Back to news

September 7, 2018 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR

Le premier ministre nomme un nouveau secrétaire parlementaire à la Défense

Le premier ministre Justin Trudeau a nommé un nouveau secrétaire parlementaire au ministre de la Défense: Serge Cormier, député d’Acadie-Bathurst au Nouveau-Brunswick et actuellement secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de l’Immigration, des Réfugiés et de la Citoyenneté, devient secrétaire parlementaire du ministre de la Défense nationale.

Le premier ministre Justin Trudeau a également annoncé plusieurs autres changements parmi les secrétaires parlementaires.

«Cette nouvelle équipe apporte avec elle une vaste expérience et un large éventail de compétences et de points de vue qui contribueront à la croissance économique et à la prospérité du Canada. Les secrétaires parlementaires appuieront leurs ministres respectifs en vue de produire des résultats concrets pour les Canadiens. Ils aideront également le gouvernement à continuer de faire croître l’économie et de renforcer la classe moyenne.», affirme le bureau du premier ministre dans le communiqué qui annonce ces changements.

Les nominations entreront en vigueur le 31 août.

Autre changement à noter, alors que Sherry Romanado, actuellement secrétaire parlementaire du ministre des Anciens Combattants et ministre associé de la Défense nationale, devient secrétaire parlementaire de la ministre des Aînés, Stéphane Lauzon, actuellement secrétaire parlementaire de la ministre des Sports et des Personnes handicapées, devient secrétaire parlementaire du ministre des Anciens Combattants et ministre associé de la Défense nationale.

http://www.45enord.ca/2018/08/le-premier-ministre-nomme-un-nouveau-secretaire-parlementaire-a-la-defense/

On the same subject

  • The Future Canadian Surface Combatant

    November 5, 2020 | Local, Naval

    The Future Canadian Surface Combatant

    By Captain Christopher Nucci, Royal Canadian Navy November 2020   Proceedings   Vol. 146/11/1,413 Canada is pursuing a single class of 15 surface combatants for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), unlike some of its allies who are building multiple classes of more specialized ships. A single variant Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is better than the project’s original vision of two variants based on a common hull (the first a task group command/air-defense version, the other a more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare version). While all naval force structure is essentially driven by national strategic defense and security interests, a single-class solution is based on three principal factors. First, it fits best for Canada’s unique naval requirements shaped by its geography, modest fleet size, and the RCN’s operational needs. Second, it optimizes effectiveness now and into the future, while responsibly seeking maximum cost efficiencies. Finally, it is an innovative approach that has only recently become both practical and advantageous because of recent technological developments, such as convergence and digitization. The General Purpose Warship Moment Naval force planning decisions must coexist in harmony with decisions regarding a navy’s overall fleet mix of capital ships, “high-end” surface combatants, “low-end” combatants, and submarines—and the roles of each type.1 In particular, surface combatants have historically fulfilled one or two warfare roles, such as antiair and antisubmarine warfare. Until recently, fielding an affordable “general purpose warship” was too difficult to achieve. The technological limitations of the latter half of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st imposed inescapable constraints stemming from the necessary physical size and power requirements of electronics and equipment, along with the expensive and challenging integration of the various single-purpose weapons, sensors, communications, and command-and-control arrangements (as well as the operations and maintenance personnel) required for each role. These limitations could only be surmounted by increasing space, weight, crew size, and the commensurate complexity. As a result, many navies introduced multiple classes of surface combatants to handle the different warfare roles, as well as low-end ships (at less cost) to have sufficient numbers of ships available to respond to contingencies. For the RCN, with a small force of submarines and no capital ships, the approach until now followed this pattern, with the Iroquois-class destroyers focused until their divestment on task group command and area air defense and the more numerous Halifax-class frigates acting as more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare platforms. Canada’s allies have had to confront similar considerations. For example, in the United Kingdom, the number of hulls and capabilities of the Type 26 (the CSC’s parent design, known as the Global Combat Ship) are directly connected to the planned acquisition of less-capable Type 31 frigates, the existence of Type 45 antiair-warfare destroyers, a larger submarine fleet, and the importance of capital ships, such as Royal Navy aircraft carriers. For Australia (which is also acquiring the Type 26/GCS-derived Hunter-class), the requirement to protect amphibious ships, more submarines in the fleet, and a separate class of air-warfare destroyers are key factors. Different requirements ultimately lead to different priorities and trade-off decisions, and Canada’s circumstances are unlike any others. Canada’s Geography, Fleet Size, and Operational Requirements Aside from the overall fleet mix, the other considerations for any state’s naval force structure are the geographic factors, overall fleet size, and operational requirements. In Canada’s case, unique geography includes the bicoastal nature of the RCN’s homeports in Victoria, British Columbia, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the tricoastal areas of responsibility in the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic. Each area is very distant from the others, and therefore any timely maritime response generally must come from the closest base. In other words, when you need a ship from the opposite coast for any unexpected reason, it is a long way to go. So, it is best if all ships are equally capable and allocated more or less evenly among homeports. Similarly, the RCN must consider the long-range nature of its ship deployments—even domestic ones—because of the significant distances to anticipated theaters of operation. A single combatant class that can perform a wide range of tasks while remaining deployed best meets this challenge and provides more options to government when far away from homeport. For example, a CSC operating in the Asia-Pacific region as an air-defense platform for an allied amphibious task group can quickly respond to a requirement to hunt an adversary’s submarine, if needed. Similarly, assembling a national naval task group of several multirole CSCs in response to a crisis is much more achievable when the RCN can draw from the whole surface combatant fleet to assign ships at the necessary readiness levels. The alternative may not guarantee a sufficient number of specialized variants needed for the task when the call comes. In other words, if any one ship becomes unavailable to perform a task for any reason, there is more depth available in the fleet to fill the gap and complete the mission. Consequently, having more ships of similar capabilities ensures a higher rate of operational availability, which is especially important with the RCN’s relatively modest fleet size. For small fleets, a “high/low” mix of warships or multiple classes of more specialized combatants actually constrains operational availability. Cost-Saving Value While increasing complexity would ordinarily imply increasing cost, a single class of ships can actually present opportunities to increase cost efficiency. First, a single class of ships eliminates duplication of fixed program costs such as design and engineering and, during ship construction, further eliminates additional costs derived from retooling and pausing work in the shipyard between the construction of different classes, while achieving better learning curves and lowering overall costs per unit compared with two shorter construction runs. As each ship enters service, a single ship class in sufficient numbers has dedicated supply chains and more efficiency and equipment availability from the provision of common parts (especially given that two allies are procuring additional ships based on the common Type 26/GCS design.) Higher cost efficiencies in maintenance from labor specialization also can be expected, as well as the ability for more efficient repair training and use of required ship repair facilities and equipment. Furthermore, training costs associated with a single class are reduced through the ability to deliver common training modules to a larger student cohort, while simultaneously allowing for deeper knowledge and specialist personnel development among a larger pool of available crew with common qualifications.  This latter point cannot be overstated—crew availability is a key requirement for operational availability, and the efficiencies made possible with a single set of common qualifications and training enables a larger pool of available personnel to deploy and more flexibility for sustained operations at the unit level. It includes Royal Canadian Air Force maritime helicopter crews and embarked unmanned systems specialists, as well as Army, special operations forces, and even Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel in a law enforcement mission who would require no additional conversion training between classes once familiar with the CSC’s modular mission bay arrangement or boat launching procedures. An Opportunity Enabled by Modern Technology Compared with a few decades ago, several recent technological developments are making multirole ships much more practical. Information-age innovation is, in essence, enabling all the potential advantages a single class of surface combatants while minimizing the traditional disadvantages. For example, any operations room or bridge display can now easily show video or data feeds from any sensor, weapon, or software support system—convergence. Likewise, instead of several stand-alone unmanned systems controllers, consoles that can control any of the ship’s unmanned air, surface, or subsurface system are becoming available. Widespread digitization has reduced space requirements, while increasing system capability, flexibility, and power and cooling efficiency. This miniaturization allows for smaller components that can fit into smaller spaces.  Multifunctionality can now be found in all kinds of components. For example, a single digital beam-forming radar can replace multiple traditional radars, software-defined radios can support different communications requirements on the fly, programmable multipurpose weapons can engage more than one kind of target but be fired from a common vertical launcher, and decoy launchers can now deploy a variety of defensive munitions. Multifunctionality even extends beyond individual systems to encompass features like the CSC’s modular mission bay—a reconfigurable space able to accommodate and integrate any containerized payload imaginable. With an air-transportable, container-based set of payloads, embarking additional specialized equipment or capabilities into a deployed ship during an overseas port visit can be done in just a few days. These developments enable a single ship to rapidly transition to and execute many naval roles while defending itself against a myriad of threats. Although a ship’s overall capacity (e.g., the desired number of crew accommodated, missiles embarked, unmanned systems carried, endurance and seakeeping performance, etc.) will still be constrained by its size, a single ship class can have a full range of capabilities. The CSC balances multirole capabilities with a modest amount of capacity. For example, it has one main gun and 32 vertical-launch cells, one helicopter, one mission bay, one multifunction radar, and the ability to embark approximately 204 personnel for crew and mission personnel. Further technological development and additional advantages will accrue from operating a single ship class, such as those from software development and data analytics. For example, the analysis of detailed technical data, such as system-error codes, from across the entire class in near-real time enables the efficient updating of control software to improve cyber security. Or, consider the ability to perform virtual research and development work on a digital twin of a physical system, such as a gas turbine, to examine performance limitations without risking the equipment itself. Data analytics performed on the same system when a part fails can help determine which sensors are critical and what patterns are early indicators of impending failure. This will allow the crew to perform preventive maintenance before the system fails catastrophically and should prevent failures in the other ships of the class. In a connected world, it is even possible to rapidly and remotely inject operational capability enhancements to deployed ships. Ultimately, the relative ease with which the software elements of a combat system can be changed will allow ships of the same class a greater capability to act and react with agility, the most efficient way to maximize potential for a relatively small fleet. Acknowledging the unique Canadian geographical and operational requirements, the imposed limitations on naval force structure, and the need to maximize the RCN’s effectiveness while seeking cost efficiencies calls for a single class of surface combatant—the current CSC project. Canada will benefit from this innovative solution for decades. The RCN is well-positioned to make the most of this new platform and the inherent flexibility and multirole capabilities it will bring. The Canadian government’s decision to move forward with the CSC program as a single surface combatant class is not only eminently feasible, but also the most sensible for the situation we face.  https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/future-canadian-surface-combatant

  • Top Aces secures approval for F-16 adversary air fleet

    December 4, 2020 | Local, Aerospace

    Top Aces secures approval for F-16 adversary air fleet

    Posted on December 4, 2020 by Chris Thatcher Top Aces has received approval to acquire and import up to 29 F-16 aircraft from an undisclosed country, the company confirmed Thursday. The Dorval, Que.-based air combat training firm said in a statement that the Block 10 aircraft would be upgraded with its open architecture mission system and offered as a platform to support United States Department of Defense training beginning in 2021. While Top Aces would not yet confirm the country of origin, Israeli media on Dec. 2 claimed the seller is the Israeli Defense Ministry. According to CTech, the F-16s are 1980s-era aircraft that were retired as of 2016, and the Defense Ministry’s export agency is overseeing the deal. The company has been pursuing a fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16s for some time, to meet the training requirements of preparing next-generation pilots flying the F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptor. Top Aces confirmed in an interview in November 2019 that it was seeking to acquire 12 Block 15 A/B models from an undisclosed allied country. “The F-16 really is our growth platform for the future, especially for advanced adversary training,” said Paul Bouchard, president and chief executive officer. “It is the most prolific adversary aircraft in the Western world. It is the adversary aircraft of choice just because of its performance characteristics. It is a fourth-generation aircraft, so from an aircraft architecture standpoint, it can be equipped and configured in so many different ways. . . . And it is also scalable given there were more than 4,000 F-16s built. It is still a production aircraft. It has a lot of existing support in terms of sustainment.” If the deal with Israel is confirmed, the F-16 jets would be added to Top Aces’ current fleets of Dornier Alpha Jets and Douglas A-4 Skyhawks, and initially based at the F-16 Center of Excellence near the company’s U.S. headquarters in Mesa, Ariz. In October 2019, the company received an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract that will allow it to compete with Air USA, Airborne Tactical Advantage Company, Blue Air Training, Coastal Defense, Draken International, and Tactical Air Support for adversary air services at 12 U.S. Air Force bases. Under the US$6.4 billion Combat Air Force Contracted Air Support (CAF CAS) contract, the Air Force can solicit individual tenders from those seven companies for advanced adversary air (ADAIR) capabilities as required, at 12 USAF bases. The contract runs until October 2024 and is estimated to involve between 40,000 to 50,000 flying hours. “As a named winner in the [CAF CAS] contract, Top Aces is uniquely positioned to offer the F-16 as the most capable and flexible ADAIR platform supporting the U.S. Department of Defense,” a spokesperson said on Thursday. Top Aces has been a pioneer in contracted aggressor or “red” air training for militaries, simulating hostile threats for fighter pilots, naval crews, and land forces for the Canadian Armed Forces since the mid-2000s. In October 2017, the company won a competition to retain the Canadian Contracted Airborne Training Services (CATS) program under a 10-year deal worth about US$480 million, which includes options to extend the service to 2031 and the value to as much as US$1.4 billion. The Canadian program is delivered with the Alpha Jet and Bombardier Learjet 35A aircraft, but Top Aces has proposed adding the F-16 when the Royal Canadian Air Force acquires its next-generation fighter. The high standards of the CATS program have opened the doors to international opportunities. The USAF contract would not have been possible without the “industry-leading” certification and airworthiness standards demanded by the RCAF and Transport Canada, Bouchard acknowledged in 2019. Top Aces secured a similar training support contract with the German Armed Forces in 2014 and, more recently, a two-year trial with the Australian Defence Force. https://www.skiesmag.com/news/top-aces-f16-adversary-air-fleet

  • CRIAQ START-UP - Deadline January 22nd 2021

    January 11, 2021 | Local, Aerospace, C4ISR, Security

    CRIAQ START-UP - Deadline January 22nd 2021

    Program details The CRIAQ Start-up Grant is targeted for Quebec start-ups active in the aerospace sector. Through a competitive process, CRIAQ will award two $10,000 grants per year in support of the technological development of two start-ups, under the rationale that this funding will help to bring the development of the product or service into alignment with potential users and customers.   Project submission and approval process To be eligible for this grant, the company must be a start-up in and at least a portion of its activities must be geared toward the aerospace industry (products, services, solutions) and must be a good standing member of CRIAQ or must commit to become one before the grant is awarded. Elements to be considered will include the following: Date of incorporation within the last two years Number of employees (fewer than ten) Participation in a recognized incubator or accelerator Etc. Proposals will be evaluated according to the following four (4) criteria: Novelty of the product or service Technical feasibility Aerospace business opportunity potential Quality of the team It is also important to note that applications from companies stemming from a CRIAQ research project will be evaluated positively.   Application and additional information The form below must be completed and submitted no later than January 22, 2021. The evaluation will be completed by February 5, 2021. Recipients must be available between February 16-19, 2021 for the announcement to be made at the CRIAQ RDV Forum. https://www.criaq.aero/en/program/criaq-start-up/

All news