February 24, 2024 | International, Aerospace
How interoperability benefits military, civil and commercial domains
Opinion: By focusing on interoperability, new capabilities can be quickly adopted and rolled out without significant system redesign.
February 16, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
Spain to double its military spending
By Alejandro López
8 February 2018
Defence spending will double by 2024, Defence Minister María Dolores de Cospedal has told Spain's parliamentary Defence Committee. The defence budget will increase from 0.8 percent of GDP (€8.7 billion) to 1.53 percent (€18.47 billion).
To limit popular opposition to war and anger against increased military expenditure, while austerity has decimated public services and made life more precarious for millions of workers and youth, Cospedal refused to publish the letter addressed to NATO outlining the increase, as she had initially promised. She claimed that part of the content was classified as secret.
Secrecy also surrounds the real level of current military spending. According to the pacifist organisation Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau, there is a whole swathe of military related expenditure that is excluded from the defence budget. If social security, pensions and insurance for the military, missions abroad, state aid for military research and development at private companies, the budget of the militarised Civil Guards and NATO fees were included, then the true figure would stand at around €18.8 billion. By 2024, it will really be “the implausible figure of €28 billion a year,” the Centre declared.
Spain's increase in military expenditure is in response to the agreement made at last May's NATO summit, under intense pressure from the Trump administration, for all NATO members to increase defence spending by 2024 to 2 percent of GDP.
Cospedal admitted that the increase to 1.53 percent fell short of NATO's objective, but insisted it would “facilitate the achievement of that horizon in future years” and was in line with targets set by other European countries.
An idea of the scale of the upgrade and renewal of the military can be gathered from the list of new equipment that will be purchased. Included are 348 new Piranha 5 armoured infantry vehicles, which are designed for close combat situations, five F-110 frigates, four S-80 submarines, three Multi Role Tanker Transport refuelling aircraft, 23 NH-90 helicopters, a Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a new training aircraft. In addition, the army will acquire a new Command and Control System and the renovation of its barracks, 17 Chinook helicopters will be modernized, and Spain will contribute funds towards the replacement for the F-18 fighter jet.
Cospedal confirmed that the military spending in Spain's participation in 17 military missions around the globe last year was €835 million, 8.2 percent more than the previous year. Spain will participate in the European Union's (EU) Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence and will head the Command and Control System for EU Missions and Operations. PESCO was agreed last November by 23 of the EU's 28 member states “to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations.”
Spain's commitment to PESCO reflects the attempt by the ruling elite in Spain and in Europe to defend their economic and military positions vis-a-vis actual and potential competitors, in a situation threatened by Brexit and the Trump administration's “America First” policy.
The Spanish government is attempting to straddle the contradictions of supporting both the German-led PESCO and the US-led NATO, two militarist projects that are incompatible in the long term. This was reflected in a resolution proposed by the government to be debated in an upcoming parliamentary session, which calls for improvements to EU-US relations in the sphere of defence, while concluding that “Europeans must assume more than ever before the responsibility of our own security.”
The growth of Spanish militarism, as elsewhere globally, is the response of the ruling class to rising inequality, the deepening economic crisis and the growing conflicts between the major powers. Its aim, as recently expressed in the new US National Security Strategy, is the conquest of new spheres of influence, markets and raw materials—above all in conflict with Russia and China—and to deflect social tensions outwards.
The main obstacle for the Spanish ruling class is the population's traditional hostility towards the military. This was recently revealed in the attempt to open a debate to re-impose conscription, following the example of France under President Emmanuel Macron. All the main dailies published articles and opinion pieces bemoaning the population's hostility to such a measure.
The pro-militarist senior researcher for the Real Instituto Elcano, Félix Arteaga, complained to El Mundo, “Raising it [conscription] here would be political suicide, first because there is no military need to justify it, and second, because the concept of obligation is not liked by Spanish society. There is no mentality or culture of national identity and, of course, no one believes that you should lose your life for the defence of the country.”
The ability of Spain's ruling elite to pursue its military ambitions is to a large extent due to the role of the pseudo-left Podemos, which has been virtually silent on these developments or has openly endorsed them. Last month Podemos covered up for increased Spanish intervention in Mali, where an EU “Training Mission” still continues five years after jihadist groups overran the north of the country in 2012, prompting a wave of refugees. Thousands attempted to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, and many drowned.
On January 24, Cospedal appeared before the Defence Commission to get belated authorisation for approving Spain's taking over control of the mission and sending in more troops on January 9. She warned the commission that increased involvement in the EU intervention was “fundamental” and that North Africa was “a strategic place” for Spain.
Juan Antonio Delgado, the Podemos spokesperson for military affairs, complained that Cospedal had “broken the law” by sending in the troops before parliamentary approval. He revealed, “I was in Mali three months ago and I learned that Spain would take over the operation,” before asking Cospedal, “In that time has there not been time to ask for authorization?”
The obvious question is why Delgado himself did not pursue the issue... and when it came to the vote [on authorisation] at the commission he merely abstained.
Even more explicit was Podemos General Secretary Pablo Iglesias, who attacked Cospedal from the right over the death of a pilot killed in a jet crash last October. He told her, “Patriotism is defending the rights of the professionals of our Armed Forces. It is shameful that in this country some who fill their mouths talking about our homeland do not respect the rights of workers who are here to protect us all and whose lives cannot be endangered.”
Such statements prove Podemos is a pro-war party, offering itself as a reliable political platform for Spanish militarism. Since its foundation, Podemos has created branches in the army and made an explicit effort to articulate its main demands. Former Chief of the Defence Staff Julio Rodríguez Fernández has stood as a Podemos candidate in recent parliamentary elections and is the general secretary of Podemos in the municipality of Madrid, where he will be the party's main candidate in next year's elections.
On the same subject
-
-
August 3, 2024 | International, C4ISR, Security
Webinar: Discover the All-in-One Cybersecurity Solution for SMBs
Learn how SMBs and MSPs can simplify, accelerate, and scale cybersecurity with an All-in-One platform. Join our webinar for expert insights and soluti
-
July 14, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security
Cyber Command’s measure of success? Outcomes
Mark Pomerleau A U.S. Cyber Command official said that when they examine whether any given operation or even when a strategy has been successful, they're not looking at metrics, but rather outcomes. “It's really about: have we enabled the collective defense of the nation,” Maj. Gen. John Morrison, Cyber Command's outgoing chief of staff, told C4ISRNET in a July interview. Roughly two years ago, Cyber Command and the Department of Defense started a paradigm shift for cyber policy and operations. The 2018 DoD cyber strategy tasked Cyber Command to “defend forward,” which is best described as operators working on foreign networks to prevent attacks before they happen. The way Cyber Command meets those goals is through persistent engagement, which means challenging adversary activities wherever they operate. Part of the need for a change was that adversaries were achieving their objectives but doing so below the threshold of armed conflict – in the so-called gray zone – through cyberspace. DoD wanted to stop that from happening through more assertive cyberspace action. Some in the academic community have wanted to see some way in which the command can measure the success of these new approaches. But Morrison explained that these outcomes, or intended effects during operations, could be enabling other partners – foreign or other agencies within the U.S. government – to take action in defense of the nation. For example, he said that when Cyber Command teams encounter malware they haven't seen before, they share it with partners in government, such as FBI or DHS, which can lead to the greater national collective defense. He also noted that building partnerships enables a sense of collective defense in cyberspace and can help significantly in the future against sophisticated adversaries. Morrison will be replaced at Cyber Command by Maj. Gen. David Isaacson. It is unclear where Morrison is headed next. The need for flexibility As Cyber Command has gained more authorities in recent years, it has been able to conduct significantly more operations and different types of operations as well, Morrison said. Throughout these missions, leaders have learned they must be flexible, be it in tactics, structure of teams, or the capabilities they need or develop. “We have thinking adversaries that we go against every single day. That drives us to change how we operate,” Morrison said. “You change your tactics, techniques and procedures but that's also going to drive changes in how we train and what we train ... It drives how we do capability development and development of capabilities and the employment of those capabilities, which again ties back to training at a much faster pace in this space.” Morrison noted that this includes how teams are organized. He explained the way defensive cyber protection teams were first envisioned when they were created in 2012-2013 is not at all how they fight now. To keep up with dynamic adversaries, Cyber Command is keeping closer watch on readiness metrics developed by the command for its cyber teams. This is a framework that details standards for how teams are equipped, manned and supplied. Cyber protection teams were detailed first and now Cyber Command has readiness metrics for combat mission teams, the offensive teams that support combatant commands, and intelligence/support teams. Officials are still working through metrics for what are called national teams that are charged with defending the nation. The command also needs to improve the way it feeds operational requirements into capabilities cyber warriors can use, Morrison said. This includes improving acquisition practices for both of the programs of record Cyber Command is executing through its Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture — which guides capability development priorities and includes the Unified Platform and Persistent Cyber Training Environment — and the more rapidly developed tools needed on the fly. “That's where you've got the ability inside the command now to rapidly produce that capability through a variety of means and get it into the hands of our operators as quick as possible,” he said. In fact, the Army has begun to embed tool developers and coders alongside operators through the Rapid Cyber Development Network to more quickly meet urgent needs. This allows them in almost in near real time to develop or change tools to meet requirements. “How do we do capability development in a much smoother fashion than we sometimes do today where we're able to rapidly assess, prioritize, resource operational requirements to produce a capability that we can then get back into the hands of our operators as quickly as possible,” Morrison said. From these capabilities that are developed for shorter term needs, he said the key will be deciding if they want to move them into a program of record. Will it be a longer term capability, will it adjust tactics, techniques and procedures or training? “We've got to work those pieces,” he explained. On the longer term, program of record capabilities, he noted officials still want the iterative development associated with more software-centric systems as opposed to more traditional military hardware. Integration with combatant commands Cyber is much more ingrained in military planning and operations than it was in years prior, Morrison said, however, work remains. There is now a closer link between the combatant commands and Cyber Command elements that plan, coordinate, synchronize and conduct cyber operations on their behalf, Morrison said, noting that they are still maturing. These include the Joint Force Headquarters-Cybers‚ which are commanded by each of the service cyber component commanders, and plan, synchronize and conduct operations for combatant commands they're assigned to, and new entities being created called cyber operations-integrated planning elements. These are forward extensions of the Joint Force Headquarters resident within the combatant commands to better coordinate cyber planning with other operations for the combatant commander. These entities all enable a greater central connective tissue from a Cyber Command perspective as they can feed from the theater level back to the command providing a global cyberspace picture. “You have to take not only a regional view of anything that you're doing, but, when you can bring the power of a global enterprise behind it, that's a pretty powerful capability for our nation,” Morrison said. “We are in the process of building every one of our CO-IPEs but I definitely think that we are heading in the right direction, especially as [the CO-IPEs] get built and they integrate closer and closer with their supported combatant commands.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/07/10/cyber-commands-measure-of-success-outcomes/