FLIR set to add Endeavor Robotics to its unmanned future

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  14 décembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial

  US Air Force chief of staff: Our military must harness the potential of multidomain operations

  By: Gen. David Goldfein Faced with the seemingly impossible task of solving the puzzle of the German military coding machine commonly known as “Enigma” during World War II, British mathematician Alan Turing and his team used a new kind of technology. They built a computing machine that foreshadowed the age of software and algorithms, breaking a code that the Germans changed every 24 hours. Turing's legacy is profound, in war and peace. Today, anyone who has spent time on the internet or social media can't help but have noticed the speed by which algorithms help companies direct targeted advertisements to us — in seconds and minutes — based on their ability to track online interests and behaviors. It is no overstatement to say that the same kind of intuitive speed in understanding and directing information is what our military needs in order to win future wars. This new kind of warfare will require us to defend against and attack foes on land and sea as well as in the air, space and cyberspace. In military parlance, the term for this is “multidomain operations,” an ungainly phrase that has nonetheless become a major focus for each of the military services, including my own, the U.S. Air Force. The term is in vogue now for good reason: Whoever figures out how to quickly gather information in various “domains” and just as quickly direct military actions will have the decisive advantage in battle. Figuring out how to master multidomain warfare will be difficult, but do it we must. History has many lessons here. One analogy I like dates to the American Revolution. As British military forces were preparing to attack Lexington and Concord, patriots devised a simple system to alert Colonial troops. They hung lanterns in the Old North Church in Boston — one if by land, and two if by sea. But how many lanterns would the patriots have hung if the British decided to conduct multidomain operations and attack from both the land and the sea? This would have created a dilemma because they would have to choose to either divide their force and defend both approaches or choose one to defend. However, the patriots had no need to worry about this because the British did not have the ability to control a split force using both land and sea approaches. Without a suitable command-and-control system, a military force cannot effectively take advantage of multidomain operations. Fast forward to today. Having the ability to credibly attack enemies independently by land, sea, air, space or cyberspace — or all at once — creates untenable dilemmas. I'd like our adversaries to always be in the lantern-buying business. Developing the systems, training and methods by which to practice this new brand of warfare will require extraordinary focus from our military. We will have to master and apply quantum computing, artificial intelligence, hypersonic flight, and new concepts for command-and-control that will need to span the globe. In order to build this capability, we will have to develop a new ethos that allows for experimental failure, just as the private sector has done in order to bring us smartphones, robotics and many other cutting-edge technologies that define the speed and precision of modern life. America's new National Defense Strategy correctly focuses the bulk of our nation's efforts on what is called great power conflict, the potential for war with formidable foes like Russian and China. We have known for some time that both are building militaries that harness AI, quantum computers, hypersonic flight and the ubiquitous threat from cyberattacks. To build a military capable of defending and deterring against such threats, it is imperative that the United States learn to fight and defend from beneath the ocean to the outer reaches of space, and everywhere in between. Last month the Air Force kicked off the inaugural Doolittle Wargame, named for the World War II hero Jimmy Doolittle, who led the daring air raid on Tokyo in 1942 that helped turn the tide of war in the Pacific. That mission personified multidomain warfare in that it was launched from an aircraft carrier hauling heavy bombers, something the Japanese were not expecting and were not prepared for. The Doolittle Wargame is the start of our efforts to learn how to harness the potential for extremely fast, unpredictable warfare from the heights of air and space to the expanses of cyberspace. If we can pull this off, it may redefine conventional deterrence in the 21st century. Gen. David Goldfein is the chief of staff for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/us-air-force-chief-of-staff-our-military-must-harness-the-potential-of-multidomain-operations/

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  17 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Défense spatiale : les grandes lignes du rapport

  Par Yann Cochennec Les députés Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille viennent de remettre leur rapport sur la stratégie de défense spatiale dont la France doit se doter pour annihiler les menaces actuelles et futures. La France a décidé de se doter d'une stratégie de défense spatiale et la première étape est ce rapport que les députés Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille viennent de rendre devant la Commission de la Défense et des forces armées. L'incident du satellite espion russe en a été l'élément le plus médiatiquement visible et a servi d'accélérateur à une volonté qui était d'ores et déjà en gestation. Après la militarisation de l'espace, Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille soulignent dans leur rapport "l'arsenalisation de l'espace avec envoi et présence d'armes qui auront vocation à être utilisées dans le cadre d'un conflit". Le tout dans un contexte qui a changé : apparition de nouvelles puissances spatiales, l'arrivée de firmes privées sur le marché du spatial et la révolution "nano", soit la capacité de produire des satellites de plus en plus petits "pratiquement indétectables, qui peuvent être équipés d'une capacité de brouillage, d'écoute, de prise de contrôle cyber ou de charges explosives". Par conséquent : "défendre nos satellites civils comme militaires dans l'espace, être capable de voir, d'éviter, d'agir et de neutraliser un menace devient dès lors un enjeu de souveraineté nationale et européenne", soulignent Olivier Becht et Stéphane Trompille. Pour les auteurs du rapport, cette stratégie de défense spatiale devrait s'orienter autour de plusieurs axes. D'abord en renforçant les moyens de surveillance. Les systèmes de radars GRAVES et SATAM doivent "être complétés par de nouveaux développements" capables de suivre des engins "non-kepleriens" ou "très manoeuvrants et suivant des orbites non habituelles". Solution préconisée : deux nouveaux systèmes de radars de veille en orbite basse installés, l'un en métropole, l'autre en Guyane. Les rapporteurs préconisent aussi la mise en place "d'un système de surveillance des orbites géostationnaires" avec l'achat de trois télescopes supplémentaires (Polynésie, Nouvelle Calédonie) en plus du système TAROT du Cnes. "La surveillance de l'espace devra aussi pouvoir s'effectuer depuis l'espace : emport de capteurs d'approche sur nos satellites, mise en orbite de satellites patrouilleurs, surveillance de nos satellites par un petit satellite de type "chien de garde". Deuxième axe : la capacité de neutraliser une menace dans l'espace. Les deux parlementaires préconisent, plutôt que l'usage de missiles anti-satellites, de développer de nouvelles technologies : laser ionique "affectant les capteurs qui équipent les voies haute résolution visibles du satellite en le rendant momentanément inopérant, laser classique permettant de détruire chirurgicalement un équipement donné d'un satellite; moyens cyber pour brouiller ou détourner un satellite, bras articulés montés sur un satellite ou une mini-navette permettant d'arrimer un satellite hostile, de le dévier de son orbite et de l'envoyer vers les confins du système solaire. Enfin, pour être en capacité de poursuivre les missions "en cas de neutralisation de nos propres satellites", les auteurs proposent les dispositions suivantes : développement de constellations de satellites, "développement de moyens de lancement très rapides de fusées emportant un satellite à partir de drones spéciaux de type ALTAIR développé par l'Onera ou de type Pegasus de Dassault", développement "de pseudo-satellites de haute altitude capables de rendre des services équivalents à un satellite de basse altitude", de type Stratobus de Thales Alenia Space ou Zephyr d'Airbus Defense & Space. Pour mettre en place cette stratégie, le rapport propose la création d'une "Force spatiale" sous l'autorité directe du Chef d'état-major des Armées ainsi que d'une "Haute Autorité de Défense Spatiale" placée directement sous l'autorité du Premier Ministre en lien direct avec le ministre des Armées. http://www.air-cosmos.com/defense-spatiale-les-grandes-lignes-du-rapport-119321

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  21 août 2018 | International, Terrestre

  US Army pursues alternatives for a Stryker-based active protection system

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — While the U.S. Army has been working to qualify a Virginia-based company's active protection system for the Stryker combat vehicle, it is also in the process of evaluating several additional APS solutions for the platform beginning in November. “The Army will be executing a fourth non-developmental APS system evaluation,” Army spokeswoman Ashley Givens told Defense News in a recent statement. The evaluation will be on the Stryker platform, she confirmed, adding that the service has received three responses to a request for information released earlier this year asking for more Stryker-focused APS solutions. “At this time the Army is still reviewing the proposals of the vendors to confirm viability,” Givens said. More than a year ago, the Army determined it needed to field an interim APS solution for the Abrams tank as well as the Stryker and Bradley. The service decided to rapidly assess off-the-shelf APS systems to fulfill an urgent operational need after failing — over a 20-year period — to field an APS capability. The Army has since selected three different systems: Israeli company Rafael's Trophy system, which is deployed in the Israeli army, for Abrams; Iron Fist from IMI, another Israeli company, for the Bradley; and Herndon, Virginia-based Artis' Iron Curtain for Stryker. While the Army has stayed on track with Abrams, due to a combination of earlier funding availability and qualifying an already fielded system, it has struggled to stay on schedule with the other two configurations. In January, Col. Glenn Dean, the program manager for Stryker, who also manages the service's effort to install APS on combat vehicles, told Defense News that Iron Curtain's delay was partly due to a decision to replace the radar originally intended for the APS. “We've had some other issues," he said. "We have learned that that system probably is not as mature as originally envisioned, so the contractor had some difficulty getting to the point they were ready to start characterization, and then we had some, I will call it, friction on the test range.” At the time, Iron Curtain had roughly three weeks of testing left to wrap up government characterization. Dean said the program office would be ready to generate final reports and bring it to the Army for a decision in the March time frame. In April, the Army released a sources-sought notice looking for other APS solutions for Stryker and also received, in fiscal 2018, $25 million to qualify a fourth system as part of the interim APS program being called the Expedited Active Protection Systems activity. According to Givens, the program office has completed the installation and characterization phase of the ExAPS activity, but “we are currently awaiting an Army decision on the next phase of activity for Iron Curtain.” In January, Col. Glenn Dean, the program manager for Stryker, who also manages the service's effort to install APS on combat vehicles, told Defense News that Iron Curtain's delay was partly due to a decision to replace the radar originally intended for the APS. “We've had some other issues," he said. "We have learned that that system probably is not as mature as originally envisioned, so the contractor had some difficulty getting to the point they were ready to start characterization, and then we had some, I will call it, friction on the test range.” At the time, Iron Curtain had roughly three weeks of testing left to wrap up government characterization. Dean said the program office would be ready to generate final reports and bring it to the Army for a decision in the March time frame. In April, the Army released a sources-sought notice looking for other APS solutions for Stryker and also received, in fiscal 2018, $25 million to qualify a fourth system as part of the interim APS program being called the Expedited Active Protection Systems activity. According to Givens, the program office has completed the installation and characterization phase of the ExAPS activity, but “we are currently awaiting an Army decision on the next phase of activity for Iron Curtain.” The Army's evaluation process of additional systems is expected to come in the form of a live-fire “rodeo” — for lack of a better term — where the service has invited a small number of the RFI respondents with the most promising potential solutions to have their APS capability put to an initial limited test against a set of threats defined by the Army, according to a source familiar with the effort. The respondents are required to fund the demonstration primarily at their own cost, but some Army funding will be used to conduct the tests. At least two companies have been invited to participate in the rodeo, the source said. One those companies is likely Germany's Rheinmetall. The company has advocated hard for the Army to also qualify its Active Defense System, and the Army admitted, prior to receiving FY18 dollars, that it would want to qualify ADS if it had the funds. Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/08/20/army-pursuing-possible-alternatives-for-a-stryker-based-active-protection-system