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  April 17, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Norway’s allies share their views on the country’s new defense plan

  By: Stephen J. Flanagan and James Black As countries around the world grapple with the unfolding coronavirus pandemic, the wider business of government continues. Norway's Ministry of Defence will shortly publish its next Long Term Plan, which will then be debated by parliament. The plan outlines how the Armed Forces, in tandem with other elements of government and society, can best address the threats to Norway from hostile states, terrorists, and fragile and failing states. The plan also examines how to bolster national resilience to deal with other risks including hybrid warfare, climate change and pandemics. A new Rand report, commissioned by the MoD to inform its strategy and policy development, offers perspectives from its closest allies on the emerging security challenges and strategic options facing Norway. We found broad alignment of Norwegian and allied assessments across Denmark, France, Germany, the U.K., the U.S. and NATO institutions, but some enduring differences in emphasis and priorities. Other allies recognize Norway as punching above its weight and playing a critical role in the defense of the North Atlantic and High North. At the same time, our research concludes there is no time for complacency. Norway's key allies agree that the most significant threat in the High North is not a crisis directed against Norway itself. The more plausible danger is “horizontal escalation” — a crisis elsewhere in Europe rapidly growing into a wider conflict that threatens Norwegian waters, airspace and territory. Russia continues to demonstrate hostile intent, and its military capabilities threaten the ability of Norway and its allies to operate military forces, secure critical infrastructure and protect civilian populations. The collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 brings an increased threat from medium-range ballistic missiles, requiring Norwegian and allied defense planners to adjust to new threats to the homeland and region. Improvements in the Russian Northern Fleet, including surface vessels and submarines armed with modern cruise missiles, also pose an increased threat to NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea, to undersea internet cables and to sea lines of communication essential to reinforcing Norway from North America or Europe in the event of any conflict. There is also strong consensus on the enduring threats posed by terrorism, nonstate actors and challenges such as climate change in the Arctic. While all allies recognize the need to consider the strategic implications of a rising China, the United States sees China as a more direct and imminent security threat. Allies also welcome Norway's contributions to missions on NATO's eastern and southern flanks. Allies perceive Norway as having an impressive mix of high-end capabilities for a country of its size and a mature total defense concept — its strategy for engaging all elements of society in national defense. These capabilities and commitments, coupled with a well-respected approach to strategy development, have allowed Norway to have significant influence on strategic thinking within NATO. Nevertheless, significant security challenges remain, and to address them our report suggests a number of options for Norwegian leaders to consider: Strengthen deterrence in Norway: Expand surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; increase the military posture in northern Norway; enhance the protection of bases and forces against air and missile threats; maximize the F-35 fighter jet's potential to aid joint operations; and prepare for operations in contested cyber, space and electromagnetic environments. Expand capacity to receive allied reinforcements: Build on lessons from the joint Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, which allies viewed as an important milestone but not a full stress test; pursue increasingly challenging training scenarios; ensure sufficient pre-positioned stocks of consumables and equipment; upgrade and expand infrastructure along with concepts for dispersing forces to prevent attack; and deepen cooperation to enhance military mobility and interoperability. Explore concepts to hold potential adversaries at risk: Invite allies with more advanced reconnaissance and deep-attack systems to deploy them to Norway periodically; develop longer-range weapons for Norwegian forces; explore the utility of low-cost, unmanned assets; collaborate with key allies on concepts to deny adversaries access to the sea and to better project forces onto the littoral; and refine parallel strategic communications to control escalation. Enhance national and societal resilience: Test and refine Norway's whole-of-government approach and the mechanisms for civil support to the military; contribute to NATO's strategy for addressing hybrid threats, such as disinformation, economic pressure and cyberattacks; and explore further measures to enhance collective preparedness and will to fight. Solidify Norwegian contributions to NATO and partners: Continue contributions to NATO operations beyond the north; help to address variations in defense expenditure across all NATO nations and rebalance trans-Atlantic burden-sharing; promote deeper NATO cooperation with Sweden and Finland; and use innovation and industry to enable influence within NATO. Other countries can learn from how Norway chooses to tackle these emerging challenges, and they can benefit from its lessons learned, particularly with respect to the total defense concept. Pursuit of some of these options, along with the Norwegian government's ongoing efforts to seek allied views, could help enhance deterrence in the north and overall NATO defense. Stephen J. Flanagan is a senior political scientist at the think tank Rand. James Black is a senior analyst in the defense, security and infrastructure program at Rand Europe. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-on-enhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/

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  June 28, 2023 | International, Aerospace

  Autonomous drones may help Air Force slash aircraft inspection times

  "A preflight inspection right now can take up to four hours," a Near Earth Autonomy official told reporters. "We can do it in 30 minutes."

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  May 9, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  The US military’s logistical train is slowly snaking toward China

  By: Kyle Rempfer A failed Venezuela coup, Iranian missiles and Russian hybrid warfare make for interesting side stories, but the center of military policy is increasingly gravitating toward U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, according to U.S. government officials. If anything, the challenge is how to quicken the pace because the logistical tail of warfare takes time to put in place and because the Pacific theater is one of the most difficult environments for moving supplies. “If there's a challenge, it's moving enough focus and enough direction from everything else we're doing towards the Pacific," said Joel Szabat, the assistant secretary for international affairs within the Department of Transportation. Szabat, whose department deals with U.S. military logistics in wartime, said the center of gravity has shifted so much toward the Asia-Pacific region that even a major crisis on par with 9/11 won't derail the change. “I don't see, in the near term at least, things that would have us pull back,” Szabat said. But he warned that new lines of effort must be implemented if that shift is to be sustainable during a war with the region's biggest player — China. The baggage train challenge The Department of Transportation is the coordinating arm for civilian airlift and sealift capacity in peacetime and wartime. But the sealift fleet is old and in need of recapitalization. The size of the fleet is also too small to support the long logistical train required in a Pacific-based conflict, and the ships that do exist are poorly positioned across the operating area and would lack armed escorts in the event of a conflict, according to Szabat. “For small or moderate-scale warfare exercises, it's adequate," Szabat said. “For the maximum deployment that our military is built for ... it is not adequate to move and sustain. We don't have the mariners. We don't have the U.S. flagged Merchant Marine that we need for that purpose.” The Marine Corps represents a large component of the military force that would need to be delivered in the event of a war. “There are 40,000 Marines at any one time that are moving around the world, and 23,000 of those are west of the international date line, so they're in the Pacific,” said Gayle Von Eckartsberg, policy director at Headquarters Marine Corps' Pacific Division. “And then you have your Marines in Hawaii, and that brings that number to over 30,000. And the rest are distributed across other places in the world.” "The Marine Corps' natural environment is the Asia-Pacific region, and I think we're uniquely capable of operating effectively [there],” she added. The Corps is posturing to act as the inside force of the region, as it practices littoral operations in contested environments and expeditionary base operations from deep in the Pacific. “We're today engaged in aggressive war gaming, training and exercises to test out and refine these concepts,” Von Eckartsberg said. “We're going to hug the enemy and we're going to be there first, operate at this level below armed conflict.” But there remains an “enduring gap in lift capability," Von Eckartsberg acknowledged. No armed escorts The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration is responsible for managing much of the Navy's sealift capability that would be responsible for delivering Marines, soldiers, sailors, airmen and their equipment into a war. If there was a conflict with China, Szabat said, there is a high degree of confidence that the Navy, with the use of pre-positioned vessels, will be able to move the initial salvo of personnel and equipment quickly into the area of operations. “But sustaining a battle means getting supplies and getting the remainder of your forces from [the continental United States] to wherever the battle is,” Szabat said, adding that the fleet for this isn't currently in place. After the initial war push, 90 percent of logistics would move via civilian vessels and aircraft, according to Szabat. Those civilian assets will need armed escorts at sea, but the Navy has no dedicated escort vessels for the Merchant Marine fleet, he added. “I used to serve in the European theater. That was a challenge. But crossing the Pacific is four times as difficult in terms of logistics and supplies," Szabat said. “We are not able to move our logistics according to war plans unless we have cooperation from our allies.” That presents a unique challenge altogether. The biggest change to U.S. policy in the region has been an increased reliance on allies to accomplish missions and long-term goals, and one would assume that the goal is for them to pick up some of the logistical burden. “But by statute, and national security presidential directive, we are supposed to be able to provide sealift with U.S. ships and U.S. mariners without relying on allies," Szabat said. "We can't do that unless we have the escorts.” However, allies and partnerships still play an important role. China's growth is followed closely by that of U.S. ally India. U.S. Pacific Command understands the power dynamics between India and China, which is part of why it renamed itself U.S. Indo-Pacific Command last year, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter Douglas, who leads the U.S. State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “Bringing the countries of South Asia in is absolutely crucial to what we do,” he said. “India is very much a partner in everything that we do and is central in the Indo-Pacific as we move forward." Allies, while unable to provide sealift under current war plans, remain crucial to U.S. efforts to counter China. The U.S. is helping train naval forces for countries like Vietnam; promising to defend the territorial integrity of countries like Japan and the Philippines; performing freedom of navigation patrols through contested waterways; and courting new allies like the small Pacific island nations in Oceania. “I expect that to continue," Douglas said. "I never want to promise resources until they're delivered, but I think the indications are pretty good that we're going to be doing more.” https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/05/08/the-us-militarys-logistical-train-is-slowly-snaking-toward-china