Germany’s TKMS buys Brazilian shipyard as production hub for local frigate program

On the same subject

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  December 9, 2019 | International, Other Defence

  Opinion: Is Pressuring Allies To Pay More For Defense Worth The Cost?

  President Donald Trump appears to be getting his wish that U.S. allies pay more for their own defense, which begs the question: Is the victory worth the cost? Pushing allies to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense is not a new concept. Trump's predecessors George W. Bush and Barack Obama both argued for greater burden sharing, and Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine's Crimea region had allies starting to move toward that benchmark. Arguably, Trump's “America First” drumbeat is getting NATO allies to pay a bigger share of the cost of their defense three decades after the end of the Cold War. Military spending by European NATO nations and Canada has risen 4.6% this year, and the majority of allies have plans to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense by 2024, according to NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg. Meanwhile, the U.S. is on a path to dial back its contribution from 22% of NATO's total funding to 16%. “This is a direct result of President Trump making clear our expectations that these Europeans would step up to help secure their own people,” says U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Unfortunately, Trump has not stopped there, openly expressing disdain for an organization established to guard against the kind of territorial expansion undertaken by the former Soviet Union. He has hurled sophomoric barbs at steadfast allies such as the UK, Germany and Canada, while refusing to criticize Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, the architect of both the Crimea invasion and Moscow's campaign to interfere in U.S. elections. For the first phase of the Trump presidency, his cabinet tried to temper those go-it-alone impulses. Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis sought to reassure allies of U.S. support for their security. But more recent White House appointees have been less willing to cross their boss. Even more damaging was Trump's abrupt decision to withdraw most U.S. forces from Syria, disgracefully abandoning America's Kurdish allies to the benefit of Turkey, Russia and Iran and leaving Europe more exposed to attacks from Islamic extremists. “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO,” French President Emmanuel Macron told The Economist. Trump sees NATO in a transactional way, “as a project in which the United States acts as a sort of geopolitical umbrella, but the trade-off is that there has to be commercial exclusivity,” he added. “It's an arrangement for buying American.” While Macron is calling for a reconsideration of what NATO means in light of reduced American commitment, European nations are not waiting. They are building up their own defense industrial base. In 2017, the EU created the Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative, which is pursuing research toward new missiles, aircraft, missile defense and electronic attack capabilities. U.S. efforts to have its companies included in the work have so far been brushed off. Trump's hardball approach also is being applied to key allies in Asia that have long served as a bulwark against a rising China. The U.S. alliance with South Korea is now reviewed annually, instead of every four years. And after signing a deal in February that calls for South Korea to pay nearly $1 billion to maintain the U.S. military presence there, Washington is now demanding that Seoul pay $4.7 billion annually. Before an agreement was reached, the U.S. walked out of the talks. The Trump administration also is looking for more cash from Japan, calling for more than triple Tokyo's $1.7 billion contribution toward hosting U.S. troops in its country. These requests are straining longstanding alliances. South Korea is edging closer to China, while Japan, which has a strong industrial base, might partner with the UK on its Tempest fighter program. To be sure, U.S. defense exports remain near an all-time high. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced $55.4 billion in potential Foreign Military Sales in fiscal 2019, about the same as the prior year. But there are indications that Trump's pay-up-now methods may lead to an erosion in future sales. Asking allies to contribute more for their own defense certainly has merit, but the wider risks to U.S. global interests cannot be ignored. Can 70-year-old alliances survive if the leading partner vocally questions their value? And if the alliances crack, what would that mean for the U.S. military industrial base? “The more our alliances fray,” says Eric Edelman, a former U.S. undersecretary of defense, “the less interest people have in buying U.S. defense goods and services.” https://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-pressuring-allies-pay-more-defense-worth-cost

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  December 2, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  E-2D Hawkeye : venir moderniser les moyens de la Marine Nationale

  La DGA a annoncé une commande de trois avions de guet aérien embarqué E-2D Hawkeye à destination de la Marine Nationale. Ils viendront embarquer sur le PANG. Foreign Military Sale. Le Ministère des Armées a rapporté le 20 novembre que la Marine serait prochainement dotée d'avions de guet aérien embarqué E-2D Hawkeye, en remplacement des E-2C actuellement en service. Ce contrat, qui prend la forme d'une FMS, a été formalisé le 4 novembre entre les armées françaises et le gouvernement américain. Prévu depuis plusieurs années, cette commande était inscrite au sein de la LPM 2019-2025 et fait suite à une longue réflexion menée par la Marine nationale, accompagnée par la DGA. Les premières livraisons sont attendues dès 2028. Le retrait du service des E-2C sera corrélé à l'arrivée des E-2D. Moderniser la flotte. Les E-2D Hawkeye, de Northrop Grumman, viendront moderniser la flotte d'aéronefs de la Marine nationale et permettront de remplacer les E-2C Kawkeye, actuellement en service. De par les développements technologiques apportés par ce nouvel appareil, le MinArm parle de « saut de génération ». « Son radar à antenne active, son cockpit et ses liaisons de données sont notamment améliorées et il peut également être ravitaillé en vol », souligne ainsi le Ministère des Armées. Les E-2D seront dotés du radar AN/APY-9 à antenne électronique active, une technologie permettant d'accroître les capacités de détection de l'appareil. Par ailleurs, afin de procéder à une évaluation de la situation maritime, les E-2D emporteront un calculateur, directement développé en France par le SIAé. Enfin, la Marine nationale nous précise que « le système de communication est entièrement modernisé, ainsi que le système de pilotage avec glass-cockpit ». Porte-avions. Tout comme les E-2C qu'ils viendront remplacer, les E-2D Hawkeye seront opérés par la flottille 4F, depuis la base aéronautique navale de Lann-Bihoué. Et tout comme leurs prédécesseurs ils pourront être embarqués sur le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle ainsi que sur le PANG (porte-avions de nouvelle génération). Les travaux d'intégration ont débuté dans ce sens. « Leurs caractéristiques sont d'ores et déjà prises en compte dans la conception du futur porte-avions français. Ils seront donc nativement compatibles », nous explique la Marine, interrogée à ce sujet. MCO. Outre l'acquisition des trois E-2D Hawkeye, la FMS passée avec le gouvernement américain et Northrop Grumman comprend un volet soutien. L'industriel américain sera ainsi en charge de la maintenance des appareils sur les deux premières années. Par la suite, la DMAé prendra le relai et notifiera un nouveau contrat de soutien. Le SIAé s'occupera alors de la cellule et des équipements depuis Cuers et des moteurs depuis Bordeaux. Le montant total du contrat s'élève à 1,850 Md€. Il inclut ainsi « l'acquisition des trois E-2D Francisés, un système d'entraînement et un système de soutien, ainsi que le soutien sur deux années », nous détaille la Marine. https://www.air-cosmos.com/article/e-2d-hawkeye-venir-moderniser-les-moyens-de-la-marine-nationale-23924

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  May 21, 2020 | International, Naval

  Shipbuilding suppliers need more than market forces to stay afloat

  By: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton The U.S. Navy's award this month of the contract for its new class of frigates starts the very necessary process of rebalancing the U.S. surface fleet, but the competition also highlighted the U.S. shipbuilding-industrial base's increasing fragility. If they lost, two of the four shipyards bidding on the frigate were at risk of either going out of business or joining the underemployed ranks of U.S. commercial shipbuilders. Due to specialization, only one or two yards construct each class of Navy combat ship with workforces, equipment, and infrastructure that would be expensive and difficult to adapt. A decision on any single ship class, as with the frigate, can shut down a shipyard and send its workers to the unemployment line. Specialization is also a problem when orders increase. The Navy's two submarine shipyards, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News division, shrank the time needed to build subs by 20 percent during the past decade while increasing production to two per year. The rising sophistication of Virginia-class submarines has now reversed this trend, however, and submarine builders' challenges are only increasing. They recently started a new contract to build up to 10 of the larger Block V Virginia submarines and are in negotiation with the Navy on a block-buy contract for the first two Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. Supplier challenges abound U.S. shipbuilders may be fragile, but their suppliers are on life support. After decades of being whipsawed by changes to shipbuilding plans and budget uncertainty, a shrinking number of suppliers are able and willing to stay in business. The Navy's recent initiatives to improve supplier production capacity and resilience don't go far enough to address its rising dependence on sole-source suppliers, which now provide more than 75 percent of submarine parts. For example, when problems with Columbia missile tubes led the Navy to seek new suppliers, it replaced the existing, sole source — BWXT — with another — General Dynamics — that will assemble tubes at the same facilities that are constructing parts for the Virginia and Columbia submarines. Last year, the Trump administration used the Defense Production Act to establish new suppliers for military missile fuel. The Navy should build on this effort to identify sole-source items for which an additional supplier is appropriate. In selecting additional suppliers, the Navy should prioritize attributes other than cost. Sole-source items by definition are important enough to justify seeking out or creating a single supplier rather than adapting the ship's design to use an existing item. Therefore, the Navy should emphasize the provider's track record in conducting similar or other challenging engineering; its ability to adjust to what will likely be variable demand and changing specifications; and the likelihood of quality production that avoids rework. Planning for resiliency The Department of Defense could help address the shipbuilding-industrial base's fragility with its current study of the number and mix of ships needed in the future fleet. Although the primary goal of this analysis should be determining the most effective fleet possible within likely budget constraints, it must also ensure the industrial base can build and sustain the future Navy. Industrial base considerations are not new to Navy force structure planning. During the last decade, the Navy or Congress added amphibious ships, submarines, destroyers and auxiliary vessels to maintain hot production lines or keep a shipyard afloat until the next order. Each of the Navy's new combatant ships are expected to cost more than $1 billion to build, constraining the Navy's ability to spread ship construction to other qualified shipyards to fill production gaps or extend classes to keep a shipyard in operation. The Navy could better support shipbuilders by rebalancing its fleet architecture to increase the number of smaller vessels such as corvettes or tank landing ships, and reduce the number of larger destroyers and amphibious warships. Smaller, less-expensive ships could be built in larger numbers per year, providing more flexibility in shipbuilding plans to stabilize the workload for shipbuilders and providing more scalability to align shipbuilding expenditures with changing budgets. Smaller ships could also be built at a wider range of shipyards, including those that only build commercial vessels and noncombatant government ships like Coast Guard cutters and oceanographic research vessels. These “dual-use” shipbuilders suffer today from a lack of coordination between commercial and government shipbuilding, which creates a feast-or-famine cycle of orders. The Navy and nation depend on a healthy shipbuilding-industrial base. To foster the industrial base in the face of natural and man-made challenges, the Navy should change its fleet design and shipbuilding plans, while investing to establish and qualify new suppliers. Without deliberate action, the U.S. shipbuilding industry will become increasingly fragile, limiting the Navy's ability to build the ships it needs and respond when today's competitions turn to conflict. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where Timothy A. Walton is a fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/20/shipbuilding-suppliers-need-more-than-market-forces-to-stay-afloat/