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July 8, 2020 | International, Aerospace

Stop buying Turkey’s F-35 parts, lawmakers tell DoD

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WASHINGTON ― A bipartisan group of lawmakers is urging the Pentagon to more quickly stop buying F-35 fighter jet components from Turkey.

Sens. James Lankford, R-Okla.; Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H.; Thom Tillis, R-N.C.; and Chris Van Hollen, D-Md., complained in a letter to Defense Secretary Mark Esper on July 6 that the Pentagon's plans to buy parts from Turkey into 2022 undercuts U.S. pressure on the country over its purchase of the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system.

The U.S. formally removed Turkey from the multinational program in 2019 over the S-400 deal, and it ended training on the jet for Turkish pilots. Furthermore, the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act barred the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey. The U.S. has warned that Turkey's use of the S-400 could compromise the stealthy F-35.

But Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord told reporters in January that it would allow prime contractor Lockheed Martin and engine-maker Pratt & Whitney to honor existing contractual obligations with Turkish manufacturers for F-35 components. That means Lockheed would receive Turkish parts through the end of Lot 14, with those planes set to be delivered to customers in 2022.

Turkish manufacturers were involved in building more than 900 parts for the F-35, and Pentagon officials said in November that it had found replacement suppliers for nearly all of them. Moving production from Turkey to the U.S. was projected to cost more than $500 million in nonrecurring engineering costs.

The lawmakers pointed to Turkey's authoritarian drift under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and to human rights violations in Syria and Iraq. Though it wasn't mentioned in the letter, CNN broke news last month that Erdogan had pressed U.S. President Donald Trump in frequent phone calls for policy concessions and other favors, worrying Trump's national security advisers.

The lawmakers argued to Esper that continuing to buy parts violates the 2020 NDAA and its “clear diplomatic message to Turkey about the consequences of moving forward with Russian defense systems and technology.”

“Based on recent revelations, it is clear that the Pentagon is not following its own timeline or the intent of Congress in this matter,” the letter read. “We encourage you to reexamine the present approach and take action to ensure an expedited removal of Turkey from the manufacturing line as required by law.”

Valerie Insinna contributed to this report.

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/07/07/stop-buying-turkeys-f-35-parts-already-lawmakers-tell-dod/

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  • DoD SBIR/STTR Pre-Release: DoD SBIR BAA 21.2, DoD STTR BAA 21.B, Air Force CSO X21.2, Air Force CSO X21.B

    April 21, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    DoD SBIR/STTR Pre-Release: DoD SBIR BAA 21.2, DoD STTR BAA 21.B, Air Force CSO X21.2, Air Force CSO X21.B

    The DoD Small Business and Technology Partnerships Office announces the pre-release of the following Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) and Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs): • DoD Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) BAA 21.2 • DoD Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) BAA 21.B • Air Force CSO X21.2 • Air Force CSO X21.B IMPORTANT DATES: • April 21, 2021: Pre-release begins • May 19, 2021: BAA opens, begin submitting proposals in DSIP • June 3, 2021: Topic Q&A closes to new questions at 12:00 p.m. ET • June 17, 2021: BAA closes, full proposals must be submitted in DSIP no later than 12:00 p.m. ET The instructions and topics for these BAAs and CSOs are available on DSIP at https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/login and at https://rt.cto.mil/rtl-small-business-resources/sbir-sttr/. Updated DoD SBIR/STTR Program & Proposal Requirements The following requirements are in place for all SBIR and STTR proposal submissions. Details on these requirements can be found in section 5.0 of the 21.2 SBIR and 21.B STTR BAAs and relevant attachments can be found in both BAAs and CSOs. 1. Foreign Ownership Disclosure Requirement • Any offeror submitting a proposal under these BAAs and CSOs will be required to disclose via self-report any foreign ownership or control. Proposers must review Attachment 2: Foreign Ownership or Control Disclosure to determine applicability. Offerors shall also require any proposed subcontractors included in their proposal under this BAA to disclose via self-report any foreign ownership or control. If applicable, an authorized firm representative must complete the Foreign Ownership or Control Disclosure (attached to both 21.2 SBIR and 21.B STTR BAAs). The completed and signed disclosure must be uploaded to Volume 5 of the proposal submission. 2. Contractor Certification Regarding Provision of Prohibited Video Surveillance and Telecommunications Services and Equipment • DoD must comply with Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019; therefore, all proposals must include certifications in Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses 52.204-24, 52.204-25, and 52.204-26, executed by the proposer's authorized company representative. The Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses may be found as attachments to both 21.2 SBIR and 21.B STTR BAAs and will be available to download during proposal submission and uploaded to Volume 5: Supporting Documents. 3. Company Commercialization Report (Volume 4) • The Company Commercialization Report (CCR) will be required for all proposal submissions. Proposers must complete the CCR by logging into their account at https://www.sbir.gov/, downloading a PDF copy of the CCR, and uploading the PDF to the DSIP proposal submission. • WARNING: Uploading a new Company Commercialization Report (CCR) under the Firm Information section of DSIP or clicking “Save” or “Submit” in Volume 4 of one proposal submission is considered a change for ALL proposals under any open BAAs or CSOs. If a proposing firm has previously certified and submitted any Phase I or Direct to Phase II proposals under any BAA or CSO that is still open, those proposals will be automatically reopened. Proposing firms will have to recertify and resubmit such proposals. If a proposing firm does not recertify or resubmit such proposals, they will not be considered fully submitted and will not be evaluated. 4. Fraud, Waste and Abuse Training (Volume 6) • The Fraud, Waste and Abuse (FWA) training is required for all proposal submissions. 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  • Turkey Is Deploying Lots Of Air Defense Systems In Syria And Libya

    July 8, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Turkey Is Deploying Lots Of Air Defense Systems In Syria And Libya

    In recent months, Turkey has deployed an array of air defense missile systems in Syria and Libya to deter and defend against air and drone attacks mounted by its rivals in these war zones. On February 27, airstrikes killed 34 Turkish soldiers deployed in Syria's northwest province of Idlib during clashes with pro-regime forces. It was the largest single loss of Turkish troops in a single incident in years. Turkey responded ferociously, launching Operation Spring Shield. It used its formidable armed drones to devastate Syrian ground forces and armor. Turkish Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon jet fighters shot down three Syrian warplanes with long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles without having to leave Turkish airspace. A Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the clashes in early March. However, Turkey quickly realized the importance of air defenses in the volatile region. It had already requested the U.S. deploy MIM-104 Patriot missiles on its southern border shortly after launching Operation Spring Shield. Aside from its controversial purchase of S-400 air defenses from Russia, which it hasn't activated yet, Turkey's air defenses are mostly short- and medium-range and relatively antiquated. The U.S. did not deploy any Patriots in Turkey this year. The only NATO country to deploy a Patriot battery in Turkey this year is Spain. Ankara has since deployed its own MIM-23 air defense missiles in Idlib. However, that system is much older and much less effective than the PAC-3 Patriot. The Turkish press also cited an official in early March saying that Turkey would deploy its domestically-built Hisar low-altitude air defense missiles to Idlib. However, it's unclear if any of these missiles were actually fielded. It's also been claimed that Turkey even deployed old Soviet-era S-200 air defense systems, acquired from Ukraine, in northern Idlib. This claim is unverified and also highly unlikely. The Turkish military is also becoming more deeply involved in the civil war in Libya where it's supporting the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in the capital Tripoli that controls the west, against General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), based in Benghazi that controls the east. In Libya, Turkey has deployed a formidable array of air defense missiles in the country's west and has also made significant headway in establishing an “air defense bubble” around Tripoli. As The Washington Institute for Near East Policy observed: “The combination of medium-range U.S.-made MIM-23 Hawk missile systems, Hisar short-range SAMs, and Korkut antiaircraft guns created a layered defense over critical infrastructure and reduced the threat to GNA drone ground stations and launch operations.” “This protection, combined with an increase in Turkish operators and equipment, allowed Libyan government forces to increase the number and effectiveness of their drone operations,” the report added. While formidable, Turkish air defenses in western Libya have their limitations. Turkish military analyst Metin Gurcan, recently pointed out that “medium- and high-altitude air defense is vital for air dominance in the Sirte-al-Jufra axis, but this remains a problem for Turkey, though low-altitude air defense has been secured through the deployment of the Hisar air defense systems in Libya.” Gurcan went on to note that Turkey's far more advanced high-altitude S-400s haven't been activated and the prospect of transferring those sophisticated missiles – which could establish a game-changing Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone over wherever they are deployed – to Libya “is out of question.” Turkey also deployed two MIM-23 Hawk batteries at al-Watiya airbase. They did not seem to have hindered an airstrike on July 3 carried out by unidentified warplanes, although they may not yet have been fully set up when that strike occurred. The jets that attacked al-Watiya – which was captured from the LNA by a Turkish-backed GNA offensive in May that broke the LNA siege on Tripoli and enabled the GNA to go on the offensive – likely belonged to a foreign air force supporting the LNA. One Turkish official said the jets were Dassault Mirage fighters. If true, then they were most likely Mirage 2000 jets belonging to the United Arab Emirates, a key backer of Haftar. The Arab Weekly, on the other hand, cited informed sources who claim the aircraft were Dassault Rafale jets, not Mirages. This would limit the attackers to either Egypt or France, both of which possess those multirole fighter jets and both of which support the LNA. The LNA wants to prevent Turkey from establishing a base in al-Watiya and further solidify its growing presence in the country by creating more air defense bubbles across the west. Turkey wants to help the GNA push on its offensive and capture the strategically-important city of Sirte and the al-Jufra region, including the eponymous airbase where Russia delivered MiG-29 and Su-24 warplanes in May. What happens next in Libya is anyone's guess. Turkey is likely to retain its presence and increase the number of its air defense missiles in Libya, especially if the GNA advances further eastward in the coming weeks. https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/07/07/turkey-is-deploying-lots-of-air-defense-systems-in-syria-and-libya/#727c5aae5555

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