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  17 décembre 2018 | Local, Naval

  ‘Near total power failure’: Questions about propulsion system on new Canadian warship

  David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen The Defence department has acknowledged the government's choice for a $60-billion warship program has a propulsion system that has been plagued by problems, at times shutting down entirely while at sea. But the department says it is confident the Type 26 ship, designed by the British firm BAE, meets all the requirements necessary for the Royal Canadian Navy's future fleet. The acknowledgement of the problems is contained in a Department of National Defence fact sheet that outlines potential issues with the selection of Lockheed Martin Canada, with its bid of the BAE Type 26 vessel, as the “preferred bidder” for the Canadian Surface Combatant program. That $60-billion CSC program, the largest single government purchase in Canadian history, will see the construction of 15 warships at Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax. Among the issues addressed by the DND was an outline of some potential problems with the Type 26 warship. “The British Navy has had serious issues with the propulsion system in their BAE Type 45s, both in the generator — which has caused near-total power failures — and the engines themselves,” the DND document noted. “Given it uses the same propulsion system, will this affect the CSC too?” But in the document, the DND also expressed confidence in the Type 26, adding that a design that didn't meet all the requirements would not have been considered. Until negotiations with the preferred bidder are completed, the DND can't discuss specific elements of the warship design, the department's response pointed out. Over the years, the BAE Type 45 destroyers have been plagued by problems, with the propulsion system conking out during operations and exercises. In March the British government awarded a contract to BAE worth more than $200 million to fix the problems, with the first ship to be overhauled by 2021. But a representative of the Lockheed Martin Canada-BAE team noted in an email to Postmedia that the propulsion system for the Type 26 “is fundamentally different to the Type 45 propulsion system.” “The T26 design therefore offers more propulsion options, both mechanical and electrical, and is underpinned by a greater number of propulsion engines, providing greater redundancy,” the email noted. “We are confident that the Type 26 design is the right solution for the Royal Canadian Navy and meets the requirements for the Canadian Surface Combatant.” Officials with the consortium expressed surprise at the suggestion the Type 45 issues could be linked to the Type 26 design. Negotiations with Lockheed Martin Canada on the surface combatant program have already hit a roadblock after the Canadian International Trade Tribunal ordered the Canadian government on Nov. 27 to postpone the awarding of a contract while it investigates claims the Type 26 doesn't meet the military's needs. That came after Alion, one of the firms that submitted a bid on the CSC project, filed a complaint with the trade tribunal. Alion, a U.S. firm, has also filed a legal challenge in federal court, asking for a judicial review of the decision by Irving and the Canadian government to select Lockheed Martin and the BAE design. Alion argues the Type 26 cannot meet the stated mandatory requirements, including speed, that Canada set out for the new warship and because of that should be disqualified. Alion had offered Canada the Dutch De Zeven Provinciën Air Defence and Command frigate, which the firm says meets all of Canada's requirements. The entry of the BAE Type 26 warship in the competition was controversial. Previously the Liberal government had said only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted, on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges as problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating. But that criteria was changed and the government and Irving accepted the BAE design, though at the time it existed only on the drawing board. Construction began on the first Type 26 frigate in the summer of 2017 for Britain's Royal Navy, but it has not yet been completed. Company claims about what the Type 26 ship can do, including how fast it can go, are based on simulations or projections. The two other bidders in the Canadian program have ships actually in service with other navies so their capabilities are known. dpugliese@postmedia.com Twitter.com/davidpugliese https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/questions-raised-about-propulsion-system-on-new-canadian-warship-amid-fears-engines-could-conk-out

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  17 février 2021 | Local, Naval

  DND unable to say exactly when delays in $70-billion warship program began

  David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen, Postmedia News (dpugliese@ottawacitizen.com) Published: a day ago Updated: a day ago National defence says it doesn't know when it determined that a $70-billion project to buy new warships had fallen five years behind schedule, adding billions of dollars to the cost. That lack of knowledge about a massive mega-project is unprecedented, according to the department's former top procurement official, and is further proof the Canadian Surface Combatant project has gone off the rails. The Department of National Defence revealed Feb. 1 that the delivery of the first surface combatant ship would be delayed until 2030 or 2031. The first ship was to have been delivered in 2025, according to DND documents. The five-year delay will cost taxpayers billions of dollars, but the specific amount has yet to be determined. DND now acknowledges that while there were indications in early 2020 the project schedule was slipping, it doesn't actually know when it was determined the Canadian Surface Combatant program was facing significant delays. “There was no specific month/year,” DND spokesperson Jessica Lamirande wrote in an email to this newspaper. “It was an evolving schedule that continued to shift.” But Alan Williams, the former assistant deputy minister in charge of procurement at DND, said that lack of insight by DND staff is dangerous. On major equipment procurements, every step should be documented, as bureaucrats could be called on to justify future spending decisions and overall management of a project, he said. “It's totally absurd they can't even say when they first determined this project would be delayed by five years,” said Williams. “Is that not the definition of a total loss of accountability and control?” The Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project would see the construction of 15 warships for the Royal Canadian Navy at Irving Shipbuilding on the east coast. The vessels will replace the current Halifax-class frigate fleet. However, the project has already faced delays and significant increases in cost, as the price tag climbed from an original $14-billion estimate to $26 billion and then to $70 billion. The parliamentary budget officer is working on a new report on the CSC cost, to be finished by the end of February. Each year of delay could cost taxpayers more than $2 billion, the PBO warned previously. Although the DND has a new delivery date for the initial ship in the fleet, that doesn't mean that the vessel will be ready for operations at that time. “We expect delivery of the first ship in 2030/2031, followed by an extensive sea trials period that will include weapons certification and the corresponding training of RCN sailors, leading to final acceptance,” Lamirande said. No dates, however, were provided on when that final acceptance of the first ship would happen. Troy Crosby, the assistant deputy minister of materiel at the DND, denied the CSC project is in trouble. “I wouldn't call it trouble,” he said in an interview with this newspaper in November. “Is it hard? Is it challenging work? Absolutely. But I wouldn't say we're in trouble.” Other defence analysts are arguing the CSC program is salvageable with better governance and oversight. But Williams said the CSC is like a train rolling down a hill without brakes. “You're heading for disaster and people are talking about improving governance,” he said. “That won't save this project.” Canada has yet to sign a contract to build the Type 26 ship proposed by the consortium of Lockheed Martin and BAE for the CSC. So far, taxpayers have spent $739 million preparing for the eventual construction, according to figures tabled with parliament. Australia and the United Kingdom also plan to purchase the Type 26. But the first ship, destined for the U.K., has yet to be completed. The Canadian government originally said it would only accept a winning bid based on a mature existing ship design or a ship already in service with other navies. That would eliminate technical risk, as the design would be a known and tested commodity. The Type 26 carries extra risk as its design has not yet been proven. Williams said Canada could build an initial three Type 26 ships and then purchase other warships based on a proven design at a much reduced cost. Copyright Postmedia Network Inc., 2021 https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/canada/dnd-unable-to-say-exactly-when-delays-in-70-billion-warship-program-began-552869/

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  20 février 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  New defence procurement agency would be disruptive, costly

  It almost seemed like a throwaway line at the end of the Liberal Party's 2019 election platform, in a section on proposed approaches to security: “To ensure that Canada's biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency to Parliament, we will move forward with the creation of Defence Procurement Canada.” Little was said about the proposal during the election campaign, but in the mandate letters to ministers that followed, National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement (PSPC), and Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard were tasked with bringing forward options to establish Defence Procurement Canada (DPC), a priority, the Prime Minister wrote, “to be developed concurrently with ongoing procurement projects and existing timelines.” Whether DPC would be a department, standalone agency or new entity within an existing department isn't clear. Nor is it apparent how the government would consolidate and streamline the myriad procurement functions of multiple departments. Jody Thomas, deputy minister of National Defence, acknowledged as much during an address to the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) Jan. 29 when asked about DPC progress. “I don't know what it is going to look like ... We're building a governance to look at what the options could be and we are studying what other countries have done,” she said, noting that a standalone agency outside the department of defence has not necessarily worked particularly well in other countries. “Everything is on the table. We're looking at it, but we haven't actually begun the work in earnest.” The idea of moving defence procurement under a single point of accountability is hardly new. Alan Williams, a former assistant deputy minister of Material (Adm Mat), made the case for a single agency in a 2006 book, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement. And the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI) issued a report in 2009 calling for a “separate defence procurement agency reporting through a single Minister ... [to] consolidate procurement, industrial, contracting and trade mandates into one new department, like a Defence Production Department, reporting to a minister.” More recently, an interim report on defence procurement by the Senate Committee on National Defence in June 2019 argued that “a single agency could simplify the complex procurement governance framework. Serious consideration could also be given to empowering project officials and making the Department of National Defence the lead department.” Williams remains a strong proponent. In a presentation to a CGAI conference on defence procurement in the new Parliament in late November, he greeted the DPC decision with a “hallelujah,” pointing to the high cost created by overlap and duplication when multiple ministers are involved in a military acquisition decision, and the tendency to play the “blame game” when delays or problems arise and there is no single point of accountability. But he cautioned that the initiative would falter without better system-wide performance measures on cost, schedules and other metrics. “If you don't monitor and put public pressure on the system, things will [slide],” he said. Williams also called for a defence industrial plan, backed by Cabinet approval, to help identify where to invest defence capital, and “a culture that recognizes and demands innovative creativity, taking chances.” Other former senior civil servants, many with decades of experience in public sector organizational reform, were less optimistic about the prospects of a new agency or departmental corporation. “There is always a good reason why things are the way they are,” said Jim Mitchell, a research associate with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and part of massive reorganization of government departments undertaken by Prime Minister Kim Campbell during her brief tenure in 1993. “If you want to change things, you first have to understand, why do we have the current situation that we have in defence procurement and who are the people who have a major stake in the status quo and why? If you don't understand that, you are going to get into big trouble,” he warned the CGAI audience of government and industry leaders. At a time when the departments are moving a record number of equipment projects, including CF-188 Hornet replacement, through the acquisition process under the government's 2017 defence policy, any restructuring could significantly delay progress. “Organizational change is always disruptive, it's costly, it's difficult, it's hard on people, it hurts efficiency and effectiveness of organizations for a couple of years at minimum,” said Mitchell. “It is something you do very, very carefully.” It's a point not lost on CADSI. “The sheer scale of the change required to make DPC real should give companies pause. It could involve some 4,000-6,000 government employees from at least three departments and multiple pieces of legislation, all while the government is in the middle of the most aggressive defence spending spree in a generation,” the association wrote in an email to members in December. A vocal proponent of improving procurement, it called DPC “a leap of faith,” suggesting it might be “a gamble that years of disruption will be worth it and that the outcomes of a new system will produce measurably better results, including for industry.” Gavin Liddy, a former assistant deputy minister with PSPC, questioned the reasoning for change when measures from earlier procurement reform efforts such as increased DND contracting authority up to $5 million are still taking effect. “You really need an extraordinarily compelling reason to make any kind of organizational change. And every time we have attempted it ... it takes five to seven years before the organization is up and standing on its feet,” he told CGAI. “If you want to do one single thing to delay the defence procurement agenda...create a defence procurement agency. Nothing would divert attention more than doing that.” While few questioned the need for enhancements to the defence procurement process, many of the CGAI participants raised doubts about the logic of introducing a new entity less than three years into the government's 20-year strategy. Thomas described a number of improvements to project management and governance that are already making a difference. “The budgeting and project management in defence is really extraordinarily well done. If I am told by ADM Mat they are going to spend $5.2 billion, then that is what they spend. And we have the ability to bring more down, or less, depending on how projects are rolling,” she explained. “We are completely transparent about how we are getting money spent, what the milestones are on projects ... The program management board is functioning differently and pulling things forward instead of waiting until somebody is ready to push it forward.” “And we are working with PSPC. I think it is time to look at the government contracting [regulations], how much we compete, what we sole source, the reasons we sole source. I think there is a lot of work there that can be done that will improve the system even more.” https://www.skiesmag.com/news/new-defence-procurement-agency-would-be-disruptive-costly