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June 12, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Security

The Pentagon is battling the clock to fix serious, unreported F-35 problems

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WASHINGTON — Over the past several years, U.S. Defense Department leaders have gone from citing technical problems as their biggest concern for the F-35 program to bemoaning the expense of buying and sustaining the aircraft.

But the reality may be worse. According to documents exclusively obtained by Defense News, the F-35 continues to be marred by flaws and glitches that, if left unfixed, could create risks to pilot safety and call into question the fighter jet's ability to accomplish key parts of its mission:

F-35B and F-35C pilots, compelled to observe limitations on airspeed to avoid damage to the F-35's airframe or stealth coating. Cockpit pressure spikes that cause “excruciating” ear and sinus pain. Issues with the helmet-mounted display and night vision camera that contribute to the difficulty of landing the F-35C on an aircraft carrier.

These are some of the problems with the jet that the documents describe as category 1 deficiencies — the designation given to major flaws that impact safety or mission effectiveness.

Thirteen of the most serious flaws are described in detail, including the circumstances associated with each issue, how it impacts F-35 operations and the Defense Department's plans to ameliorate it.

All but a couple of these problems have escaped intense scrutiny by Congress and the media. A few others have been briefly alluded to in reports by government watchdog groups.

But the majority of these problems have not been publicly disclosed, exposing a lack of transparency about the limitations of the Defense Department's most expensive and high-profile weapons system.

These problems impact far more operators than the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy customer base. Eleven countries — Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and the United Kingdom — have all selected the aircraft as their future fighter of choice, and nine partner nations have contributed funds to the development of the F-35.

Taken together, these documents provide evidence that the F-35 program is still grappling with serious technical problems, even as it finds itself in a key transitional moment.

And the clock is ticking. By the end of 2019, Defense Department leaders are set to make a critical decision on whether to shut the door on the F-35's development stage and move forward with full-rate production. During this period, the yearly production rate will skyrocket from the 91 jets manufactured by Lockheed Martin in 2018 to upward of 160 by 2023.

Generally speaking, the department's policy calls for all deficiencies to be closed before full-rate production starts. This is meant to cut down on expensive retrofits needed to bring existing planes to standard.

The F-35 Joint Program Office appears to be making fast progress, but not all problems will be solved before the full-rate production decision, said Vice Adm. Mat Winter, the Defense Department's F-35 program executive.

“None of them, right now, are against any of the design, any of the hardware or any of the manufacturing of the aircraft, which is what the full-rate production decision is for,” he told Defense News in an interview. “There are no discrepancies that put at risk a decision of the department to approve us to go into full-rate production.”

Nine out of 13 problems will likely either be corrected or downgraded to category 2 status before the Pentagon determines whether to start full-rate production, and two will be adjudicated in future software builds, Winter said.

However, the F-35 program office has no intention of correcting two of the problems addressed in the documents, with the department opting to accept additional risk.

Winter maintains that none of the issues represent any serious or catastrophic risk to pilots, the mission or the F-35 airframe. After being contacted by Defense News, the program office created two designations of category 1 problems to highlight the difference between issues that would qualify as an emergency and others that are more minor in nature.

“CAT 1-As are loss of life, potential loss of life, loss of material aircraft. Those have to be adjudicated, have to be corrected within hours, days. We have no CAT 1-A deficiencies,” Winter said.

Instead, the deficiencies on the books all fall under category 1B, which represents problems “that have a mission impact with a current workaround that's acceptable to the war fighter with the knowledge that we will be able to correct that deficiency at some future time,” Winter added.

Greg Ulmer, Lockheed Martin's vice president for the F-35 program, said currently fielded F-35s are meeting or exceeding performance specifications.

“These issues are important to address, and each is well understood, resolved or on a path to resolution," he said. "We've worked collaboratively with our customers, and we are fully confident in the F-35's performance and the solutions in place to address each of the items identified.”

Full article: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/06/12/the-pentagon-is-battling-the-clock-to-fix-serious-unreported-f-35-problems/

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  • Thales integrated sonar suite selected for Spanish Navys New Multi-Mission Frigates

    December 13, 2019 | International, Naval

    Thales integrated sonar suite selected for Spanish Navys New Multi-Mission Frigates

    November 12, 2019 - The General Directorate for Armament and Material (DGAM) and the naval shipyard Navantia have selected Thales technologies for the Spanish Navy's five new multi-mission frigates. The vessels' anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, based on two world-class sonars, the CAPTAS 4 Compact and the BlueMaster, and the BlueScan digital acoustic system, will be integrated through Navantia Combat Management System SCOMBA F110 and will enable the service to conduct maritime surveillance, search and protection missions in any theatre of operations. To protect their maritime territory and security interests around the world, States need to counter all types of threats in any environment or theatre of operations. Naval forces need reliable, high-performance systems to assert national sovereignty and accomplish their ASW missions with optimum effect. The choice of Thales technologies, which have been extensively proven in service with navies around the world, provides the highest levels of protection available today. BlueScan is a collaborative ASW solution that processes significantly higher volumes of sonar data from various different platforms to provide the operator with a complete overview of the acoustic situation in real time. The solution leverages Big Data analytics and artificial intelligence technologies to bring naval forces a tactical advantage. Under this contract, key underwater acoustics technology will be transferred to Spanish industry, in particular for the supply of the TUUM-6 digital underwater communication system and acoustic arrays. “After two years of talks with the Spanish Navy and Navantia about this contract to equip five F110 frigates, we welcome Spain's decision to join other NATO countries (the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Norway) and Australia in placing their trust in Thales for their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. To help their naval forces conduct their missions in today's heightened underwater threat environment, Thales has invested for many years in Australia, France and the United Kingdom to develop a unique set of digital sonar data processing and analytics technologies. Given the complexity of the underwater environment and the level of sophistication of the adversary, digitalisation and data fusion techniques are the only effective way to counter undersea threats in the 21st century. With our Spanish partners, and with Navantia in particular, we are very pleased to have the opportunity to strengthen our cooperation on this programme, in which local industry will play a significant role in producing, integrating and maintaining the systems alongside the Spanish Navy." Alexis Morel, Vice President, Underwater Systems, Thales • Thales sonars and acoustic systems will provide the Spanish Navy's five F110 frigates with a latest-generation anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. • The key components of the integrated suite are the BlueMaster (UMS 4110) and CAPTAS 4 Compact sonars, the TUUM-6 underwater communication system, and the BlueScan digital acoustic system already in service with other European navies. • Spanish industry partners will supply some of the high-tech equipment under a decisive transfer of technology programme put in place by Thales. View source version on Thales: https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/group/press-release/thales-integrated-sonar-suite-selected-spanish-navys-new-multi-mission-frigates

  • Bradley Replacement: Did Army Ask For ‘Unobtainium’?

    January 24, 2020 | International, Land

    Bradley Replacement: Did Army Ask For ‘Unobtainium’?

    By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: For the third time in 11 years, the Army's attempt to replace the 1980s-vintage M2 Bradley ran afoul of the age-old tradeoff between armor and mobility, several knowledgeable sources tell Breaking Defense. The General Dynamics prototype for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle – the only competitor left after other companies bowed out or were disqualified – was too heavy to meet the Army's requirement that a single Air Force C-17 cargo jet could carry two complete OMFVs to a war zone, we're told. But the vehicle had to be that heavy, GD's defenders say, to meet the Army's requirement for armor protection. Now, the Army hasn't officially said why it cancelled the current OMFV contract. Senior leaders – Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville; the four-star chief of Army Futures Command, Gen. Mike Murray; and the civilian Army Acquisition Executive, Assistant Secretary Bruce Jette – have all publicly acknowledged that the requirements and timeline were “aggressive.” (Yes, all three men used the same word). Jette was the most specific, telling reporters that one vendor – which, from the context of his remark, could only be GD – did not meet all the requirements, but he wouldn't say which requirements weren't met. So, while we generally avoid writing a story based solely on anonymous sources, in this case we decided their track records (which we can't tell you about) were so good and the subject was so important that it was worth going ahead. “Industry told the Army the schedule was ‘unobtainium,' but they elected to proceed anyway,” one source told us: That's why the other potential competitors dropped out, seeing the requirements as too hard to meet. In particular, the source said, “industry needs more time to evaluate the trade [offs] associated with achieving the weight requirement.” With more time, industry might have been able to refine the design further to reduce weight, redesign major components to be lighter, or possibly – and this one is a stretch – even invent new stronger, lighter materials. But on the schedule the Army demanded, another source told us, reaching the minimum allowable protection without exceeding the maximum allowable weight was physically impossible. Why This Keeps Happening The Army's been down this road before and stalled out in similar ways. The Ground Combat Vehicle was too heavy, the Future Combat Systems vehicles were too light; “just right” still seems elusive. In 2009, Defense Secretary Bob Gates cancelled the Future Combat Systems program, whose BAE-designed Manned Ground Vehicles – including a Bradley replacement – had been designed to such strict weight limits that they lacked adequate armor. The Army had initially asked for the FCS vehicles to come in under 20 tons so one could fit aboard an Air Force C-130 turboprop transport. After that figure proved unfeasible, and the Air Force pointed out a C-130 couldn't actually carry 20 tons any tactically useful distance, the weight crept up to 26 tons, but the added armor wasn't enough to satisfy Gates' concerns about roadside bombs, then taking a devastating toll on US soldiers in Iraq. Four years later, amidst tightening budgets, the Army itself gave up on the Ground Combat Vehicle, another Bradley replacement, after strict requirements for armor protection drove both competing designs – from General Dynamics and BAE Systems – into the 56-70 ton range, depending on the level of modular add-on armor bolted onto the basic chassis. (A much-publicized Governmental Accountability Office study claimed GCV could reach 84 tons, but that was a projection for future growth, not an actual design). Not quite nine months ago, after getting initial feedback from industry on the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, the Army made the tough call to reduce its protection requirements somewhat to make it possible to fit two OMFVs on a C-17. If our sources are correct, however, it didn't reduce the armor requirement enough for General Dynamics to achieve the weight goal. One source says that two of the General Dynamics vehicles would fit on a C-17 if you removed its modular armor. The add-on armor kit could then be shipped to the war zone on a separate flight and installed, or simply left off if intelligence was sure the enemy lacked heavy weapons. But the requirements didn't allow for that compromise, and the Army wasn't willing to waive them, the source said, because officers feared a vehicle in the less-armored configuration could get troops killed. Other Options Now, there are ways to protect a vehicle besides heavy passive armor. Some IEDs in Iraq were big enough to cripple a 70-ton M1 Abrams. Russian tanks get by with much lighter passive armor covered by a layer of so-called reactive armor, which explodes outwards when hit, blasting incoming warheads before they can penetrate. Both Russia and Israel have fielded, and the US Army is urgently acquiring, Active Protection Systems that shoot down incoming projectiles. The problem with both reactive armor and active protection is that they're only proven effective against explosive warheads, like those found on anti-tank missiles. They're much less useful against solid shells, and while no missile ever fielded can use those, a tank's main gun can fling solid shot with such force that it penetrates armor through sheer concentrated kinetic energy. (Protecting against roadside bombs and land mines is yet another design issue, because they explode from underneath, but it's no longer the all-consuming question it once ways. Advances in suspension, blast-deflecting hull shapes, and shock absorption for the crew have made even the four-wheeled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle remarkably IED-resistant and pretty comfortable). If the Army were willing to take the risk of relying more on active protection systems, or give industry more time to improve active protection technology, it could reduce its requirements for heavy passive armor. Or the Army could remove the soldiers from its combat vehicles entirely and operate them with a mix of automation and remote control, which would make crew protection a moot point. In fact, the service is investing in lightly-armored and relatively expendable Robotic Combat Vehicles – but it still sees those unmanned machines as adjuncts to humans, not replacements. As long as the Army puts soldiers on the battlefield, it will want the vehicles that carry them to be well-protected. Alternatively, the Army could drop its air transport requirements and accept a much heavier vehicle. Israel has already done this with its Namer troop carrier, a modified Merkava heavy tank, but then the Israel army doesn't plan to fight anywhere far away. The US, by contrast, routinely intervenes overseas and has dismantled many of its Cold War bases around the world. Air transport is a limited commodity anyway, and war plans assume most heavy equipment will either arrive by sea or be pre-positioned in warehouses on allied territory. But the Army really wants to have the option to send at least some armored vehicles by air in a crisis. If the Army won't give ground on either protection or transportability, then it faces a different dilemma: They need to either give industry more time to invent something revolutionary, or accept a merely evolutionary improvement. “We're going to reset the requirements, we're going to reset the acquisition strategy and timeline,” Gen. McConville said about OMFV on Tuesday. But, when he discussed Army modernization overall, he repeatedly emphasized that “we need transformational change, not incremental improvements. “Transformational change is how we get overmatch and how we get dominance in the future,” the Chief of Staff said. “We aren't looking for longer cords for our phones or faster horses for our cavalry.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/bradley-replacement-did-army-ask-for-unobtainium

  • USAF Seeks Third-Party Vendors For F-22 Sensor, Capability Upgrades

    January 14, 2022 | International, Aerospace

    USAF Seeks Third-Party Vendors For F-22 Sensor, Capability Upgrades

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