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June 26, 2024 | Local, Land

Government of Canada to hold technical briefing on the Canadian Surface Combatant Project

On June 27, 2024, senior officials from National Defence, the Royal Canadian Navy, and Public Services and Procurement Canada, will hold a virtual technical briefing on the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) Project, in advance of the official beginning of construction the following day, on June 28, 2024 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/06/government-of-canada-to-hold-technical-briefing-on-the-canadian-surface-combatant-project.html

On the same subject

  • Feds closing in on winning bidder for $60-billion warship project

    September 25, 2018 | Local, Naval

    Feds closing in on winning bidder for $60-billion warship project

    By BEATRICE PAEZ Some industry observers say there are rumblings that the multibillion-dollar announcement on the Canadian Surface Combatant could happen in a few weeks' time, but Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan says he hopes a decision will be announced on the design by 'the end of the year.' Ottawa could be close to settling on the winning bid for the $60-billion procurement of multi-purpose vessels that will form the backbone of the Canadian Navy, with rumours swirling that a decision could come in a few weeks' time, although Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan says the government will announce it by the end of the year. Some industry observers have heard rumblings that the multibillion-dollar announcement on the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project, the biggest procurement in the federal government's history, could happen as early as the upcoming defence and aerospace convention in Halifax, otherwise known as DefSec, slated for Oct. 2-4. Asked if the government plans to announce the winner in Halifax, Byrne Furlong, press secretary to Mr. Sajjan (Vancouver South, B.C.) said, the minister would be attending the convention as he does every year. Mr. Sajjan, in an interview with The Hill Times earlier this month said, the preferred bidder will be named by the end of the year. “We wanted to make sure that we gave industry enough time so that the right bid process is done correctly and we're hoping that by the end of this year, we will be able to make the announcement and a selection will be made on the design,” Mr. Sajjan said in a phone interview on Aug. 29. Three companies are competing to help deliver 15 warships over the next 25 years. Those ships will eventually replace Canada's aging fleet, namely, the 12 Halifax-class frigates and the four Iroquois-class destroyers, which have been decommissioned. In its entirety, the CSC project is estimated to cost between $56-billion and $60-billion. The cure process—a chance for the contenders to adjust their bids to fit the government's criteria—wrapped up in July. “I don't expect there to be another cure process. I think they've got a decision ready to go,” said Brian Botting, principal at Earnscliffe Strategy Group. He added there are rumours suggesting the “evaluation has been completed, and it's a matter of getting the right announcement put together,” while noting that the chance of there being an announcement is 50-50. Mr. Botting is a defence-industry consultant, whose client, Naval Group, submitted a bid outside the competitive process. The bid was rejected. DefSec is a major attraction in defence circles, and unveiling the winner in that venue would be a good play, from a communications perspective, Mr. Botting said. Still, one observer said that Mr. Sajjan's noncommittal response on the precise timing of the announcement leaves the department some wiggle room. Dave Perry, vice-president and senior analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said he'd be surprised if the government had chosen a winner by then. The preferred bidder will work with Irving Shipbuilding, which won a separate competition to build the 15 ships in the company's Halifax shipyard. Three vessels in the running Three bidders are competing to supply the ships' design: a coalition that includes shipbuilder BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, and L3 Technologies; Alion Science and Technology; and Navantia, a state-owned corporation in Spain. Mr. Botting said that BAE Systems' Type 26 frigate appears to have an edge over the other two companies, thanks to the support it enjoys in the navy ranks, “There's a lot of supporters of Type 26 in the navy. It's not that much different than what the royal navy operates on. ... We tend to have a strong focus on submarine warfare, which this ship operates as.” Type 26 is under construction in the U.K. for its navy and would be the first of its class. Construction under the CSC program is expected to start in the mid-2020s. That the navies of Canada and the U.K. face similar environments and needs makes for a compelling case in Type 26's favour, even in the face of criticism that BAE and Lockheed Martin's offer is still a design on paper, according to Mr. Botting. In addition to landing a contract with the U.K., BAE was also selected by Australia to build a new generation of warships. Multiple requests for an interview with Lockheed Martin's executive were declined. A company spokesperson touched base with The Hill Times briefly on background. In contrast, one of Alion's biggest selling points, as characterized by the company's chief operating officer, Bruce Samuelson, is that the company's offer is a “proven, off-the-shelf design” and does not carry the risks of going with a new design. Unlike its competitors, Alion is not in the business of making products, but rather it takes a “vendor-agnostic” approach as an integrator. That means that, as the designer and engineering firm, Alion works to select the different components, from the sensors to the combat-management system, which make up the ship through what's available in the marketplace. “The reason you'd buy straight off the shelf is like going to a car lot and buying a car. You know exactly what you're getting,” said Mr. Samuelsen. “Why do you change it a little bit? Because you have slightly different needs, but you really want to take advantage of what everyone else has done for that car.” The anchor to its overall design is the De Zeven Provinciën-class frigate, which has been in service in the Dutch navy for more than a decade. Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding, the Netherlands-based company, has had experience tucking under another shipyard to produce its design, said Mr. Samuelsen. The winning subcontractor will have to work with Irving. When the warship is eventually built it will resemble a mini-city. The ship has to have the trappings of a town: there has to be a functional sewage system, provide food, shelter, medical care, and at the same time, it has to be built to respond to the hostile environment that is the ocean, said Mr. Samuelsen. Navantia's proposal, which is a partnership with Saab Australia and CEA Technologies, is also based on an existing model, the F-105 frigate. Seven are in service with the Spanish and Australian navy, and there are five “smaller variants” in the Norwegian navy, according to the company. In an email response to The Hill Times, Emiliano Matesanz Sanz, the company's business development manager, said Navantia is in the “best position to face the challenging task of working with the local industry,” given that it has operated in a similar scenario as the one set up under the CSC project. Its ship was built in a new shipyard in Australia, by ASC. Two frigates have, so far, been delivered, Mr. Matesanz Sanz said. (Navantia initially agreed to a phone interview, but said due to the sensitivity of the file, an email Q&A was the only possible option.) The government had initially stated a preference for a mature design—one that was already in operation in a NATO country, for example—to mitigate the risks of cost overruns that could, for example, tie up production. But the government appeared to have been convinced by the team behind Type 26 to consider its bid because it changed the parameters for considering bids, said Mr. Botting. Due to inflation, for every year of delay, the program is projected to cost $3-billion or more, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer. If going with an untested design carries more risks, why would Canada potentially sweep those concerns aside? Part of the answer lies in the argument that while there isn't a “physical ship in the water” yet, Type 26 stands to have “some of the most modern technology,” said Mr. Perry. The chance to hold the intellectual property rights to the design is also cited as a possible point in its favour. “People would make the argument that if you have a ship that hasn't sailed and been tested yet, you can offer up the IP, because you don't have an understanding of what its full value is. Whereas if you have something that's more of a known quantity, you can put whatever premium you want on it,” he added. Conflict-of-interest concerns flared up in late 2016 when it was announced that Irving Shipbuilding planned to work with BAE Systems to bid on a $5-billion contract to provide maintenance and support for Arctic patrol vessels and resupply ships, according to a CBC report, while BAE was pursuing the CSC project that Irving is involved in overseeing. Both Irving and Ottawa said at the time that they have taken steps to ensure the process is fair. Mr. Perry dismissed conjectures that suggest changes to the bidding process have been made with the “explicit goal” of giving Type 26 the upper hand. “I don't think that's accurate. Because that's not the way the procurement system is set up. What the government has done is to try and make this environment as competitive as possible,” he said. “But you can never totally level the playing field. ... Some bids are always gonna be better than others in different respects.” Billed as the most-complex, most-expensive procurement on record in Canadian history, CSC, and more broadly, Canada's shipbuilding strategy, has raised questions about whether the country has chosen the right approach in preserving its shipbuilding culture over working to develop the high-tech side of the business. “We protected the lower-tech end of the business and not the higher-tech [end]. All the missile systems, sensors, all that stuff is being imported and assembled at the Irving yard,” Mr Botting said. “It's a different way of approaching it. The U.K. is slowly getting out of that business, but it's painful when you close down a yard.” https://www.hilltimes.com/2018/09/24/feds-closing-winning-bidder-60-billion-warship-project/169844

  • Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

    April 16, 2020 | Local, Naval

    Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 51 By: Sergey Sukhankin April 15, 2020 05:24 PM Age: 14 mins New research (which includes two articles written by Russian experts) published by the prominent think tank the Canadian Global Affairs Institute has spurred interest and hopes in Russia's expert community about the possibility of normalizing ties between Russia and Canada through cooperation in the Arctic region (Russiancouncil.ru, April 3; Cgai.ca, accessed April 12). This cooperation could potentially be premised on two main pillars. First would be the mutual rejection of “internationalization” of the Arctic. Both Canada and Russia—for whom the Arctic region is an issue of foreign policy (Russiancouncil.ru, July 1, 2019) —feel ill at ease with the increasing involvement of non-Arctic states in the region, particularly, China. Russian information outlets noted the level of distress when the Chinese icebreaker Snow Dragon completed its first-ever voyage through the Arctic Ocean off the coast of Canada, accumulating “a wealth of experience for Chinese ships going through the Northwest Passage in the future” (Regnum, September 17, 2017; see EDM, October 3, 2017). Second, Moscow seeks to exploit regional frictions and disagreements between Canada and the United States (Pentagonus.ru, accessed April 10) to boost its own position/influence in the region. Russian sources recall the year 2010, when then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly challenged Canada's stance on the status of the Northwest Passage, which Ottawa considers part of Canadian territory (Foreignpolicy.ru, February 20, 2015). In the past, both the Russian tone and general assessment of Canada's role in the Arctic were denigrating, claiming Ottawa lacked agency. Perhaps the clearest expression of this sentiment came from the director of the Institute of Strategic Planning and Forecasting, Professor Alexander Gusev, who, in 2015, declared that “they [Canada] are only performing the role assigned by the US” (Odnako.org, March 30, 2015). After 2016, however, Russia dramatically changed its coverage of the US-Canadian dispute in the Arctic region, with Moscow increasingly employing reconciliatory rhetoric toward Ottawa and employing ever more assertive public diplomacy tools. One notable example of this new approach is Moscow's reliance on pro-Russian experts based in Canada. In 2016, speaking in Sochi, on the margins of that year's Valdai Club session, Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz (a former director of the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University, in Ottawa) stated, “[T]his area [the Arctic region] will be the first one where we will feel real changes in our relations... Arctic cooperation will become the focal point thanks to which our two sides [Canada and Russia] will be extending their areas of collaboration” (Izvestia, October 28, 2016). Moreover, as repeatedly stated by Federation Council member Igor Chernyshenko (a senator from Murmansk Oblast), the Arctic region could become a “bridge,” helping Canada and Russia overcome the existing difficulties in their bilateral ties. Last May, he announced, “[W]e invited them [the Canadian side] to return to a dialogue. We proposed holding a conference between Russian and Canadian universities in northwest Russia, maybe in Murmansk Oblast. They supported this idea” (TASS, May 25, 2019). Notably, the last such event was held in November 2014, in Canada, hosted by the aforementioned Carleton University. In addition to trying to foster bilateral academic ties, Russia's outreach to Canada on Arctic issues involves sustained information campaigns via RT and similar multi-language information outlets with international reach. In particular, Russian propaganda narratives routinely overemphasize the extent of current US-Canadian disagreements in the Arctic. At the same time, foreign-audience-facing Kremlin-linked media outlets underscore the allegedly negative role of President Donald Trump (and his policies toward Canada) in aggravating the existing disputes. RT widely claimed that “after Trump's inauguration, he began pressing Ottawa on economic issues and extended claims on Canadian possessions in the Arctic region.” It also highlighted US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's remarks suggesting that “Russia is not the only country with illegitimate claims [in the Arctic] ...the US has a lasting dispute with Canada over its claims on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Finally, RT's propaganda reporting also relied on a statement by Pavel Feldman, the deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Forecasts at the Moscow-based Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN). Feldman is quoted as saying, “[T]he US and Canada carry on a heated competition over the Arctic region; yet, publicly, these countries are trying to position themselves as partners” (RT, October 16, 2019). In recent months, this increasing Russian attention to Canada as an Arctic power and a key element of regional stability and order has started to be expressed at the highest levels in Moscow. Poignantly, President Vladimir Putin declared in a public address at the start of this year that Russia “is open to cooperation with Canada on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of each other's interest.” Putin added, “[O]ur countries are neighbors in the Arctic region and bear joint responsibility for the development of this vast region, for preservation of the traditional lifestyle of its native populations and the careful treatment of its brittle ecosystem” (Vzglyad, February 5, 2020). Such reconciliatory rhetoric should, however, be taken with a heavy dose of caution in Ottawa: from the earliest days of the Soviet Union, Moscow's stance on the Arctic region has been deliberately flexible and tightly premised on being able to demonstrate its military potential in the High North and to intimidate other regional players. The Russian Federation has increasingly undertaken the same policy course since 2014 (see EDM, April 9). Incidentally, on January 31, 2020, two Russian Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers approached Canadian airspace—maneuvers that the Russian Ministry of Defense explained away as “planned exercises” (Vpk.name, February 3). It is worth pointing out that the US North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is unable to identify and track Russian bombers of this type until they are close enough to launch missiles at targets on the continent. Furthermore, it is worth keeping in mind that, in fact, Russia (not the US) is Canada's direct competitor when it comes to territorial claims in the Arctic (the Lomonosov Ridge)—a point explicitly corroborated by Russia's Arktika 2007 expedition, which explored this disputed undersea area and famously planted a Russian flag at the North Pole, on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean (Izvestia, August 3, 2007). Lastly, it may be worth keeping an eye on one of the proposed amendments (soon to be officially adopted) to the Russian Constitution on the “prohibition of actions related to the alienation of Russian territory, or the propaganda thereof” (TASS, February 25). This amendment—reportedly drafted with predominantly Kaliningrad and Vladivostok in mind—is likely to also be applied to some Arctic territories that are of equally strategic interest to Canada. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-arctic-agenda-and-the-role-of-canada/

  • Competitive Projects launches new and exciting challenges through its next Call for Proposals!

    November 9, 2022 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security, Other Defence

    Competitive Projects launches new and exciting challenges through its next Call for Proposals!

    The Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) program has launched four new challenges under its Competitive Projects element. These new challenges cover a wide scope of Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) needs including the Arctic domain, cognitive radio communications, human autonomy teaming, and just-in-time resupply of common medical equipment and devices in austere environments. Don’t miss the opportunity to apply to: Land to sea with low GHGs: Arctic eco-safe transit of personnel and cargo from ship to shore Loud and clear: Assured naval radio communications in complex electromagnetic environments Best of both worlds: Human autonomy teaming for effective decision making Under pressure: Just-in-time medical resupply in austere environments

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