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DoD also looking for tens of billions in extra funding from the White House, public still waiting for specifics on where it will go. By PAUL MCLEARYon June 22, 2020 at 3:16 PM WASHINGTON: The Pentagon knows it needs “lower double digit billions” to cope with COVID-19 related costs, but remains vague about just how much money it is asking the White House to add to the $740 billion already requested for 2021. Defense officials disclosed weeks ago that a request was on its way, and it is now with the White House Office of Management and Budget waiting for approval. The money will be part of a large-scale effort to cover defense industry claims of supply chain and workforce reductions as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, and is covered explicitly by Section 3610 of the coronavirus relief package. Under that rule, contractors can ask the Pentagon and other federal agencies to cover things mandated by new government rules like personal protective equipment, cleaning, and staggering work shifts. Speaking with reporters at the Pentagon this morning, acquisition chief Ellen Lord said “sooner is better, I think, is the best way to put it,” when asked about when the funds will be available. Lord repeated the timeline she has been referring to for weeks, saying “we continue to assess a three-month slowdown to all programs due to COVID-19,” she said, “we have seen inefficiencies across most programs. COVID-19 is shutting down defense manufacturing facilities and production lines, disrupting supply chains and distressing the financial stability of the companies DoD relies on to protect the nation.” The vast majority of defense firms have operated at at least some reduced capacity over the past several months, and Lord said the Pentagon continues to see the biggest impacts in the aviation and ship building supply chains” In order to spur the system, the DoD has sped up planned payments to the defense industry, hitting the $2 billion mark in recent days, and each of the large prime contractors have “confirmed their detailed plans to work with their supply chains to accelerate payments to identify distressed companies, and small businesses.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/dod-seeks-billions-more-for-covid-related-delays

NAVY General Dynamics Electric Boat Corp., Groton, Connecticut, is awarded an $869,043,785 cost-plus-fixed-fee and cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-17-C-2117. This modification includes continued design completion, engineering work, affordability studies and design support efforts for the Columbia Class fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Work will be performed in Groton, Connecticut (41%); Quonset Point, Rhode Island (14%); and Newport News, Virginia (2%), with other efforts performed at various sites throughout the U.S. (43%). This modification also includes submarine industrial base development and expansion efforts as part of the integrated enterprise plan and multi program material procurement supporting Columbia SSBNs and the nuclear shipbuilding enterprise (Virginia class and Ford class). The contract modification also provides additional United Kingdom (U.K.) Strategic Weapon Support System kit manufacturing and effort to support expansion of the domestic missile tube industrial base. Specific effort includes design completion associated with the SSBN 827 technical variance documentation; non-recurring design effort for scope changes between the SSBN 826 and SSBN 827; design for affordability; lead ship component development lead yard support; follow ship lead yard support; and implementation of enhanced cyber security measures. Further, the action includes U.K. Strategic Weapon Support System kit manufacturing; expansion of the domestic missile tube industrial base; and submarine industrial base supplier development efforts. The submarine industrial base development and expansion efforts improve sub-tier vendor stability and gains economic efficiencies based on production economies for major components. The nuclear shipbuilding industrial base continues to ramp up production capability to support the increased demand associated with the Navy's Force Structure Assessment. Improved capacity at the sub-tier vendors reduces risk across nuclear shipbuilding programs. The contract modification includes a fully priced option for the construction of SSBN 826 and SSBN 827, associated design and engineering support. For SSBN 827, the modification covers advance procurement, advance construction and subsequent fiscal 2024 construction of SSBN 827. This option is required to support October 2020 construction start of the SSBN 826. If the option is exercised, the cumulative value of this contract will increase to $9,473,511,245. Work is expected to be complete by December 2031. The industrial base development work is for the furtherance of the fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 116-92) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020 (Public Law 116-93), which authorized and appropriated additional funds for submarine industrial base development and expansion to ensure second and third-tier contractors are able to meet increased production requirements. This is a joint U.S. and U.K. program; U.S. fiscal 2020 national sea-based deterrence funds in the amount of $31,903,052 will be obligated at the time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc., Poway, California, is awarded a $26,866,441 firm-fixed-price contract that procures two MQ-9A Reaper unmanned air systems (UAS); one dual control mobile ground control station; one modular data center; and one mobile ground control station for Group 5 UAS intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance services/persistent strike efforts. Work will be performed in Yuma, Arizona (40%); and various locations outside the continental U.S. (60%), and is expected to be complete by December 2020. Fiscal 2020 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds for $26,866,441 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-20-C-0031). (Awarded June 19, 2020) Alabama Shipyard LLC, Mobile, Alabama, is awarded a $23,752,381, firm-fixed-price contract for a 96-calendar day shipyard availability for the regular overhaul and dry docking of the USSN Ship Supply (T-AOE 6). Work will be performed in Mobile, Alabama, and is expected to be complete by November 2020. This contract includes one base period and 10 options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $26,361,776. Working capital funds (Navy) in the amount of $23,752,381 are obligated for fiscal 2020 and 2021, and will not expire at the end of the fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured with proposals solicited via the Government Point of Entry website, and one offer was received. The U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity (N32205). Pacific Maritime Industries,* San Diego, California (N00244-20-D-0005); Marine & Restaurant Fabricators,* San Diego, California (N00244-20-D-0006); and JPL Habitability,* National City, California (N00244-20-D-0007), are awarded an estimated $23,192,490 for multiple award, firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts to provide shipboard furniture supplies to renovate spaces onboard Navy ships. Work will be performed at all three contractor locations San Diego, California; and National City, California (collectively 70% as breakdown cannot be determined at this time); and Naval Base San Diego, San Diego, California (30%). Incidental services involve preparation of spaces and installation. Related tasks may include, but are not limited to, overheads, decks, bulkheads, furniture, rearrangements, new arrangements, fabrication of shipboard furniture and food service items, installation and removals, etc. The contract will include a one-year base period and two one-year option periods and the total value of this contract will have a ceiling price of $23,192,490, if exercised. The ordering period of the contract is expected to be complete by June 2021; if all options are exercised, the ordering period will be complete by June 2023. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy) funds in the amount of $52,500 will be obligated ($17,500 on each of the three contracts to fund the contracts' minimum amounts) and funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Delivery orders will be subsequently funded with appropriate fiscal year appropriations at the time of their issuance. This contract was competitively procured with the solicitation posted on beta.sam.gov as a total small business set-aside requirement with three offers received. The Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center San Diego, San Diego, California, is the contracting activity. The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri, is awarded a $12,522,521 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee order (N61340-20-F-0096) against previously issued basic ordering agreement N00019-16-G-0001. This order procures non-recurring engineering in support of establishing a functional configuration baseline in support of the production and delivery of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out (ADS-B Out) A-kits and B-kits for the T-45 Training System. Work will be performed in St. Louis, Missouri (97%); Mesa, Arizona (1%); and various locations within the continental U.S. (2%). This order provides for the procurement of B-kits, to include air data computers and A-kits, which consist of associated wiring, splitters and filters and spares. This order also provides kit integration, follow-on analysis and engineering in support of issues that may arise during kit production and installation. Work is expected to be complete by January 2023. Fiscal 2018 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $7,109,441; fiscal 2019 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $4,516,503; and fiscal 2020 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $1,387,476 will be obligated at time of award; $7,109,441 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, Orlando, Florida, is the contracting activity. (Awarded June 19, 2020) FGS LLC, LaPlata, Maryland, is awarded a $9,760,698 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract procures network video teleconference equipment for the integrated command control and intelligence divisions integration of specialized network video teleconference systems in support of the command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions of the Joint Staff and combatant commanders, Department of Defense agencies and services, and Department of Homeland Security operational and support components. Work will be performed in LaPlata, Maryland, and is expected to be complete by June 2022. No funds will be obligated at the time of award, but will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was competitively procured via an electronic request for proposal and two offers were received. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey, is the contracting activity (N68335-20-D-0029). Innovative Defense Technologies LLC,* Arlington, Virginia, is awarded a $9,738,679 cost-plus-fixed-fee order (N68335-20-F-0349) against previously issued basic ordering agreement N68335-19-G-0036. This order provides for continued research and development efforts under Small Business Innovation Research topic N171-012, titled “Transition of Mission Planning Software to a Next Generation Component Based, Open Architecture using Advanced Refactoring Technology;” topic N07-137, titled “Artifact Assessment Tool Suite Infrastructure;” and topic N171-049, titled “Cyber Resiliency via Virtualization for Combat System.” Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama (58%); Mt. Laurel, New Jersey (20%); Arlington, Virginia (20%); and Fall River, Massachusetts (2%). This order provides further research and development of the Next-Generation Open Architecture (NGOA) Mission Planning System. The NGOA Mission Planning System includes a combat management system architecture that enables rapid software changes and fleet fielding, and an artificial intelligence/machine learning based dynamic mission planning capability that spans fleet-level and individual platform-level planning. Work is expected to be complete by June 2021. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds for $9,403,719 will be obligated at time of award, all of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey, is the contracting activity. The Boeing Co., Seattle, Washington, is awarded a $9,000,000 modification (P00004) to firm-fixed-price order N00019-19-F-2963 against previously issued basic ordering agreement N00019-16-G-0001. This modification procures research and development support for airworthiness assessment activities associated with wing stores and configurations to be analyzed with the Wideband Satellite Communication radome for P-8A airworthiness certification and flight tests for the Navy and government of Australia. Work will be performed in Seattle, Washington (85%); and Patuxent River, Maryland (15%), and is expected to be complete by September 2021. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test, and evaluation (Navy) funds for $500,000; and foreign cooperative project funds for $3,000,000 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Bethpage, New York, is awarded an $8,902,824 cost-plus-fixed-fee and cost-only modification to previously awarded contract N00024-17-C-6311 for basic outfitting assembly (BOA) installation labor and BOA installation labor other direct costs to support the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Modules Program. Work will be performed in Port Hueneme, California (80%); and Bethpage, New York (20%). The LCS Mission Modules Program provides the fleet with sets of mission capabilities that are packaged as mission modules and combined into mission packages to maximize the affordability for the utility of LCS sea frames. Each mission module makes use of common support containers whose designs are based upon an International Organization for Standardization-compliant base shipping container. The “base” container is built to print with adjustable interior rails that can be reconfigured for a variety of applications. Work is expected to be complete by June 2021. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $199,400 will be obligated at time of award. Funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY Lincoln Public School, Lincoln, Massachusetts, is being awarded an $85,722,108 firm-fixed-price contract for comprehensive educational program services for Pre-K-grade 12 and special education services. The place of performance will be at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. The period of performance is one 12-month base period and four 12-month option years. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funding in the amount of $15,909,600 will be obligated on this award. This contract was awarded as full and open competition in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 (contracting by negotiation). The Department of Defense Education Activity, Alexandria, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HE1254-20-C-0005). Caesar Rodney School District, Camden-Wyoming, Delaware, is being awarded a $54,322,239 firm-fixed-price contract for comprehensive educational program services for K-grade 12 and special education services. The place of performance will be at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. The period of performance is one 12-month base period and four 12-month option years. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funding in the amount of $9,844,731 will be obligated on this award. This contract was awarded as full and open competition in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15 (contracting by negotiation). The Department of Defense Education Activity, Alexandria, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HE1254-20-C-0003). ARMY VisionCorps, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, was awarded a $24,381,000 firm-fixed-price contract to procure Integrated Head Protection System Suspension systems. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 18, 2023. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W91CRB-20-D-0009). The University of Maine System, Orono, Maine, was awarded a $19,915,332 cost-no-fee contract for expeditionary maneuver support materials and structures. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Orono, Maine, with an estimated completion date of June 22, 2025. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation (Army) funds in the amount of $3,215,332 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W911QY-20-C-0053). Inovio Pharmaceuticals Inc.,* Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, was awarded a $16,570,397 firm-fixed-price contract for 900 CELLECTRA 2000 DNA vaccine injection devices. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2020. Fiscal 2020 defense emergency response funds in the amount of $16,570,397 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W911QY-20-C-0084). (Awarded June 19, 2020) Airborne Systems North America of California Inc., Santa Ana, California, was awarded a $13,231,241 firm-fixed-price contract for spare components for the RA-1 Parachute System. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 22, 2026. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, is the contracting activity (W56HZV-20-D-0076). Oshkosh Defense LLC, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, was awarded a $10,564,760 modification (P00097) to contract W56HZV-15-C-0095 for field service representatives to provide maintenance to Joint Light Tactical Vehicles during an exercise being conducted by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 31, 2023. Fiscal 2020 Foreign Military Sales (United Kingdom) funds in the amount of $10,564,760 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Winston-Salem Industries For The Blind Inc., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, was awarded an $8,127,000 firm-fixed-price contract to procure Integrated Head Protection System Suspension Systems. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of June 21, 2023. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W91CRB-20-D-0010). CORRECTION: A $7,985,880 contract modification announced on June 18, 2020, to DRS Sustainment Systems Inc., St. Louis, Missouri (W56HZV-16-C-0028), for seven Joint Assault Bridge Systems, incorrectly included an estimated completion date of May 11, 2024. The estimated completion date is actually Dec. 30, 2021. *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2228273/source/GovDelivery/

By: Martin Banks BRUSSELS — The new head of the European Defence Agency, Jiří Šedivý, has thrown down the gauntlet to European Union member states, telling them: “It is up to you to deliver.” In an interview with Defense News, he said the onus is on EU countries “to use the EDA to its full extent.” Šedivý has extensive experience in the defense domain, having served as defense minister and deputy defense minister of the Czech Republic, NATO assistant secretary general for defense policy and planning, and permanent representative of the Czech Republic to NATO. His term comes amid a fast-changing European defense landscape and new EU defense initiatives that are under increasing pressure to deliver results. How will the COVID-19 health crisis affect European defense spending in the near, mid and long term? Let's be realistic: We are still in the middle of the pandemic and, at this stage, nobody can foresee what its exact repercussions will be. But being realistic also means that we have to anticipate, already now, that national and European defense budgets might come under pressure as a result of the massive economic and financial costs of COVID-19, whether we like it or not. Here our answer should be straightforward: Rather than cutting national defense expenditure rashly, let's coordinate, pool and share our resources and invest more in collaborative capability development because a collective approach is much more cost-effective than national solo efforts. The same goes for defense research where national ministries of defense might face problems to receive the same funding than in the past to finance their individual national programs. The best response to shrinking national budgets for defense research is to join forces and resources and to engage in more cost-effective collaborations at EU level. We therefore should maintain our European defense ambitions, keep course and pursue the implementation of the new EU defense instruments — the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) — which are all in place, fit for purpose and ready to be used. The COVID-19 crisis could offer us an unexpected and unique opportunity to reinvigorate defense cooperation in Europe. The defense portion of the proposed EU budget has come under pressure. If the European Defence Fund is indeed curtailed, how do you expect EDA to adjust its objectives? It is too early to speculate about the Fund's future budget allocation as negotiations are still ongoing. Therefore, we have to wait and see. This being said, the EDF will be an essential part of the EU's defense-cooperation toolbox, together with CARD and PESCO. Therefore, it is crucial that the Fund receives the financial means it needs to play its role properly. I thus hope for adequate funding for this important collaborative tool because for the reasons I just explained, we need more defense cooperation in the future, not less. And the Fund will serve not only as an incentive to that end, but also as a point of leverage for economic recovery. In any case, EDA's activities are not directly linked or dependent of the Fund's budget as we are an intergovernmental agency entirely and directly funded by our member states, not through the EU budget. U.S. defense companies want to be allowed to compete for EDF money and PESCO participation. How do you believe it is possible to strengthen intra-EU defense cooperation without shutting out trans-Atlantic ties at the same time? Third-party participation in the EDF is among the topics currently discussed between member states, the Commission and the European Parliament as part of the legislative process on setting up of Fund. So the jury is still out on the outcome of these talks. EDA is not involved in that process and therefore I cannot comment. However, I want to recall a basic underlying principle of European defense cooperation, namely that the European Union is fully committed to working with the U.S. as a core partner in security and defense matters. The EU defense initiatives must be understood in this context: They are not directed against our trans-Atlantic partnership but aim to enhance Europe's contribution to our common trans-Atlantic security by sharing a greater part of the burden. PESCO and EDF will help enhance EU member states' investment in the joint development of defense capabilities and deepen cooperation to make more efficient use of defense spending in the EU. The resulting defense capabilities will not be owned by the EU but by its member states. Which means they will also be available to NATO, at least for those EU member states that are NATO allies. As a result, EU cooperation ultimately also strengthens NATO as well as our trans-Atlantic partners. What is in store for the dozens of PESCO projects currently underway? For example, do you expect new ones to join the roster at some point, or some to be canceled if they fail to deliver? As you know, PESCO is a member states driven initiative. It's therefore up to the 25 participating countries to decide whether they want to launch new collaborative projects in the future. If you ask me, I expect indeed more projects to be added in the future but not this year as it was decided to skip 2020 after three consecutive waves of new projects launched — 47 in total to date — since December 2017, when PESCO was established. Focusing on the project implementation and delivering tangible outputs is thus the priority now. Equally, it is up to the member states involved in a given project to decide about possible changes or adjustments to be made or, to answer your question, even to cancel a project that would fail to deliver. It's the member states who own the projects, so it is up to them to implement them in the way they want. This being said, EDA is available and keen to support them, if they wish, in the implementation. As the European hub for collaborative capability development, we have the expertise and experience needed to do that. We therefore encourage member states to make full use of the Agency and to seek our know-how and support for bringing their PESCO projects forward. And we see that they start to rely more and more on our help. The number of PESCO projects which have been or currently are supported by the agency has constantly increased and now stands at six; two of them (in the areas of CBRN surveillance and deployable underwater capabilities) as EDA projects. Judging from informal expressions of interest received, we have reasons to expect those numbers to further grow in the future. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/06/22/new-european-defence-agency-boss-warns-against-rash-budget-cuts-by-eu-members/

By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — As large chunks of the country begin to scale back restrictions caused by COVID-19, the companies of the defense industrial base have largely reopened for business, the Pentagon's top acquisition official said Monday. Speaking to reporters, Ellen Lord, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said that only 33 total companies in the industrial base, largely smaller services providers tracked by the Defense Logistics Agency, remain closed for business. “Out of 10,509 companies [the Defense Contract Management Agency] tracks: we are down to two closed, and 267 companies having closed and reopened,” Lord said in her remarks. “Out of 11,413 companies DLA tracks: 31 are closed with 661 having closed and reopened.” That is an improvement from April 30, when Lord said there were 93 defense-related companies tracked by DCMA closed, with 437 of the DLA tracked companies shut down at that time. “We see an enormous amount of recovery in the defense industrial base. It depends on location and what type of work is being performed, but there is enormous progress coming back,” she said. “Obviously, for manufacturing, we need people on the line. So, we're doing things differently in terms of following CDC guidelines and so forth. “We don't know what that new normal will be on speed, but we see an enormous amount of recovery.” Lord acknowledged that the efforts to stabilize the defense industrial base would be ongoing, noting officials “continue to see the greatest impacts both domestically and internationally in the aviation and shipbuilding supply chains.” She added that advanced progress payments to companies has hit over $2 billion, and that all of the prime contractors have “confirmed their detailed plans to work with their supply chains to accelerate payments to identify distressed companies, and small businesses.” The department is still tracking a roughly three-month period of delays that could have repercussions on major defense programs, Lord said, although she declined to give any specific examples. “We have seen inefficiencies across most programs,” Lord said. “DoD continues to partner with our industry partners to do everything possible to keep programs on schedule and to minimize the cost and schedule impacts. This is obviously a dynamic situation, and the overall impacts will not be completely known for a while as we work through how we operate over the next few months.” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/06/22/nearly-all-defense-companies-have-reopened-from-covid-19/

By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — The first of five new NATO surveillance drones began test flights over the Mediterranean Sea this month, nudging the alliance toward a new capability meant to relieve the demand for U.S. equipment. The flights took off from Sigonella air base in Sicily, Italy, the future headquarters of the Northrop Grumman-made Global Hawks of the Alliance Ground Surveillance program. The planes are owned by a collective of 15 NATO members. The alliance's supreme allied commander for Europe, a job currently filled by U.S. Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, has tasking authority over the new capability. The North Atlantic Council also gets a say in cases of missions outside of NATO territory. The first two drones arrived late last year. Officials expect the rest of the fleet to make the trip from the manufacturer's facilities in Palmdale, California, throughout the summer. Earlier this spring, travel restrictions spurred by the spread of the novel coronavirus had raised the possibility of a delay in getting the initial plane approved for its flight schedule. But the Italian government allowed a team of Northrop specialists into Italy in late May for acceptance testing, a key step in obtaining an airworthiness certificate for the drone. “COVID-related delays ended up only being a few weeks, but nothing that significant,” Camille Grand, NATO's assistant secretary general for defense investment, told Defense News in an interview, referring to the coronavirus disease. “We are now moving to a pattern of regular flight to enable the force to use the drone.” Officials have been tight-lipped about exactly where they intend to use the aircraft once they are fully operational. “You can imagine missions of looking into the situation on NATO's borders,” Grand said. “Both in the south, in the Middle East or the east. The drones enable you to collect intelligence beyond your airspace.” While the initial aircraft has already completed at least one nine-hour flight over the Mediterranean Sea, it remains to be seen if the the aircraft can get clearance from Italian regulators to fly over land, where air traffic is more crowded and a mishap could be catastrophic. The general idea is to use the Italian airworthiness approval to fly anywhere. “The beauty of the European airspace is that once your are certified in Italy, you can fly across the European airspace,” Grand said. He noted that the certification currently in effect is provisional, and that the scope of the process is “likely to expand over time.” For now, high-flying military surveillance drones traversing the continent must obtain permission from national airspace authorities for a restricted flight corridor to protect nearby civilian traffic. Such is the case, for example, when U.S. unmanned aircraft fly reconnaissance missions close to the Baltics. The Alliance Ground Surveillance program's ambition is to “lift any limitations,” Grand said. “It is a very interesting and fascinating challenge because it is the first time ever that we are incorporating those Global Hawks in what is usually a crowded airspace on a permanent basis.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/transatlantic-partnerships/2020/06/22/natos-new-surveillance-drone-begins-test-flights-over-the-mediterranean/

By: Andrew Chuter LONDON — Producing a promised new defense and security review was never going to be straightforward for the British government, but the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and the fast-evolving geostrategic position has muddied the waters even further, leaving open the question of future investment priorities. The integrated defense, security and foreign policy review ordered by Prime Minister Boris Johnson soon after he entered office last December was meant to provide answers to how Britain would make its way in the world post-Brexit. That exercise is partly, but not entirely, on ice as the government focuses its attention on trying to control COVID-19 without putting the economy back in the Stone Age. Completion of the review has been pushed back from this summer to sometime next year. Stephan Lovegrove, the Ministry of Defence's permanent secretary, told the parliamentary public accounts committee recently that some work on the review was ongoing, with early results expected to emerge this year. “There will potentially be something direction-setting later this year. Exactly how full that is, I do not know. Our view is that the fuller it can be, the better,” Lovegrove said. One MoD official, who asked not to be named, said one of the key items now being worked on was a look at the balance of economic priorities versus national security priorities. It's a key question, the answer to which will likely set the scene for decisions on defense investment priorities for years to come. Johnson's original claim that the review would be policy driven, not financially compelled, is no longer the case — if it ever was. Independent analyst John Louth says that post COVID-19, it's going to be all about the money. “Without doubt the pandemic has changed everything. It [the review] is going to be driven by affordability,” Louth said. Defense commentator Howard Wheeldon of Wheeldon Strategic Advisory said funding was going to be a big problem across the West. “Pressures on Western governments in relation to defense spending have probably never been greater. But while we are seeing a significant awareness of the need to invest in activities like cyber, space and ISTAR we cannot afford to ignore the ongoing need to invest in conventional weapons,” he said. “China is investing heavily in air and maritime, and Russia, despite economic pressures, is increasing spend on conventional weapons. Given that COVID-19 has impacted on virtually every nation we must expect that defense spending will be impacted in the medium term,” Wheeldon said. “For the UK we must anticipate cuts in legacy systems across all three services but I am of the view that the army will bear the brunt when it comes to capacity reduction,” he added. It's not just affordability that is the issue. The pandemic is focusing the minds of parliamentarians and others on issues like homeland resilience. The military here have been lauded for their efforts supporting the fight against COVID-19 but it could eventually come at a cost, according to Doug Barrie, a senior analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank in London. “The recognition for greater societal resilience, and the associated cost of this, as a result of the pandemic threatens to be a draw on the U.K.'s armed forces in terms of personnel and future investment — this will put pressure on defense expenditure across the board,” Barrie said. “A neutral budget would be a success for MoD, but I can see some projects being postponed and platform capabilities trimmed as a near term measure,” he added. It wouldn't be so bad if the defense equipment budget was currently under control, but it's not. The National Audit Office, the government's financial watchdog, reckons the current equipment plan has been unaffordable for several years. The worst-case scenario puts the 10-year equipment budget shortfall at £13 billion (U.S. $16 billion) says the NAO. While a decision by Johnson and his advisors on Britain's strategic road map is thrashed out the MoD is living pretty much hand-to-mouth, balancing the books annually by in-year reductions in equipment spending and other measures. Lovegrove told the parliamentary committee the MoD is focusing on smaller programs to cut to leave the government with space to make decisions on more strategic issues during the defense review. Such an approach does have financial consequences, though. “What we typically seek to do is to look at some of the less strategic capabilities, which we are capable of making decisions on outside of a full-blown, multi-year strategic review, and ask difficult questions of those for the [Service] Commands. Ultimately, we would like the Commands to make their own decisions. Sometimes those are cut; more often, they are deferred and descoped,” he said. “Deferring programs in order to give ministers proper choices within a strategic context has the result of pushing the bow wave of the unbalanced budget out a year or two, making it a bit bigger,” the permanent secretary said. “There is a cumulative effect of doing what we have to do to maintain the integrity of the program of record when the balance is out of whack, in that we defer for a year, then defer for a year, then put projects on shorter rations. The bow wave becomes bigger. You see that in the nature of the more difficult financing position that we have for the next three or four years. ... So, yes, I think that the program is very tight and getting tighter,” Lovegrove warned. Without the results of the review the defense sector is operating in a bit of a vacuum on the equipment front. Louth said that ultimately what the MoD spends its money on will be dictated by an as yet unknown view of Britain's foreign policy goals in a post-coronavirus, post-Brexit era. “Where the money is invested depends what they [the government] want to do. The problem is can anybody put their hand up and say ‘we understand what theUK strategic ambition is at the moment,” he said. Despite the strategy vacuum the review likely heralds significant change to investment priorities, according to Wheeldon. “I see a huge change of approach emerging in the UK — one that will concentrate more resources on internal defense, cyber and space and less on conventional armies and battlefield activities. The UK will remain committed to air and maritime and in particular ISTAR and carrier strike. Whilst retaining the overall air and maritime commitment to the NATO alliance I envisage a shift away from front-line land systems support to that of increased ISTAR, space and cyber,” Wheeldon said. Which sectors will see the money invested ? “My money would remain very much on ensuring we have sufficient air and maritime capabilities, particularly ISTAR, and fast jet and surface and sub-surface maritime capability. Investing in space is crucial, investing in cyber is hugely important. I also remain committed to replacement of our nuclear deterrent capability,” Wheeldon said. Barrie agreed about the key requirement to invest in sectors like cyber, space and ISTAR, but cautioned that even here “ambitions will have to be shaped by budgetary reality.” In a paper published in March as the COVID-19 crisis took hold, the Royal United Services Institute's deputy director-general, Malcolm Chalmers, and Will Jessett, a former strategy director at the MoD, offered a view of Britain's defense priorities should be in the future. Britain's new policy should be encapsulated in a new doctrine of enlightened national interest, they said. “Under such an approach, the first priority for the armed forces should be the defense of the UK homeland and its immediate neighborhood. ... The shape of expeditionary forces should now be determined primarily through the need to work closely with NATO allies in defense of Europe and its immediate neighborhood,” the two analysts said. The analysts' view of local and regional defense is partly reflected in their equipment list for Britain's future forces. “Defence priorities over the coming decade need to include robust air defense of the UK (and the Republic of Ireland), strengthened coastal defenses against limited incursions, protection of infrastructure (defense and civil) against virtual and physical attack, and maintaining the ability to provide adequate support to the civil power in national emergencies,” they said in their RUSI paper. A move towards defense of the U.K. and, through NATO, its immediate neighborhood, would represent a significant shift. Just a little over 15 months ago then-Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson was making the case for Britain competing for its interests on a global playing field. “In an era of great power competition we cannot be satisfied simply by protecting our own backyard” Williamson said in a speech at RUSI. Britain has spent billions of pounds building two new F-35 equipped aircraft carriers as part of that policy and needs to invest heavily to buy additional jets and carrier strike support vessels. But a swing towards beefing up defenses in Europe may gain more traction following U.S. President Donald Trump's recent announcement he was withdrawing thousands of troops from Europe. Whether or not Trump means it, or is playing to the gallery ahead of the U.S. elections in November, is unclear, but a significant reduction in U.S. manpower would go right to the heart of NATO planning assumptions. Causing European powers like Britain to rethink how they address the need for their forces to maneuver against a potential adversary like Russia without significant US military support. Louth said the Russian's pushing west to regain territory lost since the end of the Cold War is not as unthinkable as it once was. “We have to be able to address that level of uncertainty and in defense that must be about protecting Europe's borders. What it means is you have to have an investment strategy and a capability generation process that allows you to protect those borders by being able to maneuver across a highly amorphous battlefield across a number of domains.The physicality of force goes to the heart of deterrent,” the analyst said. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/transatlantic-partnerships/2020/06/22/defense-planning-takes-a-back-seat-in-britains-struggle-to-shake-the-coronavirus/

Steve Trimble A U.S. hypersonic defense system has evolved from wide-open concept studies two years ago into a densely layered architecture populated by requirements for a new generation of space-based sensors and ground-based interceptors. Over the next two years, the first elements of the Defense Department's newly defined hypersonic defense architecture could advance into operational reality if all the pieces can overcome various challenges, including the Pentagon's so far ambiguous commitment to long-term funding. Space-based hypersonic tracking is possible in 2023 New sea-based interceptor will possibly be ready by mid-2020s Pentagon seeks Congressional add-ons to finance plan The Space Development Agency (SDA), with assistance from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), next year will start launching satellites into orbit with new forms of tracking technology optimized to perform the challenging task of remotely targeting hypersonic missiles as they maneuver in the atmosphere hundreds of miles below. At the same time, the MDA and DARPA will soon begin demonstrating a new class of kinetic and nonkinetic interceptor technologies. In addition to solving the guidance and thermal challenges posed by hypersonic flight, this new class of missile defense weapons must be guidable by satellites potentially perched far over the horizon, not by sensors integrally linked on the ground to their launching systems. Pentagon officials began conceiving a hypersonic defense architecture a year after launching multiple offensive weapons programs in 2017, seeking to close gaps in the ballistic defense system that missiles now fielded by adversaries are designed to exploit. With the ability to maneuver hundreds of miles off a ballistic trajectory, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and cruise missiles are designed to evade the MDA's network of stationary ground-based and slow-moving sea-based radars dotted around the globe. By gliding or powering through the atmosphere against the warm background of Earth, the same missiles appear 10-15 times less luminous during the midcourse phase than the boost-phase, exoatmospheric objects that the MDA designed the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites to detect, according to Michael Griffin, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. Closing those gaps will require serious investment. Despite plans to infuse more than $10 billion to field at least three different rocket-boosted HGVs by 2025 as offensive weapons, the Pentagon's financial commitment to field a defensive capability is not as clear. The MDA, for example, submitted a fiscal 2020 budget request in February 2019 that included around $157 million in hypersonic defense. A month later, the agency submitted an unfunded-priorities list to Congress, asking for another $720 million for hypersonic interceptors and tracking sensors. Congress met the MDA more than halfway, adding $400 million to the final appropriations bill. A similar shortfall then appeared in the MDA's fiscal 2021 budget request. The agency included $207 million for hypersonic defense but asked Congress to chip in another $224 million on top of the budgeted amount, according to a March report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) Missile Defense Project. Moreover, the Defense Department's long-range forecast for hypersonic defense spending shows an ambiguous commitment at best. The MDA plans to launch a competition to select a Regional Glide-Phase Weapon System (RGPWS) in fiscal 2021 but only if Congress approves the additional $224 million identified in the unfunded priorities list. At the same time, the new SDA plans to start demonstrating MDA's Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking and Surveillance System (HBTSS) alongside the SDA's own tracking layer in orbit. But the unclassified version of the Future Years Defense Program, which details the Defense Department's five-year spending forecast, shows declining support for hypersonic defense after next year. If Congress approves the extra $224 million for MDA, hypersonic defense spending would peak at around $450 million next year, then average about $112 million annually from fiscal 2022 to 2025, according to the CSIS data. The implication seems clear: Despite the MDA's public commitment to a hypersonic defense system, the agency prefers to finance the development mainly by annual congressional add-ons. Although the MDA's long-term funding plan for hypersonic defense is limited, the potential threats are no longer speculative. In December, the Russian government announced it had achieved operational status for the Avangard, a nuclear-tipped HGV launched by a modernized SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile. Two months earlier, Gen. Paul Selva, then-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained the implications of an adversary with a nuclear-armed HGV: Imagine if NATO attempted to blunt a move by Moscow to occupy a Baltic state, and Russian strategic forces responded by threatening to launch an Avangard missile. The now-retired general warned that a single Avangard could arc over the Arctic Ocean, and as it reached the northern tip of Hudson Bay, Canada, could change course. It could then veer to target the U.S. East Coast or strike the West Coast, Selva says. U.S. forces currently have no ability to deter or defend against such a capability. To solve that problem, a new space-based tracking system is needed. The Pentagon's existing satellites are either looking for a more luminous signal than that of an HGV or a hypersonic cruise missile or are using a very narrow field-of-view sensor to minimize background clutter, says SDA Director Derek Tournear, who spoke with Aviation Week during a June 4 webinar. The first attempt to solve that problem is scheduled for launch in fiscal 2024. Forty satellites in SDA's Tranche 1 constellation in low Earth orbit carry sensor payloads for tracking hypersonic missiles. Unlike the SBIRS or other space-based capabilities, the sensors will neither have a narrow field of view nor be optimized for tracking only during the boost or exoatmospheric phases of a missile's trajectory. Instead, the spacecraft in Tranche 1 will carry a wide-field-of-view infrared sensor. “However, the jury is still out on whether [the sensors] will be able to form a track that is high enough quality to actually give you that fire control solution so that you can fire [interceptors] on [a] remote [track],” Tournear says. The backup to the SDA sensor will be demonstrated under MDA's HBTSS program. The MDA is developing what Tournear calls a medium-field-of-view system, which falls between the narrow-field-of-view format of existing satellites and the SDA's wide-field-of-view design for Tranche 1. Ideally, the SDA's wide-field-of-view sensors will detect an HGV or a cruise missile and pass the data in orbit to the HBTSS sensors, which will then develop a target-quality track. That data will be passed down to interceptor batteries on the ground. Modified interceptors, such as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, will augment new kinetic and non-kinetic options to shoot down hypersonic missiles. Credit: Missile Defense Agency Within a few years, the SDA will find out how the concept works. By the end of 2022, eight Tranche 0 satellites equipped with the SDA's wide-field-of-view sensors should be in low Earth orbit. A year later, the MDA plans to launch two satellites into low Earth orbit with medium-field-of-view sensors. The Tranche 0 constellation—aided by 20 communications-relay and data-processing “transport” satellites—will provide a limited operational capability and validate that the sensors work as designed. The next step comes in 2024, when the SDA plans to launch the 40 satellites in the Tranche 1 constellation. “We would have, in essence, regional persistence of [infrared satellites] over any area of the globe that we choose,” Tournear says. There is a catch, however. The launch of the Tranche 1 satellites in 2024 fall within the five-year spending plan but so far remain unfunded. Shortly after the scheduled Tranche 1 layer is activated, the MDA plans to field RGPWS, the new interceptor optimized for HGVs. If Congress adds the funding, RGPWS could be fielded as early as the “mid-2020s” with the Navy's Mk. 41 vertical launch systems on ships and submarines, followed later by air- and land-launched versions. The design requirements for RGPWS are classified, but it's possible the interceptor may benefit from an ongoing DARPA program. Glide Breaker, which includes Aerojet Rocketdyne as a supplier, seeks to demonstrate a “critical enabling technology” for a hypersonic defense missile. The MDA also plans to demonstrate an “extreme power” microwave weapon against “very long-range” missile threats within two years. At the same time, the MDA is adapting existing point defenses against atmospheric threats. Lockheed Martin is studying improved versions of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, called “Dart,” and of the Patriot, called “Valkyrie.” In addition to the extreme power microwave, Raytheon also is studying a new variant of the SM-3 called Hawk. Editor's note: The article has been updated to correctly identify the names of the hypersonic defense concepts under study for THAAD and Patriot. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/us-hypersonic-defense-plan-emerges-not-cash

By Ed Adamczyk June 19 (UPI) -- The Pentagon's strategy for defense in space treats the environment as a warfighting domain, a Defense Department report says. The Defense Space Strategy calls for maintenance of space superiority, support to national, joint and combined operations on earth,and assurance of space stability, the Pentagon said this week. The report identified what officials call four priority lines of effort: building a comprehensive military advantage in space; integration of power in space into the military; shaping the strategic environment; and cooperation with allies, partners, and other U.S. government departments and agencies. The 18-page unclassified section of the report was released on Wednesday. "China and Russia have weaponized space and turned it into a war-fighting domain," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Stephen Kitay told reporters on Wednesday. "Their actions pose the greatest strategic threat with ongoing development, testing and deployment of counter-space systems and the associated military doctrine designed to hold allied and U.S.space systems at risk." "The U.S. space enterprise was not built for the current strategic environment," Kitay added, noting that space has historically been regarded as a supporting domain for satellites to support other efforts, but not as a battleground. The U.S. Space Force, established as the sixth branch of the Armed Forces in 2019, is specifically designated as the country's space warfare service branch. It has previously noted Russia's direct ascent weapons and potential weapons to destroy satellites, as well as threats including electronic warfare, cyberattacks and ground-based lasers capable of blinding satellites. https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2020/06/19/Pentagon-maps-out-defense-space-strategy/3191592594867/

Point clé: L'armée avait le choix entre quelques options lorsqu'elle recherchait le prochain chasseur furtif. Il a finalement décidé de ce qui allait devenir le F-35. Le ministère de la Défense (DoD) n'a pas eu à opter pour le F-35. Dans les années 1990, Boeing et Lockheed Martin ont soumissionné pour le prochain gros contrat de chasse, un avion qui servirait dans chacune des forces aériennes, navales et marines, ainsi que pour soutenir les forces aériennes de nombreux alliés américains. Boeing a servi le X-32; Lockheed le X-35. Le Pentagone a choisi le F-35. Compte tenu des luttes de la dernière décennie avec le Joint Strike Fighter, il est impossible de ne pas se demander ce qui aurait pu être; Et si le DoD était parti avec le X-32 de Boeing à la place, ou avec une combinaison des deux appareils? Histoire: À la fin de la guerre froide, le Pentagone a proposé un projet de chasseurs conjoints dans l'espoir de réduire la queue logistique globale des forces en campagne, ainsi que de minimiser les coûts de développement. Chacun des trois services d'avions de chasse avait besoin d'être remplacé par l'avion de 4e génération dans son inventaire; les F-15 et F-16 dans le cas de l'Air Force, et les F / A-18 et AV-8B Harrier dans le cas de la Navy et du Marine Corps. Le nouveau chasseur avait donc besoin de configurations conventionnelles, porteuses et STOVL (atterrissage vertical à décollage court). Historiquement, le DoD n'avait pas eu de chance avec les programmes conjoints, mais l'espoir était qu'une «articulation» accrue entre les services, combinée à des techniques de production plus avancées et à des procédures logistiques plus soigneusement affinées, ferait qu'un combattant partagé en valait la peine. Toutes les parties ont compris que le vainqueur de la compétition connaîtrait probablement un grand succès à l'exportation, car de nombreuses forces aériennes du monde entier avaient besoin d'un chasseur de cinquième génération. En bref, il s'agissait de la plus grosse transaction à l'horizon de l'industrie de la défense de l'après-guerre froide. Boeing et Lockheed Martin ont remporté des contrats pour développer chacun deux démonstrateurs. L'histoire continue Capacités: Construits selon les mêmes spécifications, le X-32 et le F-35 avaient des paramètres de performances relativement similaires. Décidant de rivaliser sur les coûts, Boeing a conçu le X-32 autour d'une aile delta monobloc qui s'adapterait aux trois variantes. Le X-32 n'avait pas la portance du turboréacteur entraîné par l'arbre du F-35, utilisant à la place le même système de vectorisation de poussée que l'AV-8 Harrier. Le système du X-32 était moins avancé que celui du F-35, mais aussi moins complexe. Le X-32 a été conçu pour atteindre Mach 1,6 en vol conventionnel. Il pourrait transporter six AMRAAM ou deux missiles et deux bombes dans sa baie d'armes interne. Les caractéristiques de portée et de furtivité étaient généralement similaires à celles attendues du F-35, et le corps de l'avion pouvait accueillir une grande partie de l'équipement électronique avancé que le F-35 transporte maintenant. Décision: Une chose est sûre; le X-32 était un avion ridiculement laid. Cela ne ressemblait pas tellement à la ponte d'un A-7 Corsair et à un lamantin hideusement déformé. Le F-35 n'est pas un prix d'un point de vue esthétique, sans les lignes élégantes et dangereuses du F-22, mais le X-32 a rendu le F-35 positivement sexy en comparaison. Quelle importance cela devrait-il avoir? Pas du tout. Quelle importance cela avait-il? Bonne question. Les pilotes de chasse n'aiment pas piloter des avions qui semblent pouvoir être écrasés par un hors-bord en Floride. Pour des raisons plus concrètes, la stratégie de Boeing a probablement nui à ses chances. Au lieu de construire un démonstrateur capable de répondre aux exigences des trois services, Boeing en a construit deux; l'un capable de vol supersonique conventionnel, et l'autre de décollage et d'atterrissage vertical. Le prototype de Lockheed pourrait faire les deux. Le Pentagone a également apprécié la nature innovante (bien que risquée) du turbolift du F-35. Enfin, l'expérience de Lockheed avec le F-22 a suggéré qu'il pourrait probablement gérer un autre grand projet de chasseur furtif. Conclusion: Choisi en 2001, le F-35 est devenu le plus grand projet d'approvisionnement du Pentagone de tous les temps et l'un des plus assaillis. Le X-32 a échappé à tous les défis les plus importants pour le F-35. Le X-32 n'a jamais fait face à des décennies de tests et de refonte; il n'a jamais connu de dépassements de coûts massifs; il n'a jamais été soumis à une série interminable d'articles sur la façon dont il ne pouvait pas déjouer un F-16A. La nostalgie de ce qui aurait pu être est courante dans les compétitions d'avions, et il est impossible de dire si le X-32 aurait rencontré les mêmes difficultés que le F-35. Étant donné la nature complexe des projets de chasse avancés, la réponse est presque certainement «oui». Mais avec le recul, il aurait presque certainement été plus logique de choisir un chasseur alternatif VSTOL pour le Marine Corps. Cela aurait éliminé l'aspect le plus complexe du projet «conjoint»; la nécessité de créer un avion qui partage des composants critiques à travers trois variantes très différentes. Cela aurait également aidé à répartir la richesse entre les différents grands entrepreneurs de la défense, une pratique qui est devenue de plus en plus une priorité du Pentagone. Bien sûr, étant donné que les aspects STOVL des F-35 et X-32 ont été intégrés au stade de la proposition, cela aurait nécessité de revenir en arrière jusqu'en 1993, pas seulement en 2001. Robert Farley, un contributeur fréquent de TNI, est l'auteur du Battleship Book. Il est maître de conférences à la Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce de l'Université du Kentucky. Son travail comprend la doctrine militaire, la sécurité nationale et les affaires maritimes. Il blogue sur Avocats, Armes à feu et Diffusion d'argent et d'informations et Le Diplomate. Cela est apparu pour la première fois en 2016. https://www.breakingnews.fr/international/lavion-qui-aurait-pu-remplacer-le-f-35-523306.html