April 16, 2020 | International, C4ISR
Martijn Rasser
There's no question the post-corona world will be very different. How it will look depends on actions the world's leaders take. Decisions made in coming months will determine whether we see a renewed commitment to a rules-based international order, or a fragmented world increasingly dominated by authoritarianism. Whomever steps up to lead will drive the outcome.
China seeks the mantle of global leadership. Beijing is exploiting the global leadership vacuum, the fissures between the United States and its allies, and the growing strain on European unity. The Chinese Communist Party has aggressively pushed a narrative of acting swiftly and decisively to contain the virus, building goodwill through ‘mask diplomacy', and sowing doubts about the virus' origin to deflect blame for the magnitude of the crisis and to rewrite history. Even though the results so far are mixed, the absence of the United States on the global stage provides Beijing with good momentum.
Before the pandemic, the world's democracies already faced their gravest challenge in decades: the shift of economic power to illiberal states. By late 2019, autocratic regimes accounted for a larger share of global GDP than democracies for the first time since 1900. As former U.K. foreign secretary David Miliband recently observed, “liberal democracy is in retreat.” How the United States and like-minded partners respond post-pandemic will determine if that trend holds.
There is urgency to act — the problem is now even more acute. The countries that figure out how to quickly restart and rebuild their economies post-pandemic will set the course for the 21st century. It is not only economic heft that is of concern: political power and military might go hand in hand with economic dominance.
At the center of this geostrategic and economic competition are technologies — artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and 5G — that will be the backbone of the 21st century economy. Leadership and ongoing innovation in these areas will confer critical economic, political, and military power, and the opportunity to shape global norms and values. The pre-crisis trajectory of waning clout in technology development, standards-setting, and proliferation posed an unacceptable and avoidable challenge to the interests of the world's leading liberal-democratic states.
The current crisis accentuates this even more: it lays bare the need to rethink and restructure global supply chains; the imperative of ensuring telecommunication networks are secure, robust, and resilient; the ability to surge production of critical materiel, and the need to deter and counteract destructive disinformation. This is difficult and costly — and it is best done in concert.
Bold action is needed to set a new course that enhances the ability of the world's democracies to out-compete increasingly capable illiberal states. The growing clout of authoritarian regimes is not rooted in better strategy or more effective statecraft. Rather, it lies in the fractious and complacent nature of the world's democracies and leading technology powers.
In response, a new multilateral effort — an alliance framework — is needed to reverse these trends. The world's technology and democracy leaders — the G7 members and countries like Australia, the Netherlands, and South Korea — should join forces to tackle matters of technology policy. The purpose of this initiative is three-fold: one, regain the initiative in the global technology competition through strengthened cooperation between like-minded countries; two, protect and preserve key areas of competitive technological advantage; and three, promote collective norms and values around the use of emerging technologies.
Such cooperation is vital to effectively deal with the hardest geopolitical issues that increasingly center on technology, from competing economically to building deterrence to combating disinformation. This group should not be an exclusive club: it should also work with countries like Finland and Sweden to align policies on telecommunications; Estonia, Israel, and New Zealand for cyber issues; and states around the world to craft efforts to counter the proliferation of Chinese surveillance technology and offer sound alternatives to infrastructure development, raw material extraction, and loans from China that erode their sovereignty.
The spectrum of scale and ambition this alliance can tackle is broad. Better information sharing would yield benefits on matters like investment screening, counterespionage, and fighting disinformation. Investments in new semiconductor fabs could create more secure and diverse supply chains. A concerted effort to promote open architecture in 5G could usher in a paradigm shift for an entire industry. Collaboration will also be essential to avoiding another pandemic calamity.
Similar ideas are percolating among current and former government leaders in capitals such as Tokyo, Berlin, London, and Washington, with thought leaders like Jared Cohen and Anja Manuel, and in think tanks around the world. The task at hand is to collate these ideas, find the common ground, and devise an executable plan. This requires tackling issues like organizational structure, governance, and institutionalization. It also requires making sure that stakeholders from government, industry, and civil society from around the world provide input to make the alliance framework realistic and successful.
No one country can expect to achieve its full potential by going it alone, not even the United States. An alliance framework for technology policy is the best way to ensure that the world's democracies can effectively compete economically, politically, and militarily in the 21st century. The links between the world's leading democracies remain strong despite the challenges of the current crisis. These relationships are an enduring and critical advantage that no autocratic country can match. It is time to capitalize on these strengths, retake the initiative, and shape the post-corona world.
Martijn Rasser is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
August 3, 2022 | International, Aerospace
As the Canadian federal government negotiates with its U.S. counterpart for the sale of the F-35 to replace the RCAF CF-188 Hornet, Top Aces is preparing for how best to deliver aggressor air training for a fighter far more advanced than the Hornet.
October 1, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR
By: Todd South MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va., ― Last year at the annual military expo here, Commandant Gen. Robert B. Neller told industry his vision for simulations is a kind of Star Trek-like holodeck in which any Marine could fight any battle on any terrain in virtual reality. Since then, Secretary of Defense James Mattis has said that close combat infantry units should fight 25 battles before they ever taste real combat. This year one of the Marines in charge of bringing those simulation dreams to reality laid down some of the tangible needs of the Corps now and in the near-term. Lt. Col. Byron Harder, with Training and Education Command's capabilities division, told the audience at this year's Modern Day Marine military expo that while live training will always remain the standard against which a unit's readiness is measured, even live training has its limits. It costs a lot of money to ship Marines out to Twentynine Palms or other areas. It costs money to fire munitions. Some of those munitions can't be fired in most areas. Some of the advanced weapons, such as cyber and electronic warfare types, can't be used for fear of damaging civilian networks or facilities in the United States. And some really advanced weapons can't be demonstrated where just anyone can see them in action, thus revealing our tech to adversaries. And that is where simulations can help bridge the gap. But first, there's a list of things that must come to fruition. Much of that is going to be software and bandwidth, basically getting better versions of terrains and simulations that are more realistic and can accommodate as much as a division's worth of players and an equally complex, simulated adversary. But some items are smaller and more hands-on, like better virtual reality and augmented reality headsets. Those headsets are key since the Marines want them to work not as they do now, with pounds of cabling in bulky indoor shooting simulators but light with long-lasting batteries that can be taken in the field and on deployment. Harder said a goggle that is about twice the weight of existing eye protection, perhaps with its power source somewhere on the body, is likely five to 10 years away based on his survey of the field. There's another an ongoing need: better drones. But instead of longer flying, large-scale drones that can coordinate complex fires and sensors for the operational environment, what Harder said simulations needs are smaller drones that can fly lower, giving Marines a street-level, detailed view of the battlespace so they can create their own terrain maps and fight the simulated fight in the areas they'll really be operating in. And those video feeds that are now on every ISR platform in the real world? Simulations need them too, to be realistic. That means game designers have to have human-like activity going on in areas instead of some digital “blob” representing enemies. That way, when a commander wants to zoom in on a tactical frame in the game, they'll be able to do it just like in theater. Which brings it to one of the more ambitious items beyond terrain and hardware: getting simulations to act more like humans. As it works now, unit commanders set up their forces, work their mission sets and then the virtual “forces” collide and often a scripted scenario plays out. Not too realistic. What's needed is both civilian simulations to act like civilian populations might act in the real world and the same for the enemy, taking advantages, fighting and withdrawing. But one step further is key: The enemy has to talk back. When a commander finishes the fight, they should be able to query the virtual enemy and figure out why it did what it did, how it gained a certain advantage. And it shouldn't take a programmer to “talk” with the simulation. Units communicate via voice and chat. That's how simulations users must be able to talk with their simulated civilians, allies and enemies, in plain language. These pursuits are not happening in a vacuum. This April for the first time Marine pilots at both Yuma, Arizona, and Camp Pendleton, California, ran flight simulations coordinated with ground units at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. Those were done at a battalion level with a short prep time, far different than the large-scale Marine Expeditionary Unit or Marine Expeditionary Brigade-sized training that is typical. That is part of a larger effort to create a “plug-and-play” type of training module that any battalion, and later smaller units, can use at home station or on deployment to conduct complex, coordinated training. What made that work new was pairing legacy systems with a variety of software and operating systems between them. That's another example of what needs to be fixed. Marines and other services are, in many cases, using systems that were designed decades apart and creating a labyrinth of patchwork methods to get the hardware to work together when it wasn't built for that type of operation. The new systems must be open architecture so that new tech, new weapons and new terrain can be added on the fly. But also secure enough to operate across networks and not be spied upon by those who would want a peek at our tactics. Across the infantry battalions Marines received new gear last year called Tactical Decision Kits. These allow for squad to company-sized elements to do video game-play for their unit exercises, complete with NFL-style replay of engagements and decisions. That's a low-level example of one thing that's lacking in current training, Harder said. Right now the main piece of tech for a Marine commander conducting an after action review is a pen and paper pad. But with ISR drones, body cams and sensors, Marines in the near-term future should be able to monitor individual Marine's energy and hydration levels, where they pointed their weapon, when they fired, how many rounds, if they hit their target, even where their eyes were looking while on patrol. And, if on deployment, Marines can't rely on a cadre of civilian contractors back home to run their hardware. To that end, the Corps began two courses last year, the Simulation Professional Course and the Simulations Specialist Course. Both give Marines in infantry units experience setting up simulations and running the games for their units. They input training objectives and can understand and put together training for the unit staff or just for their fire team back in the barracks. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/09/28/here-is-the-current-checklist-for-marine-corps-simulations-training
July 2, 2019 | International, Aerospace
By PAUL MCLEARY WASHINGTON: As the Marine Corps prepares to wrap up the first deployment of its innovative mobile counter-drone system to the Middle East, the service is rushing ahead to put lasers on a ground vehicle, with an eye to shooting down drones. While the deployed Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System — mounted on two Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicles — can move quickly and electronically jam drones, the Marines are looking for something a little more...well, kinetic. They hope they've found it in the Compact Laser Weapons System (CLaWS) program. It is the first ground-based laser approved by the Pentagon for use by ground troops. Marine Lt. Col. Ho Lee, product manager for Ground Based Air Defense Weapons Systems, said in a statement that the CLaWS program has been developed, troops trained on it, and its been fielded for testing all in about a year's time, a timeline the Corps is hoping will get the system fielded in a relatively short time period. “We've been doing rapid prototyping, rapid delivery,” Lee said. “With this and a lot of the other efforts we are doing, we are using items currently available and integrating them to meet a capability. Little development, if any, went into this.” Back in 2017, Boeing began developing the system in 2-kW, 5-kW and 10-kW configurations. But it's unclear which version the Marines are testing. The Army has already placed a version of the weapon on a Stryker for testing in Europe, while the Marines last year showed it off on top of a JLTV. The idea is to get the system in the field as part of a larger, integrated air defense system that can protect deployed troops from DIY drones to more sophisticated models built by nation states. Despite the Pentagon's National Defense Strategy which prioritize equipping the force for competition with China and Russia, out in the world, there are still 15,000 US troops in Afghanistan, 5,000 in Iraq and somewhere around 2,000 in Syria, all of whom are in range of small, DIY drones made by insurgent groups or second-tier states. In Syria, Iranian-made drones operated by the Asad regime have dropped small bombs near US troops, and US aircraft have been forced to shoot them down using aircraft that launch expensive missiles, creating a cost imbalance that favors the other side. Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq have also long weaponized small commercial quadcopter drones to drop small munitions on Iraqi troops and US-backed fighters, who have little to no protection against them. The Taliban has filmed attacks on Afghan outposts from a collection of drones, as well. “We will never deploy again to a theater of operations where we are not under threat from unmanned aerial systems,” UK's Maj. Gen. Felix Gedney, former deputy commander of US and coalition troops in Iraq and Syria in 2017-2018 said recently. “Both those high-end systems of our near-peer competitors, and lower, off-the-shelf, botched-together systems that are developed by asymmetric enemies. And we need to get used to that.” https://breakingdefense.com/2019/06/marines-develop-laser-to-fry-drones-from-jltvs/