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Ashley Roque, Washington, DC - Jane's Defence Weekly Once again the US army is looking for new active protection systems (APSs) to equip on its family of M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Whether this is a positive or negative for IMI Systems' Iron Fist remains unclear. On 11 December, the service issued a draft request for proposal in the form of a "market survey" for APSs with a technology readiness level (TRL) 6. "This APS shall have been proven and characterised on the Bradley Family of Vehicles [FOV]," the service wrote in a short notice. "This will be accomplished through the procurement of a B-Kit, consisting of the system and countermeasures." Industry has until 18 December to respond. Recently, the service has been evaluating three APSs: Rafael's Trophy on the Abrams main battle tank (MBT), IMI Systems' Iron Fist on the M2 Bradley, and Artis' Iron Curtain on the Stryker infantry combat vehicle. In June Leonardo DRS (Rafael's US-based partner) was awarded USD193 million to integrate the capability on Abrams MBTs. Artis' Iron Curtain system, however, was cut due to a lack of maturity. IMI Systems' Iron Fist is now uncertain, and the company and an army spokeswoman did not immediately respond to Jane's request for information. Colonel Glenn Dean, project manager for Stryker Brigade Combat Team and APS acquisition, told reporters in August that IMI's Iron Fist technology was still participating in Phase I live-fire and automotive characterisation testing due to an eight-month delay caused by funding gaps, inclement weather, and integration challenges. At the time, he noted that the findings would be turned over to the Army Requirements Oversight Council in the first quarter of fiscal year 2019 for a decision on how to proceed. He also explained that the M2 Bradley is a "very difficult platform to install on". https://www.janes.com/article/85180/us-army-seeking-aps-technology-for-bradley-vehicles

Pat Host, Washington, DC - Jane's Defence Weekly Key Points The Pentagon is seeking better insight into F-35 sub-tier suppliers It is likely that the Pentagon is looking for vulnerability points or perhaps more accurate pricing The Pentagon is seeking a better understanding of the risks presented by key components and organisations in the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) sustainment supply chain that could have an impact on overall programme cost, schedule, and performance. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) relies heavily on Lockheed Martin and F135 engine developer Pratt & Whitney to provide insight into sustainment supply chain risks for the air system. The JPO has a good understanding of Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney, and their major suppliers, but the Pentagon said there is often limited visibility into the sub-tier suppliers who provide critical components and personnel to support sustainment. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) on 3 December posted a request for proposal (RFP) on Federal Business Opportunities for F-35 JPO Sustainment Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM). The contractor will need to produce and maintain an F-35 supply chain mapping and associated risk assessment. The contractor will map the air system sustainment supply chain to at least the third tier, up to a total of 250 suppliers. The map will need to show how suppliers are mapped, both vertically and horizontally. The contractor will provide a high-level risk analysis, comprising a minimum of the supplier ownership history and manufacturing locations within the last 10 years for all 250 suppliers mapped. The contractor will then provide a full risk analysis for 80 of the 250 suppliers identified, including, at a minimum: ownership history, financial information, partnerships, legal issues, and countries of origin and manufacturing locations. https://www.janes.com/article/85171/pentagon-seeks-better-insight-into-f-35-sub-tier-suppliers

By: Adam Stone The Army is rolling out a new streamlined tool for updating critical software on thousands of vehicles that use the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) system. Vehicles depend on the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below system to deliver communications, friendly and hostile-force tracking, maps and other key intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance functionality. But FBCB2 is out of date, and upgrades have required the pricey and time-consuming replacement of both hardware and software. “We wanted to give war fighters the option of doing a software-only upgrade,” said Dan Ghio, JBC-P deputy product manager. “We will still hit them with the full hardware upgrade eventually. This just gets us to a more common software baseline in the meantime. It's a stopgap for those who can get at least some of the upgrades done.” The upgrades started rolling out in the spring and so far over 800 vehicles have completed the process. Of the 103,000 fielded platforms, roughly 20,000 to 30,000 can be updated using the new approach, which applies to platforms such as Humvees and Mine-Resistant Ambushed-Protected vehicles. All upgrades should be completed by fiscal 2023, said Lt. Col. Shane Sims, JBC-P product manager. “We started with a unit at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, just to see if we were on track,” Sims said. “The process is pretty easy. You call our help center and our folks will send out a new hard drive with the new software loaded on it. Once you attach it to the system it's a 10-minute process to load it up.” While it would have been technically possible to upload the software via the internet, connectivity constraints made the hard drive a better option. “These are users with very limited bandwidth. It would take a very long time to fully download a new operating system,” Sims said. By sending out new hard drives, the engineers also help to position the system for future enhancements, while reducing the overall burden of system support. “We want to keep pushing more and more capabilities out into the field, but right now our support teams in the field have to support 18 different hard drives. There is a huge sustainment cost to supporting all of that,” Sims said. “We're a huge Army and the more we standardize, the better it is.” The latest software version includes a few significant functional enhancements. The user interface has been modernized and made more intuitive; engineers have hardened the security on the back end and made the system more reliable, Ghio said. By creating a “standardized, repeatable and intuitive process” for upgrades, he said, Army aims to empower war fighters to take control over their most critical technologies. “We believe solders and commanders can take on some of the [technology] mission themselves if given the right tools and the right instructions,” Sims said. “As we move to the future, we are going to have to rely on our units to modernize things on their own. That will allow us to inject new capabilities at a much faster pace.” Looking ahead, Army engineers are still looking to overcome the bandwidth limitations that presently prohibit them from pushing out upgrades online. “We are definitely looking at ways to do an over-the-air update,” Sims said. “It would be a lot of easier, just the same way you do an update to an iPhone or an Android. We could send a message to the entire force and have everyone updated at once. That would improve our security posture and would serve to keep everyone current.” At the same time, safety and security concerns factor heavily, as the Army looks to enhance systems on vehicles that are equipped for live fire. “A software malfunction on a firing system would be a catastrophic event, so we have to make sure that our software doesn't interfere with any of the safety mechanisms on these platforms,” Sims said. https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2018/12/13/need-to-upgrade-army-vehicle-software-got-10-minutes

By: Frank Bakke-Jensen A serious security crisis in the northernmost corner of Europe would affect all of NATO. That is why the alliance just conducted the largest full-scale military exercise in decades— in Norway. In October and November, some 50,000 soldiers from 31 countries were engaged in a major exercise designed to test our ability to operate together in crisis or war. Around 65 ships, 250 aircraft and as many as 10,000 vehicles took part. Exercise Trident Juncture 2018 demonstrated NATO's revitalized focus on collective defense of its member states and the geopolitical importance of Europe's northern flank. Trident Juncture 2015 took place in the Mediterranean region. This year's Trident Juncture was a unique opportunity for NATO and our partners Sweden and Finland to test and further develop our ability to operate together in the north. Norway's rugged terrain, intricate coastline and demanding climate represent challenges in and of themselves to the war fighter, making this one of the reasons why it is so important to train here. Not just because it makes us better at defending ourselves, but also because it strengthens the bond between our countries and sends a strong signal to anyone who may want to use military power to force our will. The fact that 31 countries contributed to the exercise proves that we, as an alliance, stand together. Even more importantly, the exercise demonstrated our will and determination to come to each other's aid, should it ever be necessary. With Trident Juncture 2018, we have shown in a very visible way that we will come to the aid of any member nation, should any of us need it. We see no military threat against Norway today. However, we have seen a more assertive Russia with both the will and the ability to use military power to achieve political goals. Cyberattacks and disinformation are fueling political polarization in both Europe and the United States, which in turn is challenging democratic institutions and our ability to compromise. International terrorism is changing how we think about security; migration has emerged as perhaps the No. 1 dividing force; and climate change is affecting all of these issues in ways we cannot fully predict. As members of a successful alliance, we all share a common responsibility to maintain peace and stability in our neighborhoods — from the north to the south. Democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of religion, as well as a rules-based world order, are at the heart of our nations. All 29 allies participated in exercise Trident Juncture. All 29 allies stand together in our 360-degree approach to security. And all 29 allies share the burdens of collective defense and deterrence. These are the fundamental values that make us capable of reacting to a rapidly changing security environment. We are firm believers in dialogue, transparency and a predictable world order based on international law and binding agreements. Unfortunately, we see that these values are increasingly challenged. That is why it is necessary to have a credible military capability. While Denmark, Norway and Iceland are members of NATO, Sweden and Finland are not. By including Sweden and Finland in a NATO exercise, we improve our ability to act together as neighbors. The Nordic contribution to Exercise Trident Juncture was substantial, with over 13,000 soldiers and a large number of civilian personnel. In a fine example of Nordic cooperation, army elements from Finland operated as part of a Swedish brigade, and Danish helicopters supported the Norwegian brigade. NATO and partner forces from Finland and Sweden used military bases and airfields in all the Nordic countries, with the strategically important Iceland serving as a central hub, gateway and staging area for deployment and sustainment of allied forces across the north Atlantic. From a Norwegian perspective, Trident Juncture 18 has been a success. For the first time in decades, the whole alliance came together in the High North to test reinforcement plans and to demonstrate that we are committed to collective defense. In addition, the sea lanes across the Atlantic are once again seen as vital. Being a host nation, with all it entails, is a daunting task for a small nation like Norway. With this exercise, we were able to test our abilities to receive and accommodate allied forces. All units were in position, with their equipment, on time. All supplies were delivered as planned. The infrastructure was satisfactory. In addition, we were able to put our total defense concept to the test. More than 50 other Norwegian actors — governmental as well as nongovernmental — were involved. Seen with Norwegian eyes, Exercise Trident Juncture 18 has contributed to continued stability in the High North. Frank Bakke-Jensen is Norway's defense minister. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/norways-defense-minister-ensuring-collective-defense-and-deterrence-in-the-northernmost-corner-of-europe/

By: Mark Pomerleau The Marine Corps has famously claimed that every Marine is a rifleman, but the Corps has moved 1,000 personnel in the last two years to focus on cyber, electronic warfare, signals intelligence and information operations. These moves have come at the cost of infantry, “a pretty big cost to go pay for the Marine Corps,” Kenneth Bible, deputy director of the C4 directorate and deputy chief information officer, said Dec. 6 at the Charleston Defense Contractors Association Defense Summit. "The commandant really had to go think about taking that out of the structure to create these [units] across the Marine Corps.” Now the Marines are looking to integrate these new units — called Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups, or MIGs — with traditional formations. The deputy commandant for information, a new three-star position created in 2017 to oversee all aspects of information-related warfare, is overseeing efforts to further develop the groups and integrate them into battle plans. "How does he employ those capabilities as part of an integrated warfare plan? How does he implement a strike package in the information domain?” Bible said. “We really have to figure out how to go make that a relevant force and make it something that the MEF commanders can use.” Bible explained these forces will be able to provide traditional military information support operations, psychological operations, military deception, or cyber to fight in the information environment. An operational advisory group met earlier in December with all of the group commanders that focused a lot on how they were maturing capabilities, Bible said. Some of the key questions that still remain surround how to provide intelligence support to cyber, as well as how to incorporate information support capabilities for a more integrated force package, from shaping operations to when operations actually take place. Bible said that Lt. Gen. Lori Reynolds, the deputy commandant for information, has told the organization to start building out exercise plans to work more closely together, adding there will be more specifics to come in the near future. Trident Juncture, NATO-led Trident Juncture exercise in Norway that took place from Oct. 25 to Nov. 7, he said, was a good example of getting limited capability out to commanders to test. New tactical defensive cyber teams participated in the exercise and commanders saw their impact, Bible said. https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2018/12/11/marines-looking-to-integrate-new-information-capabilities

By: Mark Pomerleau The Marines are looking to develop and equip specialized tactical cyber teams with a specific defensive tool set. These teams, known as defensive cyber operations-internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM) companies, are designed to help defend critical digital assets at the tip of the spear. These companies will fall under the newly established Marine Expeditionary Force Information Groups, or MIGs, and one will reside within each MEF providing MEF commanders information-related capabilities to include cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare and information operations. All three DCO-IDM companies have reached the minimum threshold for deployment,though their specific kits are not in place yet, Gregg Kendrick, executive director of Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command, said Dec. 6 at the Charleston Defense Contractors Association Defense Summit. In the interim, service-retained cyber protection teams — strategic-level defensive cyber teams that feed up to U.S. Cyber Command — are partnering with the companies to conduct operations and participate in exercises. These companies will serve as a “paired down version” of cyber protection teams in the cyber mission force and be employed at the Marine Air Ground Task Force level, said MGySgt Carlos Torres, senior enlisted Marine in the cyberspace division for the Deputy Commandant for Information, during the annual C4ISRNET Conference in May. The companies have used the expertise from cyber protection teams and Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command throughout their establishment. Kendrick said the companies and elements of a cyber protection team participated in the NATO-led Trident Juncture exercise in Norway that took place from Oct. 25 to Nov. 7. Kenneth Bible, deputy director of the C4 directorate and deputy CIO, said Trident Juncture served as a good example of giving these teams exposure to operations and commanders, who want this capability. Kendrick added that the deputy commandant for information, which oversees all aspects of information for the Corps, to include the MIGs, requested Marines with intelligence backgrounds to go to each of the DCO-IDM companies. This will allow them to begin the process of establishing an organic intelligence support ability in the defensive cyber sphere as opposed to having to rely on outside resources, such as Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command. This is critical given the expeditionary and tactical nature of these teams. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/marine-corps/2018/12/11/marines-need-to-equip-defensive-cyber-teams/

By: Gen. David Goldfein Faced with the seemingly impossible task of solving the puzzle of the German military coding machine commonly known as “Enigma” during World War II, British mathematician Alan Turing and his team used a new kind of technology. They built a computing machine that foreshadowed the age of software and algorithms, breaking a code that the Germans changed every 24 hours. Turing's legacy is profound, in war and peace. Today, anyone who has spent time on the internet or social media can't help but have noticed the speed by which algorithms help companies direct targeted advertisements to us — in seconds and minutes — based on their ability to track online interests and behaviors. It is no overstatement to say that the same kind of intuitive speed in understanding and directing information is what our military needs in order to win future wars. This new kind of warfare will require us to defend against and attack foes on land and sea as well as in the air, space and cyberspace. In military parlance, the term for this is “multidomain operations,” an ungainly phrase that has nonetheless become a major focus for each of the military services, including my own, the U.S. Air Force. The term is in vogue now for good reason: Whoever figures out how to quickly gather information in various “domains” and just as quickly direct military actions will have the decisive advantage in battle. Figuring out how to master multidomain warfare will be difficult, but do it we must. History has many lessons here. One analogy I like dates to the American Revolution. As British military forces were preparing to attack Lexington and Concord, patriots devised a simple system to alert Colonial troops. They hung lanterns in the Old North Church in Boston — one if by land, and two if by sea. But how many lanterns would the patriots have hung if the British decided to conduct multidomain operations and attack from both the land and the sea? This would have created a dilemma because they would have to choose to either divide their force and defend both approaches or choose one to defend. However, the patriots had no need to worry about this because the British did not have the ability to control a split force using both land and sea approaches. Without a suitable command-and-control system, a military force cannot effectively take advantage of multidomain operations. Fast forward to today. Having the ability to credibly attack enemies independently by land, sea, air, space or cyberspace — or all at once — creates untenable dilemmas. I'd like our adversaries to always be in the lantern-buying business. Developing the systems, training and methods by which to practice this new brand of warfare will require extraordinary focus from our military. We will have to master and apply quantum computing, artificial intelligence, hypersonic flight, and new concepts for command-and-control that will need to span the globe. In order to build this capability, we will have to develop a new ethos that allows for experimental failure, just as the private sector has done in order to bring us smartphones, robotics and many other cutting-edge technologies that define the speed and precision of modern life. America's new National Defense Strategy correctly focuses the bulk of our nation's efforts on what is called great power conflict, the potential for war with formidable foes like Russian and China. We have known for some time that both are building militaries that harness AI, quantum computers, hypersonic flight and the ubiquitous threat from cyberattacks. To build a military capable of defending and deterring against such threats, it is imperative that the United States learn to fight and defend from beneath the ocean to the outer reaches of space, and everywhere in between. Last month the Air Force kicked off the inaugural Doolittle Wargame, named for the World War II hero Jimmy Doolittle, who led the daring air raid on Tokyo in 1942 that helped turn the tide of war in the Pacific. That mission personified multidomain warfare in that it was launched from an aircraft carrier hauling heavy bombers, something the Japanese were not expecting and were not prepared for. The Doolittle Wargame is the start of our efforts to learn how to harness the potential for extremely fast, unpredictable warfare from the heights of air and space to the expanses of cyberspace. If we can pull this off, it may redefine conventional deterrence in the 21st century. Gen. David Goldfein is the chief of staff for the U.S. Air Force. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/us-air-force-chief-of-staff-our-military-must-harness-the-potential-of-multidomain-operations/

By: Sebastian Sprenger BERLIN — As the European Union positions itself to become a defense force in its own right, some in Washington have wondered if such moves would weaken NATO as the dominant trans-Atlantic security pact. Alliance leaders, including Camille Grand, who serves as NATO's assistant secretary general for defense investment, have defended EU efforts, arguing something good will come out of it if both organizations manage to cooperate. Grand sat down with Defense News Europe Editor Sebastian Sprenger during the NATO-Industry Forum in Berlin in November to discuss the state of play between the EU and NATO, defense spending by allies, and new technologies on the horizon. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said the alliance can benefit from the European Union's newfound interest in all things defense. How so? It can be fruitful for both organizations as long as we work well together. Of course it is good news to see the European Union as a more active player in the field of defense, provided that we operate in an environment where we avoid competing guidance to the member states and the allies, especially those who are members of both organizations, and provided that the EU effort strengthens trans-Atlantic security by enabling the European allies to acquire capabilities earlier or faster or in a more efficient way. Outlook 2019: World leaders and analysts speak on the state of global security and the defense industry We have a number of areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO, including in the field of capability development. Could things be better? Yes, probably, for example in terms of interaction between both organizations and fostering transparency, access to relevant documents, and so forth. Ultimately, I think the issue is whether the European effort can be a good contribution to a broader burden-sharing effort. But I think we also have to keep in mind that the effort in the field of defense remains primarily with nations. There is still a sizable trans-Atlantic imbalance as it pertains to the size of the defense-industrial base. Is that detrimental in the long run? The situation is relatively well-known. The defense market in North America, and especially in the United States, is larger than in Europe. There is an imbalance in defense spending; that's the whole point about the defense investment pledge, to partially correct that and having European members invest more in defense. Beyond that, the consolidation of defense industries took place in the United States earlier. In Europe it is still a process that is underway. There are still many companies competing for all sorts of markets. We have a fragmented demand and a fragmented supply, if you will. The issue is not to end up with a single company in Europe or in the U.S.; I think competition is healthy. The issue is: Can we tackle the issue of fragmentation in a European market? As seen from NATO, we don't really do industrial policy, per se. That's really a European Commission perspective. If it enables Europeans to be more efficient in delivering the capabilities we all need in the alliance, that can be good news. What do you expect to come out of industry consolidation in Europe? First of all, I think it has to be a business-driven process, primarily. It's not for organizations such as the EU or NATO to decide. I think what is true is that we see repeatedly cases of where there are a very large number of types of equipment in the same category available. There are a number of medium and small players in Europe that are part of the defense equation, and the defense industry is something where states look carefully at preserving some national capacity. The issue is: Should that organization evolve over time into a slightly more consolidated market? For me, the key criteria is to promote opportunities for multinational cooperations, which is something that we do both at NATO and the EU. It's very important that allies who are EU member states, when they are in a position to do so, decide to go for multinational solutions — with or without a single industrial champion. The European NATO members have pledge to spend more on defense. How does that manifest itself from where you sit? First of all, they are indeed spending more on defense. The increase in defense spending for this year is expected to be more than 5 percent for Europe and Canada. It's a complete overturn from the previous 25 years. We are now in the fourth year in a row of increasing defense spending. This is starting to make a real difference. In the last couple of years, Europe and Canada have spent €36 billion (U.S. $27 billion) more on defense than they had done previously. This starts being real money. It enables us to do three things: First of all, to fill some of the very serious gaps that we have — whether in ammunition or spare parts, for example. Secondly, to reinvest in building up capabilities for identified shortfalls, for example air-to-air refueling, anti-submarine warfare, all sorts of domains. Thirdly, to invest in defense for innovation. For example, take a deeper look at disruptive technologies, 21st century technologies. From where I sit, I can see two things. First of all, the NATO defense-planning targets have been apportioned by all allies. It's the first time in history that all allies have agreed to deliver what they are being asked. Secondly, all allies have agreed to keep increasing their defense spending. We might see nuances in terms of when they intend to reach 2 percent of GDP, which has partly to do with the politics in each country. But I think the political commitment is very strong and was strengthened by the Brussels summit in many ways. There is more money coming, and that creates more opportunities not only for new capabilities but also more cooperation. I think altogether, we have a dynamic that is very positive. Ultimately it makes a difference. People were always pointing at the fact that the Russian Federation had tripled its defense budget over the previous decade. Without trying to match that in any shape or form into an arms race, we also have seen now that reinvesting massively in defense, as the Russian Federation has done, has given Moscow more ability to act in the Middle East, to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces, and so on and so forth. The notion that investing in defense doesn't make a difference is wrong. What are the top three of four areas that need more investment for NATO? One that we are focusing on is the joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance domain. This is something where modern warfare requires us to have an edge. Then also I would emphasize mobility, both tactical and strategic. All of our missions require the alliance to be very mobile and be able to forward-deploy quite quickly. I would also cite integrated air and missile defense as a domain of focus. And lastly, the maritime domain, especially anti-submarine warfare. But those are only examples. We are in the process of designing NATO for the 21st century, which needs to be more agile and regain a degree of robustness that we didn't necessarily anticipate 10 years ago when we were working on the assumption that the primary objective of NATO would be to have light, deployable forces to go out of area. I could have mentioned cyber, of course, as a priority. I didn't mention it because while it is obviously a major, major domain for building our capabilities on, it is probably not as cash-intensive as others. The Germans seems to be perpetually moving toward 2 percent of GDP on defense, as opposed to saying when they will reach it. Is that enough? Is the GDP-percentage metric suitable for defense contributions? First of all, Germany has turned a corner on defense spending. I would note that Germany has a commitment to move to 1.5 percent, which is significant. Is this enough? Probably not. And Germany should meet its political commitment like other allies and aim towards moving as quickly as possible to the 2 percent objective. Having said this, 2 percent is a figure that is quite reasonable. The Cold War figure for Germany was more in the 3 percent realm. The notion that 2 percent would be a massive and disruptive number doesn't seem to me quite convincing. The second argument that I sometimes hear in the wealthy European countries is that 2 percent when you're rich is much more difficult to achieve. I could exactly reverse that argument, saying 2 percent when you're poor is much more difficult to achieve because then you're competing with much more immediate, existential needs in terms of infrastructure, education and so on. From that perspective, the good news with the 2 percent concept is that the burden is the same for everyone. Of course, with Germany being the largest economy in Europe, a lot of effort tends to be indeed with Germany. Germany already has demonstrated a willingness to move significantly in this direction, and there are high expectations that it will continue down that route and meet the target. I honestly think it's both doable and manageable. But then, of course, that doesn't happen overnight. Are NATO and the EU on the same page when it comes to modernizing the members' combat aircraft fleets, especially in Europe? I wouldn't say there is a NATO-EU competition or disagreement over that because, first of all, NATO doesn't take sides in terms of choosing equipment. NATO identified the need to modernize and keep an effective air force. And then each ally can decided which way they want to go. Some of them, quite a number now, have decided to go for the F-35 solution. On the other hand, other allies have either recently acquired planes that are quite modern — whether it's the Eurofighter or the Rafale — or are projecting to build together — as the French and the Germans [are] — the next generation of aircraft. Britain is also contemplating its own. From a NATO perspective, I think it's fair to say that we recognize every ally's right to pursue what they think is the best approach to address a capability challenge. The European Union is pursuing a slightly different perspective because the EU does have a dimension in terms of industrial policy and research policy where they can see benefits in supporting technological development in Europe. The United States, Russia and China are spending significant amounts of money on artificial intelligence research and development. Where does NATO as a whole stand on investments in this area? We have to look very seriously, as NATO allies, at the latest generation of disruptive technologies. And artificial intelligence is one of them. There is a major challenge coming from other major powers, starting with China. The United States is already well into it, Europe is starting to do that. I would nevertheless put AI in the broader context of new and disruptive technologies because I think it's one of them. And AI can also probably bring a lot to our intelligence efforts. But I would put it in the broader context of all sorts of technology revolutions underway. And maybe sometimes we over-focus on AI only, as if it was the single game changer. Nobody has fully assessed how much it's going to change the way we do military operations. Is AI going to be a tool to assist in decisions, or is AI going to allow for more autonomous systems to operate? On this, we've been working very, very hard, including with Allied Command Transformation. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/nato-defense-investment-official-talks-european-security-and-artificial-intelligence

Cet appel à proposition concerne les techniques issues de l'intelligence artificielle et présentant un intérêt opérationnel pour la défense. L'objectif du cycle de sélection est d'identifier des couples « sujet précis / solution » pour des applications opérationnelles moyen terme et de soutenir un challenge technique qui mérite un effort dans la durée. Couples « sujet précis / solution » pour des applications opérationnelles à moyen terme de l'intelligence artificielle Les propositions sélectionnées ont vocation à conduire à des applications opérationnelles à moyen terme sur des thématiques d'intérêt pour la défense tout en restant relativement duales et permettant d'en dériver des produits / services également dans un cadre hors défense. Pour ce premier appel à proposition dans le domaine de l'intelligence artificielle, les couples « sujet précis / solution » retenus devront relever d'un des thèmes présentés ci-après : Fusion, corrélation, détection de signaux faibles et visualisation d'informations multi-sources en grande dimension (textes, images, enregistrements de bases de données...) ; Détection en faible rapport signal/bruit : petits objets dans des images ou objets partiellement masqués, cibles furtive), reconnaissance vocale en environnement bruité ; Application pour la lutte informatique défensive : cartographie automatique du système à protéger/détection de vulnérabilités, détection d'intrusion, contre-mesures réactives ; Autonomie pour la robotique : perception de l'environnement (reconnaissance et suivi d'objets et localisation, analyse sémantique pour l'identification des routes/chemins, obstacles mobiles ou non (« traversabilité »), interaction intelligente hommes/robots (modalités d'interaction nouvelles entre robots dotés de modules d'IA et opérateurs, perception intelligente de l'opérateur par le robot, gestion par un opérateur d'une flotte multi-robots). Il n'y a pas de quota entre les différents thèmes, la priorité sera donnée à la qualité des propositions présentées. Le nombre de couples « sujet précis / solution » soutenus sera de l'ordre de 4 à 6 et dépendra de la qualité des propositions. Challenge technique Il est également prévu de soutenir un sujet plus prospectif sur un challenge technique qui mérite un effort dans la durée. Pour ce premier appel à proposition, le thème retenu concerne la simplification des processus d'apprentissage à partir de données (données annotées en faible nombre, utilisation de données simulées, apprentissage non (ou moins) supervisé). Le nombre de propositions soutenues pour le challenge sera 1 ou 2 et dépendra de la qualité des propositions. Les modalités de ce premier appel à proposition en intelligence artificielle sont les suivantes : Les organismes de recherche, les PME (1) ou ETI (entreprise intermédiaire indépendante) de moins de 2000 salariés peuvent participer à cet appel à proposition ; Les soumissions des propositions de projets, pour la phase de présélection, s'effectuent au travers d'une fiche (format Word) d'une page à remplir. La fiche est accessible en cliquant ici Clôture de l'appel à proposition Les propositions de projet doivent être envoyées à l'adresse agenceinnovation.dir.fct@intradef.gouv.fr (un accusé sera transmis dès réception de votre soumission) et impérativement avant la date et l'heure de clôture de l'appel à proposition : Le 8 janvier 2019 à 17h Important : Aucune participation ou aucun élément complémentaire ne pourra être accepté après la date et l'heure de clôture de l'appel à proposition. Le processus de sélection, et donc l'évaluation des propositions, implique différents acteurs du ministère des Armées dont les experts DGA dans le domaine de l'intelligence artificielle et des opérationnels des forces. Les personnes intervenant dans le cadre de l'évaluation des propositions soumises ne sont pas autorisées à entrer en contact avec les déposants concernant leur proposition. Le processus de présélection se déroulera selon le calendrier ci-après : Les dates clés étant : Annonce des propositions présélectionnées, date et horaire de passage à la session de Speed Meeting (par courriel) : le 21 janvier 2019 ; Déroulement des sessions de Speed Meeting (30 min : 15 min de présentation + 15 min d'échanges) pour les propositions sélectionnées : le 29 janvier 2019 ; Annonce des propositions sélectionnées pour accompagnement (par courriel) : le 1er février 2019. Les projets seront sélectionnés sur la base des critères suivants : Pertinence des propositions Couples « sujet précis / solution », Capacité du proposant à disposer d'un savoir-faire lui permettant de le réaliser, Intérêt pour la défense et les marchés civils sur lesquels l'entreprise ou le consortium serait susceptible de se développer, Satisfaction des critères d'éligibilité du dispositif de soutien à l'innovation (DSI) auquel le proposant peut prétendre. Contacts Pour toutes questions, vous pouvez contacter : Aurélie Missere Tél. : +33 (0)9 88 67 17 55 (1) Définie comme micro, petite ou moyenne entreprise (PME) par la recommandation de la Commission no 2003/361/CE du 6 mai 2003 concernant la définition des micro, petites et moyennes entreprises. FAQ Quel est le positionnement de l'appel à proposition par rapport aux autres dispositifs ? Au vu du projet proposé, l'AID orientera les propositions sélectionnées vers le dispositif de soutien à l'innovation (DSI) le plus pertinent pour financer le projet. Quelle est la durée retenue pour les projets ? La ligne directrice retenue est de viser plutôt une avancée plus limitée sur un temps raisonnable qu'un objectif trop ambitieux sur un temps long. Pour les Couples « sujet précis / solution » permettant d'aller vers des applications opérationnelles moyen terme, la durée pourrait être de l'ordre 6 mois à 2 ans. Pour le Challenge technique, la durée pourrait être de l'ordre de 2 ans. Quel est le modèle de financement associé ? Les dispositifs de soutien à l'innovation envisagés sont des dispositifs de type subvention. Une fourchette de l'ordre 300 à 500 k€ donne l'ordre de grandeur envisageable. Quelle est la nature de « l'accompagnement » évoqué dans l'appel à proposition ? L'accompagnement proposé consiste à aider à la finalisation du projet pour la mise en place d'un dispositif de subventionnement approprié. Pendant le déroulement du projet, l'accompagnement visera à préparer un éventuel déploiement opérationnel ce qui nécessite un interfaçage avec des systèmes existants ou une intégration dans un système existant. Dans le cas de projets applicatifs, est-il envisageable d'avoir accès à des jeux de données ? La proposition initiale doit être effectuée sans recours à des jeux de données fournie par l'Etat. Durant l'accompagnement pour la finalisation du projet, la mise à disposition de données par l'Etat sera examinée. Si votre question n'apparaît pas, il vous suffit de nous envoyer un mail àagenceinnovation.dir.fct@intradef.gouv.fr. Nous vous répondrons dans les meilleurs délais, en général sous 24h à 48h. Sources : Ministère des Armées https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/la-vie-du-ministere/preselection-de-projets-ia-appel-a-proposition