November 21, 2018 | International, C4ISR
In just two words, the phrase “artificial intelligence” captures a deep techno-utopian promise, the notion that through craftsmanship humans can create learning and thinking machines outside the processes of organic life. AI is typically the realm of technologists and science fiction writers.
Now it is also in the world of export controls prohibitions and restrictions on technologies as overseen by the Department of Commerce.
In a proposed rule announced Nov. 19, the Bureau of Industry and Security wants to set out guidelines establishing “criteria for identifying emerging technologies that are essential to U.S. national security.” The stated goals of such controls are tied to both security and protectionism for existing American industry, especially the science, technology, engineering and manufacturing sectors.
The proposed rules encompass 14 technologies, covering brain-computer interfaces to advanced surveillance technology. Nestled in that list of technologies is “artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technology,” which is further broken into 11 related tools.
Here is a list of all the kinds of AI that the new rules seek to put under Commerce export controls:
Several of these are as much mathematical concepts, or processes, as they are distinct, controllable technologies. Others, like AI cloud technologies, suggest always-online servers, which by the very nature of the internet, are difficult to control within borders.
Tackling an entire technological field, especially one with as low a barrier to entry as coding, is a tricky proposition, even in the instances where the technology is clearly defined.
Why might the White House go through all this trouble?
“These revisions could compose an important element of a strategy of targeted countermeasures against the near-term threat posed by China's tactics for tech transfer and the long-term challenge of China's emergence as a powerhouse in innovation,” said Elsa B. Kania, adjunct fellow at the Center for New American Security.
“However, the revision of this traditional mechanism for today's challenges is inherently challenging, particularly when development is driven by commercial technologies.”
Unlike, say, controlling the components and designs of missiles in the Cold War, many of the technologies covered under these proposed rules have both commercial and military applications. We need not look abroad to find this. Project Maven, the tool Google created to process images collected from drones, was built on top of an open-source library. Identifying objects in images is hardly a military-specific task. Should companies within the United States be restricted in how they create, sell and share those same tools with researchers and commercial companies outside American borders?
“China's national strategy of military-civil fusion, which seeks to create and leverage synergies among defense, academic, and commercial technological developments in dual-use technologies, increases the ambiguity and uncertainty of tech transfer and collaboration,” Kania said.
“That is, the boundaries between defense and commercial technologies can become quite blurred as a result of the nature of these technologies and the Chinese government's strategy for their integrated development.”
Putting in place controls to hinder the free flow of AI between American companies and businesses abroad may mitigate that risk somewhat, but countries set on acquiring the tools can pursue research by other means, including technology transfers, espionage, theft through hacking, or even straightforward investment and acquisition. Staying ahead in artificial intelligence likely cannot be done through commerce restrictions alone.
“The U.S. must recognize that such controls may slow and hinder China's advances in these emerging technologies, but China's emergence as a powerhouse and would-be superpower in such emerging technologies will remain a critical long-term challenge,” Kania said. “We must not only pursue such defensive countermeasures, but also undertake a more offensive approach to ensuring future American competitiveness through investing in our own innovation ecosystem.”
https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2018/11/20/to-maintain-tech-edge-us-seeks-export-controls-on-ai
February 18, 2021 | International, Aerospace
The US Air Force is studying a future fighter fleet that might include new Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters or possibly a clean-sheet 4.5-generation fighter.
February 8, 2024 | International, Aerospace
The Waid 1 and 2 drones share distinctive features — wing stabilizers, pitot tubes, fuselages — with Iran’s Shahed-131 and -136, according to the agency.
June 12, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Joe Gould WASHINGTON ― Plans for a Senate-crafted version of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a new military fund to boost deterrence against China in the Pacific, is one step closer to becoming law. The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved nearly $6 billion for the fund in its version of the annual defense policy bill, the panel announced Thursday. It authorizes $1.4 billion in fiscal 2021, which would be $188.6 million above the administration's budget request, and $5.5 billion for fiscal 2022. The bill also directs the defense secretary to create a spending plan for all of the funds. “The best way to protect U.S. security and prosperity in Asia is to maintain a credible balance of military power, but, after years of underfunding, America's ability to do so is at risk,” the committee's summary stated. “The FY21 [National Defense Authorization Act] establishes the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) to send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that America is deeply committed to defending our interests in the Indo-Pacific. “PDI will enhance budgetary transparency and oversight, focus resources on key military capability gaps, reassure U.S. allies and partners, and bolster the credibility of American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.” Though not all details of the fund were immediately made public, SASC Chairman Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., and ranking member Jack Reed, D-R.I., previously said they would sponsor a measure to enable U.S. military operations in the region, beyond supporting new weapons platforms. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has said China is his department's top adversary, but said Congress has worked to sharpen the Pentagon's spending and focus in the region. The PDI would follow the form of the multiyear European Deterrence Initiative, which has consumed $22 billion since its inception after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Congress will have to internally negotiate the final dollar amount for PDI and what those funds would buy, but House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., and ranking member Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, have expressed support for the idea. Though the Senate's approach differs, Thornberry has also proposed spending $6 billion―all in FY21―on priorities that include air and missile defense systems as well as new military construction in partner countries; Smith hasn't released his own plan. Once approved by the full Senate, its version of the NDAA would be reconciled with the House's version, which the HASC is expected to make public late this month before it goes through markup July 1 and advances to the House floor. With an eye on China beyond the PDI, the SASC bill also encourages the Air Force to establish an operating location in the Indo-Pacific region for F-35A fighter jets and to allocate “sufficient resources and prioritize the protection of air bases that might be under attack from current or emerging cruise missiles and advanced hypersonic missiles, specifically from China." There are also a number of provisions aimed at safeguarding America's technology and industrial base from Chinese intellectual property theft and “economic aggression,” according to the summary. The bill would also require reports from the Pentagon on how to mitigate the risks from vendors like Chinese telecom firms Huawei and ZTE when basing U.S. troops overseas. The SASC summary said its proposed PDI would: Increase lethality of the joint force in the Pacific, including by improving active and passive defense against theater cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles for bases, operating locations and other critical infrastructure. Enhance the design and posture of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region by transitioning from large, centralized and unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient and adaptive basing; increasing the number of capabilities of expeditionary airfields and ports; enhancing pre-positioning of forward stocks of fuel, munitions, equipment and materiel; and improving distributed logistics and maintenance capabilities in the region to ensure the sustainment of logistics under persistent multidomain attack. Strengthen alliances and partnerships to increase capabilities, improve interoperability and information sharing, and support information operations capabilities with a focus on countering malign influence. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/06/11/senate-panel-oks-6-billion-military-fund-to-confront-china/