1 octobre 2018 | International, Aérospatial

Airbus Helicopters mise sur la « reprise » des commandes militaires

BRUNO TREVIDIC

La demande militaire devrait permettre à Airbus Helicopters d'atteindre ses objectifs en 2018, estime le nouveau PDG, Bruno Even.

Arriver de l'extérieur pour prendre les commandes d'une entreprise sur un marché en crise n'est pas chose facile. Encore moins quand votre prédécesseur est susceptible de devenir votre patron. Tel est le défi relevé par Bruno Even, le nouveau patron d'Airbus Helicopters . Transfuge de Safran Engines, Bruno Even, 49 ans, a succédé il y a sept mois à Guillaume Faury, parti chez Airbus commercial aircraft. Sa mission ? Poursuivre la restructuration de l'ex-Eurocopter.

Le NH90 reprend des couleurs

« L'année 2018 est celle de la reprise des commandes militaires, se félicite Bruno Even. Ces derniers mois, nous avons sécurisé plusieurs opportunités, dont une commande de 28 NH90 pour le Qatar. Nous avons également reçu la confirmation d'une nouvelle commande de NH90 et de 50 hélicoptères légers Lakota pour l'armée américaine... En 2018, nous devrons avoir plus de commandes militaires que de livraisons ».

Marché civil stable

A l'inverse, le marché civil, sur lequel Airbus Helicopters a b'ti son succès, est toujours atone. « La remontée des cours du pétrole ne s'est pas traduite par une reprise des commandes, du fait des surcapacités accumulées. Environ 30 % de la flotte mondiale d'hélicoptères lourds dédiés au marché off-shore est au sol. La situation devrait perdurer un an ou deux », juge Bruno Even.

Plan de transformation

Pour faire face à cette situation, Airbus Helicopters a déjà dû en passer par deux plans de départs volontaires (800 postes au total). Surtout, l'hélicoptériste s'est engagé dans une vaste réorganisation industrielle , qui prévoit de spécialiser ses principaux sites de production en France, en Allemagne et en Espagne. Un chantier engagé il y a deux ans, mais qui est loin d'être achevé et que Bruno Even va devoir mener à bien s'il veut atteindre l'objectif de 10 % de marge d'ici cinq ans.

« Dans un marché difficile, l'optimisation des sites et des coûts reste une priorité, souligne-t-il. Nous avons engagé la spécialisation des sites avec le programme H160, nous allons la poursuivre avec les programmes plus anciens. Cela passera par des transferts de production entre les sites. Nous sommes en discussion avec les partenaires sur les moyens d'y parvenir d'ici trois à quatre ans ». Le processus ne doit rien modifier à la répartition de la charge de travail entre la France, l'Allemagne et l'Espagne, assure-t-il. Aucun plan social n'est envisagé, les départs naturels devant permettre de réduire les sureffectifs en douceur.

Les sous-traitants sollicités

La réduction des coûts passera également par un sacrifice des fournisseurs, ajoute le dirigeant. « 70 % de la valeur d'un hélicoptère provient de la chaîne de sous-traitants, il est normal que chacun fasse un effort, estime Bruno Even. Nous nous remettons en cause, nos fournisseurs pourraient eux aussi revoir leur organisation ».

Améliorer la satisfaction client

Autre priorité de Bruno Even : la satisfaction client, mise à mal par des taux de disponibilité jugés trop faible sur les hélicoptères militaires et le crash d'un H225 en Norvège sur les engins civils. « Nous travaillons à ce sujet depuis plusieurs années, mais nous ne sommes pas encore là où les clients nous attendent », reconnait-il. Airbus Helicopters entend améliorer de 15 % la disponibilité des Caracal de l'armée française dès 2018, et faire revoler les H225 cloués au sol par les compagnies pétrolières. Quitte à leur trouver de nouveaux usages ou de nouveaux clients, comme l'Ukraine.

Priorité au H160

En revanche, Bruno Even n'aura probablement pas de sitôt à gérer un nouveau programme , la gamme étant largement renouvelée. « La priorité, c'est de livrer le H160, dit-il. Nous sommes en phase avec le calendrier initial, avec une certification prévue pour fin 2019. Nous avons rentré les premières commandes, une dizaine, ce qui correspond à la trajectoire fixée. Nous avons également validé avec la DGA la première phase d'études de levée de risques, en prévision du lancement des versions militaires du H160, appelé à devenir l'hélicoptère multirôle de l'armée française. Le lancement du programme militaire devrait intervenir en 2023, pour des livraisons à partir de 2028 ».

Bruno Trévidic

https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/air-defense/0302322607770-airbus-helicopters-mise-sur-la-reprise-des-commandes-militaires-2209518.php

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