19 juin 2024 | International, Terrestre, C4ISR
Chinese military’s rifle-toting robot dogs raise concerns in Congress
Lawmakers want U.S. military officials to examine the threat posed by new Chinese robot dogs armed with rifles.
10 décembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial
Despite progress, industry faces ‘very tough roadmap’ to field FCAS by 2040
By: Vivienne Machi
STUTTGART, Germany — After the decade that has been the year 2020, it may seem like 2040 is centuries away. But for Airbus, the scheduled in-service date for Europe's next-generation combat aircraft and weapon system feels just around the corner.
The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) industry partners have made significant progress on the pan-European, multi-system effort despite the hurdles of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Airbus, along with its co-contractors Dassault Aviation and Indra, face a “very tough roadmap” to finalize system designs, begin preliminary development, launch production, and get the systems into service, said Bruno Fichefeux, FCAS leader for Airbus, during the company's annual trade media briefing Dec. 9.
The 18-month Joint Concept Study and Phase 1A of the demonstrator portion are progressing well, but the companies need to move quickly to reach key technology maturation phases, he said. “This is a major de-risking and speeding approach towards the future development program, to ensure that we are on time on expectation.”
France, Germany and Spain have teamed up on the FCAS program, which includes seven next-generation technology pillars: a sixth-generation fighter jet, multiple “remote carrier” drones, a next-generation weapon system, a brand new jet engine, advanced sensors and stealth technologies, and an “air combat cloud.”
In September, the nations' three air forces worked together to down-select the five preferred architectures that will help inform the program's follow-on phases, Fichefeux said at the virtual briefing.
The goal for 2021 is for FCAS to enter the preliminary demonstrator development phase for the next-generation fighter and the remote carrier aircraft. Those contracts are currently in negotiations, he noted. Starting in 2021, the FCAS will go from spending a “few million” euros to “billions,” he added. “It's a massive step forward [that] we want to initiate next year.”
Observers can expect to see some major design choices after those negotiations are complete; for example, whether the next-generation fighter will have one or two seats, Fichefeux said.
Airbus' unmanned aerial systems team has moved forward with efforts related to the remote carrier and manned-unmanned teaming technologies. Jana Rosenmann, the company's UAS leader, said at the briefing that her team had submitted their proposal for Phase 1B of the FCAS demonstrator portion that is scheduled to begin next year.
The team is studying two remote carrier designs. “We are looking at both a smaller, expendable remote carrier, as well as a larger, conventional-sized remote carrier, looking in the direction of a loyal wingman to fly together with the combat aircraft,” Rosenmann said. Airbus is the lead contractor for the remote carrier pillar.
The program has some new partners on board, Fichefeux shared Wednesday. In April, Airbus teamed up with the German Ministry of Defence for an eight-month pilot program bringing non-traditional startups and research institutes into the FCAS fold.
Eighteen organizations worked on 14 separate program elements, spanning the entire range of technology pillars. Those efforts have led to concrete results, to include a first flight-test-approved launcher of an unmanned aerial system from a transport aircraft; a secure combat cloud demonstrator; and a demonstrator of applied artificial intelligence on radio frequency analysis.
These 18 partners could be picked up for subcontracts later on in the program, Fichefeux noted.
The plan is to “mature these pilots step by step, and then it could develop into real contracting participation within the FCAS development,” he said. “There is a perspective to bring them on board at a later stage.”
Meanwhile, Airbus also announced Wednesday that its Spanish subsidiary was selected as lead contractor for the low-observability pillar of the program. Airbus Spain will also lead Madrid's contribution to the next-generation fighter pillar. Indra serves as national lead for the entire program since Spain joined FCAS in early 2020, and also heads the sensor pillar while contributing to the combat cloud and simulations efforts.
The finalization of the low-observability contract “completes Spain's onboarding as an equal nation across all FCAS activities,” Airbus said in a release. “The signature closes a ten-month process of onboarding Spain as the third nation.”
The program will begin testing low-observability technologies early in the demonstrator phase, Fichefeux confirmed. Both the fighter aircraft demonstrator and the remote carrier will have stealth capabilities when they begin flight tests, which are expected as early as 2026. Then the team will need to work on issues such as how to factor in the future engine's heat signature, and how to integrate sensors and antennae, Fichefeux said. Low-observability “is part of almost all pillars, and the aim of this maturation is to prove” what works and what won't work, he noted.
Along with a personal deadline, the FCAS program may also face schedule pressure from Europe's second sixth-generation fighter program. The United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden have teamed up on the Tempest program, with a current goal of delivering new fighter aircraft to the nations' militaries by 2035.
When asked whether the two fighter programs may converge at some point, Fichefeux noted that that would ultimately be a government decision.
“That is our responsibility, on the industry side, is just not to lose time waiting,” he said. “If the governments want to define a path of convergence, we will support it in due time.”
Sur le même sujet
-
-
25 septembre 2024 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité
Cybersecurity Researchers Warn of New Rust-Based Splinter Post-Exploitation Tool
Unit 42 reveals the discovery of Splinter, a new Rust-based post-exploitation tool posing cybersecurity risks.
-
14 avril 2020 | International, Naval
US Navy should turn to unmanned systems to track and destroy submarines
By: Bryan Clark Anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, is one of a navy's most difficult missions. Sonars detect submarines with only a fraction of the range and precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above the water. Submarines can carry missiles able to hit targets hundreds of miles away, requiring searches to cover potentially vast areas. And the torpedoes that aircraft and surface ships use to sink submarines need to be dropped right on the submarine to have any chance of sinking it. These challenges led the Cold War-era U.S. Navy to rely on a sequential approach for tracking enemy submarines. Electronic or visual intelligence sources would report when an opposing sub was leaving port, and it would hopefully get picked up by sound surveillance, or SOSUS — sonar arrays on the sea floor — as it entered chokepoints, like that between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Patrol aircraft would then attempt to track the submarine using sonar-equipped buoys, or sonobuoys, and eventually turn it over to a U.S. nuclear attack submarine, or SSN, for long-term trail. The U.S. ASW model broke down, however, in the decades following the Cold War as U.S. submarine and patrol aircraft fleets shrank, the Chinese submarine fleet grew, and Russian submarines became quieter. Today, the U.S. Navy devotes enormous effort to tracking each modern Russian submarine in the western Atlantic. During the 2000s, the strategy of full-spectrum ASW started an essential shift in goals, from being able to sink submarines when needed to being able to defeat submarines by preventing them from accomplishing their mission. Full-spectrum ASW and other current concepts, however, still rely on aircraft, ships and submarines for sensing, tracking and attacking enemy submarines to bottle them up near their own coasts or sink them in the open ocean. Although SOSUS has improved since the Cold War and is joined by a family of new deployable seabed arrays, the next link in the U.S. ASW chain is still a P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, or a U.S. SSN. These platforms are in short supply around the world, cost hundreds of millions to billions of dollars to buy and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars a day to operate. With defense budgets flattening and likely to decrease in a post-COVID-19 environment, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to continue playing “little kid soccer” in ASW, with multiple aircraft or ships converging to track and destroy submarines before they can get within missile range of targets like aircraft carriers or bases ashore. The Navy should instead increase the use of unmanned systems in ASW across the board, which cost a fraction to buy and operate compared to their manned counterparts. Unmanned aircraft could deploy sonobuoys or stationary sonar arrays, and unmanned undersea or surface vehicles could tow passive sonar arrays. Unmanned surface vehicles could also deploy low-frequency active sonars like those carried by U.S. undersea surveillance ships that can detect or drive off submarines from dozens of miles away. Although autonomous platforms will not have the onboard operators of a destroyer or patrol aircraft, improved processing is enabling small autonomous sensors to rapidly identify contacts of interest. Line-of-sight or satellite communications can connect unmanned vehicles and sensors with operators ashore or on manned ASW platforms. A significant shortfall of today's ASW concepts is “closing the kill chain” by attacking enemy submarines. Air- or surface-launched weapons have short ranges and small warheads that reduce their ability to sink a submarine, but their cost and size prevents them from being purchased and fielded in large numbers. Unmanned systems could address this shortfall in concert with a new approach to ASW that suppresses enemy submarines rather than destroying them. During World War II and the Cold War, allied navies largely kept submarines at bay through aggressive tracking and harassing attacks, or by forcing opposing SSNs to protect ballistic missile submarines. The modern version of submarine suppression would include overt sensing operations combined with frequent torpedo or depth-bomb attacks. Although unmanned vehicles frequently launch lethal weapons today under human supervision, the small weapons that would be most useful for submarine suppression could be carried in operationally relevant numbers by medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs or medium unmanned surface vessels. Moreover, the large number and long endurance of unmanned vehicles would enable the tracking and suppressing of many submarines over a wide area at lower risk than using patrol aircraft or destroyers. Today the U.S. Navy uses unmanned systems in ASW primarily to detect submarines. To affordably conduct peacetime surveillance and effectively defeat submarines in wartime, the Navy should increase the role of unmanned systems. Using manned platforms to conduct command and control, and unmanned vehicles to track, deter and engage submarines, could significantly reduce the costs of ASW operations and enable the Navy to scale its ASW efforts to match the growing threat posed by submarine fleets. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is an expert in naval operations, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, military competitions and war gaming. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/13/us-navy-should-turn-to-unmanned-systems-to-track-and-destroy-submarines/