23 mars 2022 | Information, Autre défense

FAQs about the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Frequently asked questions about the impacts of Russia-Ukraine conflict on global trade and how EDC can help

https://www.edc.ca/en/article/faqs-russia-ukraine-conflict.html

Sur le même sujet

  • Plan d’investissement de la Défense 2018

    11 juin 2018 | Information, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Plan d’investissement de la Défense 2018

    Le Programme des capacités de la Défense (PCD) un nouvel outil maintenant en ligne permet d'accéder à des renseignements sur les occasions d'investissement en défense. À l'instar du Guide d'acquisition en défense, le PCD offre à l'industrie de l'information sur la planification comme les fourchettes de financement et les échéanciers des projets. L'industrie pourra y trouver environ 250 projets financés dans le cadre de la politique Protection, Sécurité, Engagement (PSE), dont des projets d'infrastructure ainsi que d'importants contrats de soutien en service afin de faire ses prévisions pour les occasions d'acquisition en défense et tenter d'obtenir des contrats. Gr'ce à ces renseignements, l'industrie sera en mesure de prendre des décisions éclairées en matière de recherche-développement (R-D) et de partenariats stratégiques fondés sur les besoins prévus des Forces armées canadiennes. On trouvera dans le PCD : des projets : des projets de biens d'équipement ou d'infrastructure d'une valeur de plus de 5 millions de dollars prévus et financés dans le cadre du la politique PSE des contrats de soutien : des contrats de soutien en service et des contrats de service professionnels d'une valeur escomptée supérieure à 20 millions de dollars qui seront octroyés dans les prochaines années pour soutenir les capacités livrées dans le cadre de la politique PSE des projets de PSE notés et inscrits Le PCD comprend une fonction de recherche par mot-clé et segmente les occasions d'investissement en composantes qui peuvent servir de critères de recherche : secteurs en matière de capacités de Défense (SCD) secteurs d'investissement en matière de capacités de défense (SICD) promoteurs du projet capacités industrielles clés (CIC) Les secteurs en matière de capacités de Défense (SCD) se divisent en treize grandes catégories, comme les le domaine terrestre, le domaine maritime, le domaine aérien, l'aérospatiale et le cyberespace. Ces catégories se subdivisent en éléments constituants plus de 150 secteurs d'investissement en matière de capacités de défense (SICD), comme les véhicules de modèle commercial, les pièces de navires et l'avionique. Les promoteurs du projet correspondent au commandement du service ou à l'organisation civile équivalente au sein du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN). Il est aussi possible de rechercher les projets et les occasions d'investissement en fonction des capacités industrielles clés (CIC) d'Innovation, Sciences et Développement économiques Canada. Ces secteurs de capacité indiquent à l'industrie qu'elles sont les principales activités commerciales prioritaires pour le gouvernement en ce qui concerne l'approvisionnement en matière de défense. Enfin, il y a une fonction de recherche avancée qui permet à l'utilisateur de filtrer ses résultats selon des critères particuliers. http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/fr/programme-capacites-defense/index.asp https://www.canada.ca/fr/ministere-defense-nationale/organisation/rapports-publications/plan-dinvestissement-de-la-defense-2018.html

  • Uncle Sam Wants YOU To Compete For Army Network Upgrade: CS 21

    28 août 2019 | Information, Terrestre

    Uncle Sam Wants YOU To Compete For Army Network Upgrade: CS 21

    By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. TECHNET AUGUSTA: No incumbent contractor should feel safe, and all comers should consider taking a shot, Army network modernization officials told me here. Even for its upgrade coming in the next few months– Capability Set 2021, aimed at infantry brigades — the service is still thrashing out which technologies to include, let alone who gets paid to build them. Subsequent biennial upgrades — Capability Set 23, CS 25, CS 27, and beyond — are even more in flux, by design, to leave room to add the latest tech. In fact, even an upgrade already being fielded to specialized communications units, the Expeditionary Signal Battalion – Enhanced (ESB-E) kit, is open to change. On the flipside, if the Army decides your product isn't ready for the upcoming upgrade cycle, or it just doesn't fit the available budget, you should still aim for the next upgrade, or the one after that. And you should take that shot ASAP, because the early work on those later upgrades has already begun. Gone are the days of a stately, deliberate, laborious acquisition process in which the Army would plan out the future in detail before going to industry. “We'd almost always guess wrong,” said Maj. Gen. David Bassett, the Program Executive Officer for Command , Control, & Communications – Tactical (PEO C3T). “Eventually we'd deliver yesterday's technology tomorrow.” That said, Bassett doesn't want to overcorrect by delivering tomorrow's technology today, before it's ready for the harsh conditions and high demands of erecting a wide-area wireless network in a war zone. “I know y'all won't believe this, but some of the things that vendors show me as mature, it turns out they're not,” Bassett snarked at the TechNet Augusta conference last week. “What we're not doing is holding up a Capability Set for any given technology. If it's ready, bring it to us. ... If it's not ready yet, look to a future Capability Set.” For any given product, he said, “we need you to help us understand ... whether you see that as something that's part of the network of '23, part of the network of '25, or whether it's something we really ought to be trying to add in to the network of '21 at the last minute.” Bassett has held industry “outreach sessions” recently in Nashville and Baltimore, with another this November in Austin. These are forums for the Army to solicit white paper proposals to solve specific problems and then award small demonstration contracts using Other Transaction Authority (OTA). Larger-scale procurement for Capability Set 21 should start in April, Bassett said. “The contracts, the logistics, the testing,” he said, “we're in the midst of that right now, so we can buy the network in '20, we can integrate and test it next summer, and we can deliver to brigades in '21.” Competition, Accelerated To test new network concepts and designs as fast as possible, the Army is using a lot of “stand-in” technology — that is, whatever is available, from existing contracts or inventory, that works well enough to run the test. But those stand-ins aren't necessarily, or even probably, the final products the Army plans to use, and their manufacturers don't have any incumbent advantage over other contenders. “Believe us when we say that we're not vendor locked and that we're going to open this up for a competitive environment in FY 20, after we decide what the final network architecture needs to be,” said Col. Garth Winterle, who works for Bassett as project manager for tactical radios. So the Army has two main messages for industry about Capability Set 2021, Winterle told me. “Be prepared for competitive procurement in FY 20,” he said, “[and] be open to providing information, including some stuff they may not share typically, like potential price points.” It's not just stand-in systems that are subject to competition and change, Winterle continued. It's also formal Programs Of Record with incumbent vendors, established contracts, and painstakingly negotiated budget lines. Even today, “all of my radio contracts are multi-vendor,” Winterle told me. That means one vendor on the contract may win the first lot of radios, but a different vendor may win the second — or the Army may bring in a new vendor that wasn't even in the initial award, all without having to redo the POR. “All Programs of Record are being compared to potential commercial systems as part of the experimentation, so if elements of [the existing] WIN-T architecture come up against new commercial that are more affordable or more affective...they have to participate in a run off,” Winterle said. “Gen. Bassett's been clear: There're no sacred cows.” Yes, large chunks of the current Warfighter Information Network – Tactical will remain in Army service for years to come, despite former Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley calling WIN-T inadequate for highly mobile high-tech war and truncating the program back in 2017. For all the Army's urgency about advancing, the service is just huge, so on any plausible budget it will take a decade to overhaul everything. The Army's target date for total modernization is 2028. But key pieces of WIN-T will be replaced much sooner, and some select units will be rid of it entirely in the near term. First up is the 50th Expeditionary Signal Battalion at Fort Bragg, which deploys teams worldwide to keep frontline units connected. The 50th ESB started turning in all its WIN-T kit this past October. Not only are all three companies within the battalion now using a new kit called ESB-Enhanced: Each company got a different version of the new equipment, which it field-tested, modified, and tested again. A council of generals approved proposed changes “at least every month,” said Col. Mark Parker, until recently the Army's capability manager for networks & services. Now, after about a dozen revisions in less than 12 months, the Army has a radically new ESB-E. That means not just new kit, but new personnel, training, organization — even a reorganized motor pool. The streamlined formation needs 18 percent fewer soldiers and half as many vehicles. It can deploy on commercial aircraft instead of heavy-duty Air Force transport — the basic network kit actually fits in the overhead bin — but it can provide communications to 60 percent more command posts. (48, up from 30). The final ESB-E design is due before the new Army Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville, in October — a year after the first new kit was fielded — so he can decide whether to reorganize the other Expeditionary Signal Battalions across the Army on the new model. “Not all ESB-Es are going to look alike,” however, Parker told the conference. A battalion supporting the 18th Airborne Corps (as the 50th ESB-E does at Fort Bragg) might need parachute-qualified communications techs, while one supporting fast-moving armored divisions might need different ground vehicles to keep up. The Army also keeps hoping to add new technology to each ESB-E as it becomes available, Bassett told the conference. To 2028 & Beyond The way Army upgraded the Expeditionary Signal Battalion – Enhanced is preview of what it hopes to do across the force, Bassett said. That means streamlining or bypassing the traditional requirements process, and using existing contracts and authorities to get new tech to the troops fast — and then get their feedback to make it better in the next round. “We're a little late” with Capability Set 21, Bassett said frankly, because Congress didn't approve an Army request to reprogram already-appropriated funds to speed field-testing. But the Army was able to put the entire brigade architecture together in the laboratory — using stand-ins for the final product — and test it “end to end,” Winterle told me. That means sending realistic loads of both voice and data, based on real-world mission requirements, from tactical radios to satellite communications to US-based server farms. The next big step is to take the hardware into the field, with a full brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to be field tested next year. While Bassett and his procurement professionals focus on Capability Set 21, the Army-wide Cross Functional Team for network modernization is already working on CS 23. While '21 is optimized for infantry units, '23 will take on medium-weight brigades of 8×8 armored Strykers and heavy brigades of M1 tanks and M2 Bradleys. These vehicles can carry a lot more hardware than infantry on foot, so they can field more powerful transmitters and larger antennas. But they'll really need that added power, because they can cover much more ground in a day and need to transmit signals over longer distances, without revealing their location to eavesdropping enemy electronic warfare units. By Capability Set '25, if not before, “we should be able to have constant communications where you can come up or drop off as required, depending on threat,” said the CFT's unified network lead, Col. Curtis Nowak. This ability to connect, get essential data, and then go dark to avoid detection is central to the Army's emerging concept of high-tech warfare, what's called Multi-Domain Operations. The Army's goal is to modernize the entire force to wage multi-domain operations by 2028. That's why the Army has already scheduled successive network upgrades in '21, '23, '25, and '27. But that's not the end, officials have made clear. “The reality is there will be a Capability Set '29,” Nowak told me. “We're no longer going to have a finish line.” https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/uncle-sam-wants-you-to-compete-for-army-network-upgrade-cs-21/

  • The real obstacle for reforming military spending isn’t in the defence ministry. It’s the Treasury Board

    14 novembre 2019 | Information, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    The real obstacle for reforming military spending isn’t in the defence ministry. It’s the Treasury Board

    KEN HANSEN Ken Hansen is an independent defence and security analyst and owner of Hansen Maritime Horizons. Retired from the Royal Canadian Navy in 2009 in the rank of commander, he is also a contributor to the security affairs committee for the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia. For people inside the Department of National Defence, a minority Parliament – coupled with election promises for increased social spending and tax cuts – represents an uneasy calculus. Defence spending is always on the chopping block because it represents the largest pool of discretionary spending in the federal budget, and every party spent the recent federal election campaign being vague about military policy – offering some kind of oversight-body reform or scrutiny over the billions of dollars that have been earmarked, even as they lent their support to ensuring the military has the equipment it needs. In particular, the single largest program in Canadian defence history – the Canadian Combat Ship plan for 15 warships – will be a tantalizing target for politicians looking to get rid of perceived fat. Such cuts to shipbuilding programs have even already become normalized: The order for Halifax-class frigates were trimmed to 12 from 18 in 1983 and the Iroquois-class destroyers to four from six in 1964, to name just two. The political leaders weren't wrong when they said the military procurement system is broken. But regardless of which party had won this past election, and no matter what tweaks at the edges that the Liberal minority government and its potential supporters pursue, the reality is that the core issue remains unaddressed: Treasury Board's bulk approach to purchasing the country's military kit. Treasury Board policy states that bulk buys are how military procurement should be done, to ensure the lowest per-unit cost. But this forces tough decisions about what to buy, since the larger the order, the longer it will take to produce them all – not to mention the problems involved with trying to predict the future of warfare. Information systems become outdated in five years; weapons and sensors in 10. With a planned operating life of 25 years, any ships ordered today will be out-of-date by the time the first are delivered, and fully obsolete by the time the last one arrives. Block purchasing leads to block obsolescence. Traditionally, when technological change threatens to render military systems obsolete, the best way to hedge was to order in batches of the smallest number acceptable. In the years before the world wars, for instance, countries working to build competent naval forces put less emphasis on fleet numbers and more on technology and industrial capacity until the last moments before conflict. Technological competence was as important as numbers for fleet commanders. Another outcome of bulk buys is that the volume means that they happen only every two to three decades (or longer, in the worst cases). With such lengthy dry spells between purchases, it is impossible to retain corporate knowledge in either the defence or civilian branches of government. More frequent purchasing keeps the process alive in both practice and concept, with lessons learned that can be implemented by the same people who made the mistakes in the first place. Such irregularly timed purchases have created desperation among defence planners whose vision of the future consists of short golden days of competence and pride, followed by long years of rust-out and irrelevance. Unwittingly, the dark decades were in large part of the military's own making because of its desperate desire to acquire the absolute best model available – a practice known as “gold-plating” – instead of working steadily to build capacity and skill that would address long-range fleet needs. This is a collision of interests. The Treasury Board looks only at capital-acquisition decisions from the perspective of the buyer. It's left to the military to worry about how long they may have to operate obsolescent or obsolete equipment and systems, and to do the necessary mid-life upgrading, which is partly why costs balloon spectacularly. Life-cycle cost data is actually far more important that the initial sticker shock of the newest and shiniest model advocated by the military's leadership. The mindset needs to change. Politicians who implement bureaucratic change will probably see some improvements in decision-making. But the biggest obstacle to defence procurement is that bulk purchasing is our lone approach, and that it happens only every few decades. Regular, planned capital acquisition is the best path forward, but all paths to the future must first run through the Treasury Board. No amount of political policy adjustment can change that. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-real-obstacle-for-reforming-military-spending-isnt-in-the-defence/

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