he added, but he questioned whether that computing power is needed at the micro-tactical level.
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16 mai 2024 | International, Terrestre
BAE Systems to develop next-generation airborne decoy countermeasure
Expanding the capabilities of BAE Systems’ combat-proven AN/ALE-55 Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy, DBD consists of a towed unit connected by fiber-optic cable to electronic warfare equipment onboard the aircraft
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21 février 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Opinion: Defense Budget’s Resilience Rests On Shaky Foundation
Byron Callan Some of the main talking points on the fiscal 2021 defense budget request and the plan that accompanies it through 2025 are that it aligns resources with the National Defense Strategy and that this year's budget theme is about all-domain operations. The Pentagon called out priorities to sustain readiness and prepare for future challenges with investment in hypersonics, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Given a flat top line, the Defense Department had to make tough choices by making program cuts that have been well-documented and are well-covered by this publication. The outlines of structural changes in how the Pentagon is preparing for the future are indeed visible in the budget request and plan, but it is unrealistic to expect this budget to have completely framed out all that will be done. Increases in research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) spending both in absolute terms and compared to last year's plan for 2021-24 underscore shifts that are underway. It may take at least 2-3 more years to see how some of these RDT&E efforts translate into new programs and will inform how the U.S. will fight in future conflicts. Much as defense contractor management, analysts and planners will focus on the details in the defense budget, it is important also to factor in some of the assumptions that underpin the budget—the foundation upon which it rests. Here there are questions worth considering. The first is the real GDP forecast for 2021-29. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) forecast depends on stable 3% annual real growth every year, which is well above consensus estimates. The U.S. is now in its longest economic expansion ever. Can this be extended into 2021 or beyond? Possibly. Has the U.S. somehow eliminated the risk of recession from a rapid increase in interest rates, another energy shock, a pandemic or a severe economic crisis in other parts of the world? Very likely not. Another questionable factor is the new budget and plan's interest-rate assumptions, as there was a big change from prior projections. The OMB and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) do not disclose how they expect the composition of federal debt by debt maturity to change over forecast periods. They usually provide projections only on three-month Treasury bill interest rates and on the 10-year Treasury note. The U.S. Treasury shows that as of Jan. 31, of the $17.2 trillion in federal debt held by the public, 14% was in Treasury bills with an average interest rate of 1.7%, and 58% was in notes with maturities of 2-10 years at an average rate of 2.1%. Net interest outlays are a mix of the interest the federal government pays to public holders of that debt and the interest it pays to itself on debt held in federal trust funds. One way to think about the debt burden and the interest expense associated with it is to take the net interest outlay projections and divide them by the total debt the OMB or CBO estimates. One of the changes the OMB made in its budget projections was to lower interest rate estimates. In recent years, these projections were too high compared to prevailing market levels, as the OMB and CBO both projected rates would return to “normal” levels. In the OMB's mid-session review from this past summer, the implied interest rate (net interest outlays divided by total debt) was 2.3% in 2019 and rose to 3.0% by 2022 and 3.3% by 2025. In the latest budget and plan, the implied rate is flat—at 2.1% in 2020, creeping up to 2.3% by 2025. This is another questionable factor that could weigh on the foundation of the defense spending plans. If rates do move to higher levels, then outlays will compete with other forms of federal spending. If rates fall further than projected, it may be due to a far weaker economy, which in turn weighs on federal deficits. A final questionable factor is the deficit projections themselves. The Trump administration again plans reductions in non-defense discretionary spending, which Congress has not supported in the last three budget requests. The share of non-defense discretionary outlays as a percent of total outlays drops to 12% in 2024 from 15% in 2019. For defense contractor management, planners, analysts and investors, foundations on which the budget plans are based imply that the structural and programmatic changes in the 2021 budget could be accelerated if deficits and interest rates are higher than the plan presumes. Like a high-rise building built to code in an earthquake zone, the Pentagon's structural and spending changes may make defense better able to withstand future macroeconomic tremors and shifts. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/opinion-defense-budgets-resilience-rests-shaky-foundation