Six questions with France’s Air and Space Force chief

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  November 29, 2018 | International, Aerospace

  Will the Thai Air Force get more Gripen jets?

  By: Valerie Insinna SURAT THANI AIR FORCE BASE, Thailand — The Royal Thai Air Force's Wing 7, home to all of the country's Saab Gripen aircraft, wants more jets. The question is whether the country's defense budget will allow for it, one official said Tuesday. “As operators, we know that this is a very good aircraft, and we would love to have more,” said Group Capt. Prachya Tippayarat, deputy commander of the RTAF's Wing 7. “But it's just that I don't know when. The Air Force will have to think about that.” The RTAF currently operates 11 Gripen C/D fighter jets, bought from the Swedish government and manufactured by Saab. The Air Force lost one Gripen in a 2017 crash that destroyed the jet and killed the pilot. With 11 jets left, it is more difficult to accomplish both training and maintenance, Tippayarat said. “So of course we are looking for the replacement for the 12th one. It's just a matter of when. As the operator, we cannot tell when we are going to have that aircraft,” he said, adding that the service might have other budget priorities. Thailand's 11 Gripen aircraft are operated from Surat Thani Air Force Base, located about 328 miles south of Bangkok. Defense News visited the base Nov. 27-28 and accepted airfare and accommodations from Saab. Surat Thani plays a key role in defending southern Thailand. Although the nation also operates Northrop Grumman F-5s and Lockheed Martin F-16s, Wing 7's Gripens are the Royal Thai Air Force's premier fighters, used primarily for air-to-air and air-to-ground combat, and for secondary missions such as reconnaissance, Tippayarat said. The Thai government is also considering an upgrade of the RTAF Gripens' software suite, he added. The jets are currently configured to the MS19 standard, but the potential upgrade to MS20 would bring the jets into the most advanced configuration for the Gripen C/D. The MS20 software adds capabilities that make the Gripen a more formidable jet for air-to-ground attacks, including an electro-optical pod that allows the jet to drop laser-guided weapons, the addition of Boeing's Small Diameter Bomb and MBDA's Meteor missile, and new radar modes. One MS20 enhancement that the RTAF won't need is the addition of Link 16 capability, the data link used by NATO and its partner nations. The RTAF Gripens run on the Thai military's indigenous network, Link T. If Link 16 functionality is needed, the service can use its F-16s, but operating Link T on the Gripen allows Thailand to protect its homegrown capabilities and information, Tippayarat said. Saab delivered the first Gripens to Thailand in 2011. Other Gripen C/D users include Sweden, Hungary, the Czech Republic and South Africa. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/11/28/will-the-thai-air-force-get-more-gripens

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  December 14, 2024 | International, Land

  These Marine units will field new mobile command vehicle in 2025

  Elsewhere in the Corps, Marines conducted the service’s first organic rebuild of a JLTV engine at a Defense Department depot.

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  March 18, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security

  The Pentagon is handling cyber vulnerabilities inconsistently

  Mark Pomerleau The Department of Defense has not consistently mitigated cyber vulnerabilities identified in a 2012 report, according to the department's inspector general. The DoD IG issued a follow-on report to its 2012 report, issued March 13 and made public March 17, that determined cyber red teams didn't report the results of assessments to organizations and components didn't effectively correct or mitigate the identified vulnerabilities. The new report discovered that components didn't consistently mitigate or include unmitigated vulnerabilities identified in the prior audit and during this audit by red teams during combatant command exercises, operational testing assessments and agency-specific assessments in plans of action and milestones. “Ensuring DoD Components mitigate vulnerabilities is essential to achieve a better return on investment,” the report stated. “In addition, we determined that the DoD did not establish a unified approach to support and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions. Instead, the DoD Components implemented Component-specific approaches to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams, and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions.” The report found that DoD didn't establish a unified approach because it didn't assign an organization with responsibility to oversee and synchronize red team activity based on priorities, it didn't assess the resources needed for each red team and identify requirements to train them to meet priorities and it didn't develop baseline tools to perform assessments. “Without an enterprisewide solution to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams and prioritize their missions, DoD Cyber Red Teams have not met current mission requests and will not meet future requests because of the increased demands for DoD Cyber Red Team services,” the report said. “Until the DoD assigns an organization to assess DoD Cyber Red Team resources, it will be unable to determine the number of DoD Cyber Red Teams and staffing of each team to support mission needs, which will impact the Do D's ability to identify vulnerabilities and take corrective actions that limit malicious actors from compromising DoD operations.” The DoD IG issued seven recommendations the secretary of defense assign an organization responsibility for. They include: Review and assess red team reports for systemic vulnerabilities and coordinate the development and implementation of enterprise solutions to mitigate them; Ensure components develop and implement a risk-based process to assess the impact of identified vulnerabilities and prioritize funding for corrective actions for high-risk vulnerabilities; Ensure components develop and implement processes for providing reports with red team findings and recommendations to organizations with responsibility for corrective actions; Develop processes and procedures to oversee red team activities, including synchronizing and prioritizing red team missions, to ensure activities align with priorities; Perform a joint DoD-wide mission-impact analysis to determine the number of red teams, minimum staffing levels of each team, the composition of the staffing levels needed to meet current and future mission requests; Assess and identify a baseline of core and specialized training standards, based on the three red team roles that team staff must meet for the team to be certified and accredited; and Identify and develop baseline tools needed by red teams to perform missions. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/03/17/the-pentagon-is-handling-cyber-vulnerabilities-inconsistently/