How the Space Cybersecurity Working Group fosters communication

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  May 19, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Our nation’s defense supply chain imperative

  By: Bill Brown, L3Harris Technologies The Department of Defense and defense industry have a long history of responding quickly and forcefully to crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no exception. Today, hundreds of thousands of dedicated defense workers remain at their posts – delivering mission-critical products and services to support our troops around the world, while also providing personal protective equipment and other supplies to first responders and health care workers here at home. However, this most recent crisis has re-exposed weaknesses in our defense industrial base – highlighting the need to significantly bolster the nation's vital supply chain. This serves as a call to action to develop a strategic, long-term approach across government and industry. We witnessed the fallout from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Thousands of suppliers shuttered or permanently shifted precious capacity to other verticals when defense budgets were indiscriminately cut following the Budget Control Act of 2011 and sequester of 2013. When budgets began to recover several years later, the damage was clear – longer lead times that in some cases doubled or more, and increased reliance on single-source and international suppliers for critical components, such as microelectronics. In 2017, President Trump signed an executive order and established a multi-agency task force to study supply chain resiliency. The task force identified five macro forces that create risk to the supply chain and national security preparedness including sequestration and the uncertainty of government spending, the overall decline of U.S. manufacturing capabilities and capacity, harmful government business and procurement practices, industrial policies of competitor nations, and diminishing U.S. STEM and trade skills. Task force members proposed a comprehensive set of risk-reduction actions – ranging from establishing sustained and predictable multi-year budgets and developing an adaptive acquisition framework, to directing investment to small businesses and diversifying the supplier base. Over the past two years, the government has made initial strides on a number of these fronts, including working to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign sources for critical rare earth minerals and decreasing the country's dependence on China and other international suppliers for semiconductors and related components. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic emerged before these and other task force initiatives gained serious traction and forced the DoD to refocus its near-term priorities. And the urgency escalated when we began to see the brutal impact the pandemic was causing in the commercial aerospace sector, an important vertical market for many defense suppliers. The department quickly designated defense suppliers as essential and increased progress payments, spurring larger defense contractors to accelerate payments to thousands of small business suppliers. These actions helped companies to continue operating, maintain their employment and hiring goals, and sustain critical spending on internal research and development (IRAD) to keep the innovation engine humming. At L3Harris, for example, we recommitted to investing nearly 4 percent of revenues in IRAD, hiring 6,000 new employees and maintaining our apprenticeship and internship programs to provide opportunities for the workforce of the future. The combined DoD and industry efforts demonstrate the power of a focused, collaborative approach to mitigate and address the damaging effects of the pandemic and to support the broader defense industrial base. Today, we are at a critical juncture. We have an opportunity to make the necessary strategic investments that could significantly strengthen our supply base for generations to come, including: · Ensure sustained/predictable budgets – stable, long-term funding helps companies better plan and encourages them to invest in staffing, technology and facilities needed for the country to maintain its technical superiority. Now is not the time to pull back the reins on defense spending. · Accelerate contract awards – shorter decision and acquisition cycles enable suppliers to invest in and deliver technologies faster than with traditional methods, and in the near term could help offset the impact of the commercial aerospace downturn. · Expand domestic supplier base – increasing domestic capabilities reduces vulnerabilities and increases access to critical components, such as rare earths and microelectronics, and over time can help reduce the proportion of sole/single-source supply. · Increase workforce investment – providing advanced STEM education opportunities drives innovation and productivity by enhancing critical skillsets for existing employees, while attracting, training and growing the workforce of the future. · Institutionalize process improvements – the COVID-19 pandemic forced government and industry to find new and more efficient ways to work. The challenge now – to make these advances permanent. These are not quick fixes. However, they provide a strong platform for a more resilient national defense supplier base, which is vital at a time when near-peer adversaries continue to invest heavily in new technologies that threaten our nation's security. The imperative is clear – and the opportunity is now. Bill Brown is chairman and CEO at L3Harris Technologies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/18/our-nations-defense-supply-chain-imperative/

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  February 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  The drive to advance missile defense is there, but there must be funding

  By: Richard Matlock Over the past five years, missile threats have evolved far more rapidly than conventional wisdom had predicted. Best known is North Korea's accelerated development and testing of sophisticated, road-mobile ballistic missiles. But the U.S. National Defense Strategy requires renewed focus on greater powers. China has adopted an anti-access strategy consisting of new offensive missiles, operational tactics and fortifications in the South China Sea. Russia, too, has developed highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles specifically designed to defeat today's defenses. Grappling with these sobering realities demands change. The 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to countering regional missiles of all kinds and from whatever source, as well as the increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states. But programs and budgets have not yet aligned with the policy. The upcoming defense budget submission presents an important opportunity to address these new and complex challenges. The Missile Defense Agency's current top three goals are sustaining the existing force, increasing capacity and capability, and addressing more advanced threats. The first two are necessary but insufficient. The third goal must be elevated to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the geopolitical and technological realities of our time. For the last decade, less than 2 percent of MDA's annual funding has been dedicated to developing advanced technology, during which time our adversaries have begun outpacing us. As President Donald Trump said last January, we “cannot simply build more of the same, or make incremental improvements.” Adapting our missile defense architecture will require rebalance, discipline and difficult choices. Realigning resources to develop advanced technologies and operational concepts means investing less in single-purpose systems incapable against the broader threat. It also requires we accept and manage new kinds of risk. Indeed, meeting the advanced threat may, in the short term, require accepting some strategic risk with North Korea. The beginning of this rebalance requires more distributed, elevated and survivable sensors capable of tracking advanced threats. The most important component here is a proliferated, globally persistent space layer in low-Earth orbit consisting of both passive and active sensors. MDA may be the missile defense-centric organization best suited to developing and integrating this capability into the architecture, but there is considerable opportunity for partnering with others to move out smartly, as recently urged by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten. Partnerships with the Space Development Agency and the Air Force can be supplemented by collaborative efforts with commercial space companies. We need not do this all at once. Space assets could be fielded in phases, with numbers, capability (sensors, interceptors, lasers), missions, and orbits evolving over time. MDA demonstrated a similar paradigm with the Delta experiments, Miniature Sensor Technology Integration series and the Near Field Infrared Experiment in the past. Meanwhile, other sensors could alleviate the cost of building new, billion-dollar radar on islands in the Pacific Ocean — efforts which continue to suffer delay. Adding infrared tracking sensors to high-altitude drones, for instance, has already been demonstrated experimentally in the Indo-Pacific theater with modified Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. These need not be dedicated assets. Sensor pod kits could be stored in theater to be deployed aboard Reapers or other platforms during heightened tensions. We must revisit boost-phase defenses and directed energy. In 2010, the Airborne Laser program demonstrated that lasers could destroy missiles in the boost phase, but deploying toxic chemical lasers aboard large commercial aircraft was fiscally and operationally untenable. Fortunately, considerable operational promise exists with recently developed solid-state lasers (the cost of which is around $2 of electricity per shot). We must move these systems out of the laboratory and build and test operational prototypes. Near-term actions to better manage risk against the rogue-state ballistic missile threat must not overtake the pursuit of these larger goals. Although the Pentagon is currently considering a 10-year, $12 billion program for a next-generation interceptor, nearer-term, cheaper options are available. Replacing each existing kill vehicle on the Ground-Based Interceptors with several smaller kill vehicles would multiply each interceptor's effectiveness dramatically. The U.S. has been developing this technology since 2006, including a “hover” flight test in 2009. Affordable solutions like this must be found. Missile defense cannot do it all. Denying, degrading and destroying enemy missile systems prior to launch must be part of the mix. But left-of-launch activities can be expensive and difficult, and reliance on a cyber magic wand carries risk, too. We need to broaden our approach to attack all parts of our adversary's kill chain. The National Defense Strategy urges that we contend with the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be — or as it previously was. To meet the threats of today and tomorrow, we must radically transform our U.S. missile defenses. It falls to the 2021 budget to do so. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/31/the-drive-to-advance-missile-defense-is-there-but-there-must-be-funding/

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  August 31, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Suisse: Six milliards en jeu pour renouveler la flotte aérienne de l’armée

  Après l'échec de l'achat des avions Gripen en 2014, le peuple suisse est à nouveau appelé à voter pour ou contre l'acquisition d'avions de combats. La Suisse doit renouveler sa flotte d'avions de combat. Les appareils en service actuellement seront en fin de vie d'ici 2030. Le Conseil fédéral et le Parlement veulent acquérir de nouveaux avions pour six milliards de francs. Les opposants y voient une dépense inutile. Le peuple tranchera le 27 septembre. La votation porte sur le montant maximal destiné à l'achat des avions de combat qui remplaceront les 26 F-5 Tiger et les 30 F/A-18 de l'armée. Les premiers, acquis en 1978, sont déjà obsolètes. Ils ne peuvent voler que de jour et par temps clair, et ne servent plus qu'à l'instruction. Les seconds atteindront leur limite dans une dizaine d'années. Après l'échec de l'achat des avions Gripen en 2014, le gouvernement a décidé de ne soumettre aux urnes que le cadre général de l'acquisition. Le choix du type et du nombre d'appareils nécessaires lui reviendra ensuite. L'enveloppe de 6 milliards de francs, soit deux fois plus que le Gripen, est plafonnée et ne pourra pas être augmentée. Elle pourra en revanche être ajustée à l'évolution des prix. L'achat des nouveaux avions de combat recueille dans les derniers sondages une majorité en sa faveur. Le clivage droite/gauche est marqué, le camp bourgeois étant favorable à la dépense et le camp rose-vert opposé. Objectif controversé Pour le comité référendaire, composé du PS, des Verts et du Groupe pour une suisse sans armée, dépenser 6 milliards de francs pour les avions est une fausse promesse de sécurité. Le scénario d'une guerre aérienne en Europe n'est pas réaliste. La Suisse doit plutôt se préparer à de nouveaux types de menace: catastrophes, cyberattaques, pandémies ou changement climatique. Les avions de combat ne pourront pas contrer ces menaces. Des investissements dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique ou la pénurie d'électricité seraient plus sensés, selon les opposants. L'émergence de nouvelles formes de guerre ne remplace pas les anciennes menaces, répond le camp des partisans dans les rangs duquel se trouvent des membres du PLR, de l'UDC, du PDC, du PBD, des Vert'libéraux, du PEV et de nombreuses organisations militaires. Bien qu'il n'y ait pas de conflit armé en Suisse, les conditions peuvent rapidement changer. Il s'agit de l'avenir de la politique de sécurité. Une menace imprévisible La menace évolue constamment et la population doit être protégée contre les attaques imprévisibles, argumente la ministre de la Défense Viola Amherd. L'armée de l'air a de nombreuses t'ches pour lesquelles des avions de combat sont nécessaires. Elle intervient si un avion se trouve en situation critique ou s'il viole les règles. Lorsque Genève accueille une conférence internationale sur la paix, des avions doivent en permanence être dans les airs. L'armée doit également pouvoir contrôler de manière plus intense ses frontières en cas de tensions dans les environs et s'assurer qu'aucun appareil militaire étranger ne survole le territoire. Elle doit protéger son espace aérien en cas d'attaque directe. Coûts à définir L'argent dépensé pour les avions fera défaut dans d'autres domaines comme l'éducation, la santé, la sécurité publique ou sociale ou encore la culture, rétorquent les opposants. Cet achat serait en outre un chèque en blanc donné au gouvernement et au Parlement. Le jour de la votation, les électeurs ne connaîtront pas les coûts concrets. Si l'on prend en compte l'ensemble des coûts sur la durée de vie des avions, la facture s'élève à 24 milliards, avancent les référendaires. Le Département fédéral de la défense estime pour sa part la dépense à 18 milliards. Le PS propose l'acquisition d'avions de combat légers, moins onéreux. Pour Viola Amherd, ces appareils ne valent rien pour le service de police de l'air et encore moins pour protéger la Suisse en cas de crise. Ils ne volent pas assez haut, sont trop lents ou n'ont pas les radars ou l'armement nécessaires. Compensations prévues L'arrêté sur lequel le peuple doit se prononcer inclut des conditions. Il précise que le constructeur remportant l'appel d'offres devra investir 60% du montant du contrat dans l'économie suisse (65% en Suisse alémanique, 30% en Suisse romande et 5% en Suisse italienne). L'achat sera coordonné avec la modernisation du système de défense sol-air. Quatre jets sont encore en lice: le Rafale du français Dassault, l'Eurofighter de l'européen Airbus et les deux avions américains, le Super Hornet de Boeing et le F-35A de Lockheed-Martin. https://www.lematin.ch/story/six-milliards-en-jeu-pour-renouveler-la-flotte-aerienne-de-larmee-442405814349