July 9, 2021 | Local, Naval
December 13, 2017 | Local, Aerospace
Government launches CF-188 replacement program with interim Hornet buy
Canada will acquire 18 F/A-18 Hornets and associated spare parts from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) to augment its fleet of CF-188 fighter jets until a replacement is selected and brought into service in 2025.
Government ministers and senior officials confirmed the widely anticipated plan to buy 30-year-old F/A-18A/B legacy Hornets at a press conference on Dec. 12, putting to rest a previous proposal to acquire 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets.
The Liberal government had announced in November 2016 a plan to buy the Boeing-built Super Hornets as an interim measure to address an urgent capability gap in the fighter fleet. Although the possible sale was approved by the U.S. State Department in September, the government ceased all discussions with Boeing after the company issued a trade complaint against Montreal-based Bombardier over the sale of the C Series jetliner to Delta Air Lines.
“We have received a formal offer for sale of F-18 aircraft from the government of Australia, which we intend to pursue. And we have received an offer of Super Hornets from the U.S. government, which we intend to let expire,” said Carla Qualtrough, Minister of Public Services and Procurement.
At the same time, the government officially launched a $15 to $19 billion competition to procure 88 aircraft to replace the entire fleet of Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) legacy Hornets by inviting interested governments and manufacturers to join a suppliers list.
Qualtrough said the list would allow the government to identify and “share sensitive information” with eligible governments, manufacturers and suppliers able to meet Canada's needs.
“All suppliers are welcome to participate in the process. No firm is excluded,” she said.
Engagement with industry, which has been ongoing since 2012, is expected to lead to a request for proposals by the spring of 2019, followed by a contract award in 2022. Delivery of the first aircraft would begin in 2025.
While ministers and senior officials stressed an “open and transparent” competition, the government also introduced a new criterion in the evaluation of company's bid: Its impact on Canadian economic interests, a measure journalists quickly dubbed the “Boeing clause.”
“This new assessment is an incentive for all bidders to contribute positively to Canada's economy,” said Qualtrough. “When bids are assessed this will mean that bidders responsible for harming Canada's economic interests will be at a distinct disadvantage compared to bidders who aren't engaged in detrimental behaviour.”
A government official, speaking on background, acknowledged that “many of the suppliers we deal with on defence procurements have several business lines and global reach. We are seeking to leverage (these) procurements to incentivize favourable economic conduct towards Canada and discourage detrimental actions by commercial suppliers.”
Qualtrough said the assessment, which will be used in future procurements, would be developed through consultations with industry. “All proposals will be subject to the same evaluation criteria.
“The assessment of economic impact will be done at the time of the assessment of the bids,” she added, an indication that much could change between the government and Boeing by 2019.
The eventual CF-188 replacement program will include aircraft, sustainment, infrastructure, and aircrew and maintenance training, and will generate billions for Canadian industry in industrial and technological benefits, said Navdeep Bains, Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, noting that the industrial and technological benefits (ITB) policy has already generated over $40 billion in economic investment.
“If you think that sounds impressive, the economic benefits of these new fighter jets will add significantly to those ITB numbers. This is an enormous investment in a very important sector for us. That's why our government feels it's important to do business with trusted partners.”
MINDING THE GAP
The Liberal government has faced pointed criticism on a number of fronts for claiming a capability gap. During Question Period on Tuesday, Conservative Member of Parliament Tony Clement suggested the capability gap does not exist.
“It's a fairy tale created by Liberals to justify their political decisions,” he said.
Gen Jonathan Vance, Chief of the Defence Staff, countered that criticism during the press conference, claiming the RCAF cannot generate enough mission-ready aircraft to meet North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) commitments simultaneously.
“The RCAF cannot concurrently meet those obligations now without some form of supplemental capability until a future fighter fleet is in place,” he said. “The acquisition of Australian F-18s is a logical choice.”
Senior officials with the RCAF and Department of National Defence (DND) said the Australian Hornets would “integrate seamlessly” with the CF-188s. Both fleets have similar operating requirements and share comparable training systems, all of which can be supported by existing supply chains and frontline maintainers.
Both countries have cooperated on fleet management and system upgrades, and shared test data, “so we know the jets well,” said the DND official. “We know the state of their aircraft and what modifications may be needed to operate them until the [new] fleet is in place.”
Montreal-based L3 MAS, responsible for maintaining Canada's CF-188s since they first entered service in the 1980s, has also performed centre barrel replacements on a number of Australian jets as part of a fuselage life extension program.
However, Canada recently began additional structural modifications to ensure the Hornets can operate through 2025, and the Australian F-18s will need to be modified to a similar standard.
The government must still negotiate the final price tag for the 18 jets, modifications and spare parts, but a senior official estimated it would be about one-tenth the cost of 18 Super Hornets and associated mission and weapon systems and support, which the U.S. State Department estimated at US$5.23 billion.
“Specific dollar amounts will be available once we have finalized an agreement with Australia,” he said.
If an agreement is reached, the first Australian Hornets would begin arriving in 2019 and the capability gap would be closed by the end of 2021, two years faster than the planned delivery of the Super Hornets, officials said.
The RCAF had planned to deploy the Super Hornets as a standalone squadron at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alta. The senior Air Force official said the force structure had not yet been finalized, but would likely involve aircraft being placed across the operational and training squadrons at 4 Wing and 3 Wing Bagotville, Que.
He also acknowledged that more aircraft would mean a need for more pilots and technicians, and that “retention and recruitment efforts were underway to meet this requirement.”
https://www.skiesmag.com/news/government-launches-cf-188-replacement-program-interim-hornet-buy/
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November 30, 2018 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
Why can't Ottawa get military procurement right?
Murray Brewster · CBC News The last couple of weeks may go down in the Trudeau government's public record as the point when the desires of deliverology met the drawbacks of defence procurement. Remember 'deliverology'? That lofty concept — measuring a government's progress in delivering on its promises — was the vogue in policy circles at the beginning of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's administration. While it's sometimes derided as an empty concept, deliverology must have seemed tailor-made for a new government inheriting a troubled defence procurement system. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal's decision Tuesday to step into the brawl over which multinational consortium will design and support the construction of the navy's new frigates is another lesson in how (apologies to Robert Burns) the best laid plans of mice and men go awry. The tribunal's decision to order Ottawa to put the frigate project on hold pending the completion of their probe into a complaint by a failed bidder comes at a politically awkward time for the Liberals. One week ago, Auditor General Michael Ferguson delivered an ugly report on the Liberals' handling of fighter jet procurement — specifically, the plan to buy interim warplanes to cover the gap until the current CF-18 fleet can be replaced with new aircraft. Self-inflicted wounds A cynic's reflex (given the checkered history of defence purchasing over the last decade) might be to consider these two events as just another day at the office for the troubled government procurement system. That might not be entirely fair. Still, experts were saying Wednesday that the government is suffering from numerous self-inflicted political and administrative wounds on this file. With a federal election on the horizon, and in a climate of growing geopolitical instability, the question of what the government has actually managed to deliver on military procurement is an important one to ask, said Rob Huebert, an analyst in strategic studies at the University of Calgary. While the system, as the Trudeau Liberals and previous governments have constructed it, seems to be the perfect model of the "evidence based" policy making promised by the champions of deliverology, it's also not built for speed. Some would suggest the deliverology model was followed to the letter in the design competition now tied up before the trade tribunal and in Federal Court. What seemed like endless consultations with the bidders took two years. The government made up to 88 amendments to the tender. And in the end, the preferred bid was challenged by a competitor that claims not all of the navy's criteria were met. Alion Science and Technology Corp. and its subsidiary, Alion Canada, argue the warship Lockheed Martin Canada and BAE System Inc. want to sell to Ottawa cannot meet the speed requirements set by the tender without a substantial overhaul. It does not, the company claims, meet the government's demand for a proven, largely off-the-shelf design. Michael Armstrong, who teaches at Brock University and holds a doctorate in management science, said the government could have avoided the challenges and accompanying slowdowns had it been more precise in its language. "They could have been more clear and firm when they use the words 'proven design'," he said. "Did they literally mean we won't buy ships unless they're floating in the water? Or did they mean that British one that doesn't quite exist yet is close enough? "If they would have been more firm and said, 'We want a ship that actually exists,' that might have simplified things at this stage." Huebert described the auditor general's report on the purchase of interim fighters as an all-out assault on evidence-based policy making. "It is just so damning," he said. A break with reality The Conservatives have accused the Liberals of avoiding the purchase of the F-35 stealth jet through manufacturing a crisis by claiming the air force doesn't have enough fighters to meet its international commitments. The auditor found that the military could not meet the government's new policy commitment and even ignored advice that one of its proposed solutions — buying brand-new Super Hornets to fill the capability gap —would actually make their problems worse, not better. That statement, said Huebert, suggested a jaw-dropping break with reality on the government's part. "They [the Liberals] were just making things up," he said. It might have been too optimistic to expect the Liberals to fix the system, said Armstrong, given the short four years between elections. But Huebert said Ottawa can't carry on with business as usual — that the government now must deliver on procurement, instead of doubling down on rhetoric. The problem, he said, is that governments haven't really paid a price in the past for botched military procurement projects. There was "no political pain for the agony of the Sea King replacement, as an example," he said, referring to the two-decade long process to retire the air force's maritime helicopters. "The thing that makes me so concerned, even outraged, is that we are heading into a so much more dangerous international environment," said Huebert, citing last weekend's clash between Russia and Ukraine over the Kerch Strait and ongoing tension with Beijing in the South China Sea. "When things get nasty, we have to be ready." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/why-can-t-ottawa-get-military-procurement-right-1.4924800
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June 3, 2019 | Local, Aerospace
Comment le F-35 est réapparu sur le radar d’Ottawa
Marc Godbout Justin Trudeau s'était engagé à ne pas acheter le F-35, l'avion de chasse de Lockheed Martin. Pourtant, de récentes manoeuvres rendent de plus en plus probable l'acquisition de l'appareil américain. Une réelle compétition aura-t-elle vraiment lieu pour remplacer les vieux chasseurs des Forces armées canadiennes? Les jeux de coulisse se sont intensifiés toute la semaine à Ottawa. L'enjeu est énorme : un contrat de 19 milliards de dollars pour 88 avions de combat canadiens. En toile de fond, le salon canadien des équipements militaires. Non seulement les lobbyistes sont plus actifs que jamais, mais leurs clients ont mis le paquet pour séduire et chercher à influencer le futur acheteur. Airbus et SAAB ont même fait venir d'Europe, par navire, des répliques de leurs avions de chasse respectifs. Mais au-delà des apparences, l'inquiétude s'est installée. Après le F-35, le F-35 Après des années d'attente, de dérapages et d'interminables débats, un appel d'offres du gouvernement fédéral doit finalement être lancé d'ici la mi-juillet. Il le sera juste avant la campagne électorale, près de quatre ans après l'élection des libéraux qui avaient promis d'amorcer le processus immédiatement en arrivant au pouvoir. Résultat? Le choix du gagnant ne sera annoncé qu'en 2022, et les premiers avions, livrés en 2025, au plus tôt. Les concurrents potentiels pour la construction des avions de chasse canadiens : Boeing (Super Hornet) Airbus (Typhoon) Saab (Gripen) Lockheed Martin (F-35) Quatre joueurs souhaiteraient être de la course. Mais le seront-ils tous? Le portrait pourrait très bien changer. Les pressions exercées par Washington sur Ottawa y sont pour beaucoup. L'administration Trump a obtenu des assouplissements au processus d'évaluation des retombées économiques au Canada pour s'assurer que le F-35 soit de la course. La politique canadienne d'approvisionnement militaire exige depuis très longtemps que les entreprises dépensent au pays l'équivalent de la valeur d'un contrat afin de renforcer l'industrie canadienne. Or, le programme du F-35, dont le Canada est l'un des neuf pays partenaires, est structuré autrement. Les entreprises canadiennes ont le droit de soumissionner pour des contrats mondiaux liés à la chaîne d'approvisionnement. Les pays partenaires ne peuvent, par contre, exiger des avantages économiques comme condition préalable à l'achat de l'appareil. Voilà que la récente révision obtenue par Washington permet à Lockheed Martin et son avion de ne pas être écartés de la compétition quoiqu'ils seraient pénalisés s'ils choisissent un système différent. On est donc bien loin de la promesse électorale de 2015 de Justin Trudeau, qui s'engageait à ne pas acheter l'avion de Lockheed Martin. Les libéraux ont tout fait pour se distancer du F-35 dans la foulée du fiasco qui collait à la peau des conservateurs. Mais la réalité a fini par rattraper le gouvernement Trudeau. « Sélectionner un appareil autre que le F-35 pourrait créer des tensions avec les Américains », soutient Justin Massie, professeur de science politique à l'UQAM. « Le F-35 est important pour l'administration Trump, qui veut développer davantage l'industrie militaire américaine. » Ce revirement a eu l'effet d'une douche froide chez les concurrents. « Il ne serait pas étonnant de voir des joueurs se retirer dès le départ ou en cours de route. Ils sont furieux », a confié à Radio-Canada une source très proche du dossier. Tant l'américaine Boeing que l'européenne Airbus et la suédoise Saab disent maintenant attendre « l'ensemble des exigences » de l'appel d'offres avant d'annoncer leurs intentions finales. « Nous sommes sur nos gardes [....] et de plus en plus incertains de vouloir nous lancer », a même indiqué un dirigeant de l'une de ces compagnies, sous le couvert de l'anonymat. Retour vers le futur Le temps est-il en train de jouer en faveur du F-35? Possiblement. « Le volume de production du F-35 entraîne la diminution du coût à l'unité qui est inférieur à celui de ses concurrents qui sont moins avancés sur le plan technologique », expliquait récemment Richard Shimooka dans un rapport de l'Institut Macdonald-Laurier. Alors que le coût par avion dépassait les 200 millions de dollars américains au début de la production en 2007, il devrait passer sous la barre des 80 millions d'ici 2020, selon le Pentagone. Plus de 390 appareils ont été livrés dans le monde. Et pas plus tard que cette semaine, le président américain annonçait la vente de 105 avions supplémentaires à l'issue d'un sommet avec le premier ministre japonais. Les pays qui ont choisi le F-35 : États-Unis Royaume-Uni Italie Pays-Bas Norvège Danemark Belgique Turquie Japon Australie Israël Corée du Sud Il s'est déjà écoulé neuf ans depuis l'annonce par le gouvernement Harper de l'achat de 65 avions F-35. « La modernisation de nos vieux F-18 a coûté beaucoup d'argent. Et l'acquisition de chasseurs intérimaires australiens a coûté au bas mot un milliard de dollars de plus aux contribuables canadiens », déplore Justin Massie. Neuf ans plus tard, le Canada a commencé à recevoir ses premiers F-18 australiens usagés, toujours dans l'attente d'une solution permanente. Il est quand même plutôt ironique de constater que l'Australie voulait s'en débarrasser pour recevoir ses premiers F-35 tout neufs. https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1173077/canada-avions-chasse-f-35-achat-armee