June 20, 2018 | International, Naval
WASHINGTON — The Navy's acquisition boss, aiming to get his arms around the long-term maintenance and ownership costs of the world's most complex fleet, has directed Naval Sea Systems Command to undertake an ambitious long-term plan for all the ships in the fleet.
James “Hondo” Geurts, the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, has asked NAVSEA to compile a 30-year ship repair and maintenance plan that he intends to roll out alongside the annual shipbuilding plan.
“The idea is, we have this 30-year shipbuilding plan, that's only as good as our ability to repair and modernize those ships once we build them,” Geurts told a gaggle of reporters Tuesday. “So what we'd like to do is create the companion plan that takes the shipbuilding plan and what we have in inventory, then forecast and plan for all the repair and modernizations that we'll have to do.”
The Navy wants to have an idea, as it looks down to road, if it has the needed industrial capacity and infrastructure in place to meet the fleet's needs, which will become especially important as the fleet builds up.
In fact, the Navy struggles to adequately maintain the smaller fleet it has today. In testimony last week, NAVSEA head Vice Adm. Thomas Moore told House lawmakers that the net capacity private shipyards that handle surface ship maintenance was only 75 percent of what the Navy required.
During the past decade, the increasing demands on a smaller fleet drove deployment lengths to nine months or longer, which racked up a readiness deficit that the Navy is still working through. Deployment lengths have come back down closer to seven months, but the unpredictable operations tempo made it difficult for the Navy to plan yards periods and impacted the business of the private shipyards.
Geurts conceded that operations will undoubtedly impact a 30-year maintenance schedule but said having it on paper was the right place to start when managing complicated schedules.
“It's a very complex issue with inputs and outputs,” Geurts said. “But the only thing I know is the best way to get after a complex issue is laying out at least what you know and having that at least as a baseline so then when you have to do changes – for operational reasons of whatever — you are changing from a known baseline and you can understand quickly what the second and third order effects are. Like we do on new construction, I'd like to introduce that kind of rigor.”
Ultimately the hope is that industry can plan better with a long-term plan in place, Geurts said.
“My hope is if we can do that, industry can start planning resources, they can start hiring resources when they see the signal,” he said. “Right now we are not as well positioned in the future as I'd like to be.”
June 6, 2024 | International, Aerospace
The electronic warfare (EW) pod detects and counters inbound threats, protecting the Poseidon and its crews, and expanding the aircraft’s operating range in contested environments.
August 21, 2018 | International, C4ISR
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. ARLINGTON: As the Army reboots its battlefield radio networks, it's jettisoning exquisitely custom-made military waveforms and moving to simpler — but more capable — commercial radio protocols. The move is underway on three fronts, Maj. Gen. David Bassett, the two-star Program Executive Officer for command, control & communications – Tactical (PEO C3T), says: The Army's already moving its backpack-mounted tactical radio, the Manpack, from the milspec Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) to the commercial TSM waveform, with both Harris and Rockwell Collins now integrating TSM in their radios. (Special operators already use TSM). They're currently selecting vendors to do the same for their handheld Leader Radio, mainly used by junior and non-commissioned officers on foot. Bassett's staff told me to expect an award sometime in September. They're exploring alternatives to the Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) as the “backbone” of the Army's tactical network. TSM is one candidate but there are others, including some still in development, Bassett told me in an interview here. It's all part of a wider effort to rebuild the Army's command, control, and communications (C3) networks for war against a high-tech great power. Speaking at a cyber and networks conference held here Aug. 2 by the Association of the US Army, Bassett said the Army will conduct operational testing of new command systems — including two lower-complexity alternatives to complement the current mainstay, JBC-P — and start fielding them, he said, “this fall.” Why the rush? Army systems like WIN-T(Warfighter Information Network – Tactical) worked adequately as long as we had big bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, with plenty of time to set up extensive infrastructure and minimal enemy interference. China and Russia, however, have cutting-edge cyber and electronic warfare attackers to hack the network software, powerful electronic warfare units to jam its transmissions, and long-range precision guided missiles that can easily target large, stationary command posts. So last year Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley ordered a crash program of improvements, cancelling planned WIN-T upgrades in favor of new technologies, many from the thriving commercial IT sector. “It was kind of a shock to the system,” the Army's Chief Information Officer, Lt. Gen. Bruce Crawford, told the AUSA conference. “The Army came forward and said there were some programs it wanted to halt and some things it fundamentally wanted to do differently.” Appealing To Industry Gen. Milley's announcement met with initial resistance, including on Capitol Hill, but inspired intense interest from industry. Maj. Gen. Bassett himself had come to the AUSA conference from a meeting in Raleigh, one corner of North Carolina's thriving“research triangle,” where he had briefed 400 representatives from some 126 companies. “Down in Raleigh, the challenge that I gave them was learn how you fit into our network design. Propose solutions that will fit into our network,” Bassett said. “We want them to become part of that infrastructure rather than competing with it.” https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-takes-its-radio-network-commercial-can-you-hear-me-now
August 17, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Fenella McGerty The two Russian defense companies in this year's Top 100 list — air defense missile systems manufacturer Almaz-Antey and weapons developer Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC — have again fallen in rank. Almaz-Antey has fallen to 17th place from 8th and 15th in 2018 and 2019 respectively. Similarly, Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC has fallen to 35th place from 25th and 32nd in 2018 and 2019 respectively. The falling revenues of the companies this year reflect the difficult market conditions these enterprises are operating in as a result of the impact of COVID-19 on government budgets. Even before the pandemic and the consequent contraction in economic output emerged, the outlook for Russian defense spending was already subdued in light of persistently low oil prices in 2019. Domestic spending was further constrained this year as the oil price fell below $20 per barrel in April, with the projected average price for the year reaching just $40 per barrel. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 6.6 percent contraction in Russia's real gross domestic product this year as lockdown measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 subdued domestic and international economic activity, the latter further weakening global energy demand. The 4.1 percent growth projected for 2021 means the Russian economy will only return to pre-pandemic output in 2022. Last month, as part of wider measures to offset the bleaker fiscal setting, the Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a 5 percent reduction in financing for the state armament program over the next three years. Under the new plans, the 20 trillion rouble (U.S. $271 billion), 10-year military appropriations program (known as GPV 2027) that runs to 2027 covering defense procurement, repairs, research and development, and infrastructure investment will be reduced by a total of 225 billion roubles between 2021 and 2023. Wider defense funding could be reduced by as much 323 billion roubles. The previous state armament program (GPV 2020) saw significant increases enacted to defense investment between 2011 and 2016 as the country pursued ambitious modernization targets. As a proportion of GDP, the official Russian defense budget peaked in 2015 at 3.8 percent. If one includes wider defense spending items such as military pensions, social support and housing, total Russia expenditure accounted for as much at 4.8 percent of GDP that year. This period of significant defense investment helped to recover some lost ground from the previous two decades. Progress was remarkable but by no means comprehensive, with strategic nuclear forces and defense aerospace surpassing modernization targets, while maritime and land forces fared less well. Pockets of advanced capability — e.g., air defense, weapons, combat aircraft — evolved alongside less efficient entities that failed to deliver against the ambitions of GPV 2020. Nonetheless, as Russia approached the overarching target of 70 percent “modern” equipment within the armed forces inventory, defense spending increases slowed and the country moved from a period of dramatic capability buildup toward a sustainment phase — a move further presaged by wider economic constraints at the time As such, GPV 2027 is less ambitious than GPV 2020, and annual defense budget allocations have reflected this. Russian defense spending has been stagnant in real terms since 2017, as sanctions impacted government finances, energy revenues remained subdued and modernization ambitions were deemed close to fulfillment. Official projections of the budget for national defense saw slightly stronger growth in 2021 and 2022, although this was proposed in the months before the full economic ramifications of the pandemic were realized. Russian companies therefore face a tighter domestic market — as indeed will most countries in the wake of the pandemic — while the burden of debt has stifled investment in new technologies and R&D. This lack of funds to invest in research has created a further challenge for companies facing increasing political pressure domestically to diversify production efforts toward the civil market. The reported moves to restructure defense industry debt will ease some of the stress on companies and provide some temporary bandwidth with which to focus on investment. However, such moves will further constrain domestic defense spending, as funds to absolve debt will inevitably squeeze investment elsewhere in the budget. Perhaps on the positive side, the further weakening of the rouble against the dollar in 2020 has the potential to provide Russian defense equipment with an added price advantage in global defense markets and to facilitate exports. The comparatively cheaper kit will appeal to countries that find they have less investment funds at their disposal than a year ago. As competition in export markets intensifies and funding tightens, buyers may find they can demand greater industrial participation, partnership and technology transfer in moves to bolster self-sufficiency and resilience. Markets which have previously shown preference for Western equipment may find such capabilities are no longer affordable with Russia's relative willingness to offer favorable exchange rate agreements and flexible financing terms, offering a further advantage in constrained export markets. Fenella McGerty is a senior fellow for defense economics at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/17/budget-and-pandemic-present-challenges-to-russias-defense-industrial-base