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December 8, 2020 | International, Land

DoD SBIR/STTR Component BAA Open: Army SBIR BAA 21.4, Topic A214-001

The DoD Small Business and Technology Partnerships Office announces the opening of the following Broad Agency Announcement (BAA):
Army SBIR 21.4
• A214-001: Identifying and Enabling Emerging Technology Leaders
IMPORTANT DATES:
• December 8, 2020: BAA opens, begin submitting proposals in DSIP
• December 23, 2020: Topic Q&A (formerly SITIS) closes to new questions at 12:00 p.m. ET
• January 12, 2021: BAA closes, full proposals must be submitted in DSIP no later than 12:00 p.m. ET
The instructions and topics for these BAAs are available on DSIP at https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/login and at https://rt.cto.mil/rtl-small-business-resources/sbir-sttr/.
Please be sure to submit your proposals as early as possible in order to avoid unexpected delays due to high volume of traffic during the final hours before BAA close. Report system difficulties to the DSIP Help Desk IMMEDIATELY and include screenshots of any error messages received

[NEW!] DSIP Registration and Login
Effective August 13, 2020: The DoD SBIR/STTR Innovation Portal (DSIP) is now integrated with Login.gov – a government-wide registration platform that provides a seamless login experience.
ALL Small Business Concerns (SBCs) are required to register for a Login.gov account and link it to your DSIP account. If you already have a Login.gov account, simply link your existing account to DSIP. To set up your Login.gov account, click the “Login/Register” button on the DSIP homepage, here: https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/login.
NOTE: The email address you use for Login.gov should match the email address associated with your existing DSIP account. If you do not recall the email address associated with your DSIP account, or if you already have an existing Login.gov account using a different email address, you will need your Firm's DUNS number and your Firm PIN in order to link your Login.gov account with your DSIP account. If the email address associated with your existing DSIP account has been used for multiple DSIP accounts within your Firm, you will also need your Firm's DUNS number and your Firm PIN in order to link your Login.gov account with your DSIP account. The Firm PIN can be obtained from your Firm Admin. You can view the Firm Admin's contact information by entering your Firm's DUNS number when prompted. If you are the Firm Admin, please ensure that you contact all DSIP users in your Firm and provide them with the Firm PIN.
Job Aids and Help Videos are in the Learning & Support section of DSIP, here: https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/learning-support/training-materials. ALL SBCs MUST complete your Login.gov setup as soon as possible to avoid delays in submitting proposals in DSIP.
After setting up your Login.gov account, take a few minutes to log in and become familiar with DSIP.
• Returning users can log in from the DSIP homepage.
• For new program participants, follow the steps for New User Registration to create your account in DSIP.

Topic Q&A (formerly SITIS)
Proposers may submit technical questions through Topic Q&A page at https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/login. All questions and answers are posted electronically for general viewing. Topic Q&A will close to new questions on December 23, 2020 at 12:00 p.m. ET, but will remain active to view questions and answers related to the topics until the BAA close.
Proposers are advised to monitor Topic Q&A during the BAA period for questions and answers and frequently monitor DSIP for updates and amendments to the topics.

Learning & Support
Visit the Learning & Support section for Job Aids and Help Videos to guide you through submitting and viewing questions and answers in the Topic Q&A, preparing and submitting your proposal in DSIP, and more: https://www.dodsbirsttr.mil/submissions/learning-support/training-materials

DSIP Help Desk Contact Info
• Phone Number: 703-214-1333
• Email: DoDSBIRSupport@reisystems.com
• Non-Holiday Hours: Monday – Friday, 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m. ET
• Please refer to the DSIP homepage for Help Desk availability on holidays.
Thank you for your interest in the DoD SBIR/STTR Program.
DoD SBIR/STTR Support Team

To sign up and receive upcoming emails, please follow this link: https://secure.campaigner.com/CSB/Public/Form.aspx?fid=667492&ac=g9gk

https://rt.cto.mil/rtl-small-business-resources/sbir-sttr/

On the same subject

  • What will top the Space Force to-do list?

    August 30, 2018 | International, C4ISR

    What will top the Space Force to-do list?

    By: Kelsey Atherton In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Air Force's Global Positioning System was a continuous target. “Every year [as] we went through the budget cycle the United States Air Force ... tried to kill the GPS program,” Gen. John Hyten, now head of U.S. Strategic Command, said during a 2015 speech. “Why would they kill the GPS program? It's really very simple: ‘Why would we need a satellite navigation system when we have perfectly good [inertial navigation system, or] INS for airplanes? Why would we do it?' Nobody could see the future of what GPS was going to bring to the world.” First developed and launched late in the Cold War, GPS made its combat debut in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and ever since has informed the movements and targeting capabilities of the Department of Defense. More than that, since GPS signals were opened to the commercial world, everything from road trips to finding new restaurants to the entire development of self-driving cars has hinged around accessing the reliable signals, that let machines and people know exactly where they are in time and space. The whole architecture is simultaneously vital and vulnerable and, in the era of a pending Space Force, an unspoken mandate is that it has never been more important that the United States ensure the signal endures. It is the potential risk of losing GPS, and everything else supported by the satellite network, that serves as the foundation for much of the discussion around a new Space Force. For as long as humans have put objects into orbit, space has been a military domain, but one with a curious distinction from other fighting theaters: while land, sea and air have all seen direct armed confrontation, space is instead a storehouse for sensors, where weapons are vanishingly rare and have yet to be used in anger. “Capabilities that we have built that we now take for granted in the Air Force, the whole [remotely piloted aircraft, or RPA] fleet that we fly, is impossible without space,” Hyten said at another speech in 2015. “You cannot have Creech Air Force Base without space because the operators at Creech reach out and talk to their RPAs via satellite links. Those aircraft are guided by GPS. You take away GPS, you take away SATCOM, you take away RPAs. They don't exist anymore. All those things are fundamentally changed in the Air Force.” Looking over the horizon Missiles remain the most effective way for nations to reach out and mess with something in orbit, and so long as GPS satellites cost around $500 million to build and launch, the cost of destroying a satellite will remain cheaper than fielding satellites. There is a double asymmetry here: not only are the satellites that power the GPS network expensive to build and launch, but the United States relies on this network to a far greater extent than any adversary that might decide to shoot those satellites down. This vulnerability is one reason that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is funding development of networks of smaller satellites, which are individually less capable than existing models but are cheaper to field and replace and will deploy in greater numbers, making destruction by missile a much more expensive proposition. Blackjack, the DARPA program that aims to do this, is focused on military communications satellites first, though the approach may have lessons for other satellite functions. “Better distribution, disaggregation and diversity of space capabilities can make them more resilient against attacks,” said Brian Weeden, director of program planning for the Secure World Foundation. “But the specific answer of how best to do that might be different for each capability. The specific techniques to make [position, navigation and timing, or] PNT more resilient may be different than the techniques needed to make satellite communications more resilient.” Missiles are not the only threat faced by satellites in orbit. An April 2018 report by the Secure World Foundation on Global Counterspace Capabilities details the full spectrum of weapons and tools for disrupting objects in orbit, and also the nations and, in some instances, nonstate actors that can field those tools. The nations with counterspace programs highlighted in the report include China, Russia, the United States, Iran, North Korea and India, all of which (barring Iran) are also nuclear-armed nations. Beyond anti-satellite missiles, which only China, Russia and the United States have demonstrated, the other means of messing up a satellite are the familiar bugaboos of modern machines: electronic warfare, jamming and cyberattacks. “The most important thing is that it's not always about the satellites in space. Space capabilities include the satellites, the user terminal/receivers, and the signals being broadcast between them. Disrupting any one of those segments could lead to loss of the capability,” Weeden said. “In many cases, it's far easier to jam a satellite capability rather than destroy the satellite. And, from a military perspective, the end effect is what's important.” A satellite that cannot broadcast or whose signal cannot overcome the strength of a jammer is a satellite that is functionally offline, and the means to disable satellites extend beyond the traditional strengths of near-peer competitors to the United States and down even to nonstate actors. In 2007, the Tamil Tigers reportedly hacked the ground nodes for a commercial satellite and were able to gain control of its broadcasting capabilities, and in 2008 a set of hackers demonstrated they could eavesdrop on supposedly secure Iridium signals. A decade has passed since those demonstrations, but satellite architectures change slowly, in waves of half-a-billion dollar machines launched over time. Should a vulnerability be found on the ground, there's lag time between how long it can be exploited and how long it can be rendered inert. What happens if the GPS signal stutters out of sync with time? Everything about how GPS works is bound up in its ability to precisely and consistently track time. Knowing where something is depends on knowing when something was. Without the entire network of automatic navigation aids they've built their lives around, people will fumble. Consider what happened for 11 hours on Jan. 26, 2016. “The root cause was a bug in the GPS network,” wrote Paul Tullis in Bloomberg. “When the U.S. Air Force, which operates the 31 satellites, decommissioned an older one and zeroed out its database values, it accidentally introduced tiny errors into the database, skewing the numbers. By the time Buckner's inbox started blowing up, several satellites were transmitting bad timing data, running slow by 13.7 millionths of a second.” Tullis goes on to detail the possibility and plans for a redundant ground-based navigation system that could let GPS-dependent functions of commercial machines keep working, even if a satellite slips out of sync. There is an international agreement to eventually make all signals across the Global Navigation Satellite System (GPS, Galileo, etc.) broadcast compatible civil signals. This would improve the redundancy among day-to-day civilian applications dependent upon GPS, but it would do very little for the military signals. “There is no such compatibility between the military signals of the different constellations,” says Weeden. “In fact, during negotiations with the European Union the U.S. demanded that the Galileo protected/military signal be made separate from the GPS military signal. It is possible to create receivers that can pull in the military signals from both GPS and Galileo, but it's not easy to do so securely.” GPS III, which Lockheed Martin is building, will mitigate some of this when those satellites are on orbit: the new hardware is designed with stronger signals that will make them harder to jam, but that will also require new receivers on the ground. While developers are working on making those new receivers, one way to build in redundancy would be to make GPS receivers that can use both Galileo and GPS military signals, suggests Weeden. That's a technical solution that requires at least some political finesse to achieve, but it's one possibility for making existing infrastructure more redundant. “But there are also other ways to get precision timing and navigation other than from GPS, such as better gyroscopes or even using airborne or terrestrial broadcasts of PNT signals,” says Weeden. “These alternatives are probably not going to be as easy to use or have other drawbacks compared to GPS, but they're better than nothing.” Redundant systems or complementary systems provide a safeguard against spoofing, when a navigation system is fed false GPS coordinates in order to reroute it. Big changes in inputs are easy for humans monitoring the system, say a car's navigation or a drone flying by GPS coordinates, to spot, but subtle changes can be accepted as normal, lost as noise, and then lead people or cars or drones into places they did not plan on going. The next generation of threats Protecting the integrity of satellite communications from malicious interference is the centerpiece of a report from the Belfer Center, entitled “Job One for Space Force: Space Asset Cybersecurity.” The report's author, Gregory Falco, outlines broad goals for organizations that manage objects in space, policymakers, as well as a proposed Information Sharing and Analysis Center for space. These include everything from adopting cybersecurity practices like working with security researchers and encrypting communications to setting up a mechanism for organizations to disclose if their satellites suffered interference or hacking. If the security of GPS is suffering from anything, it is less ignorance of the threat and more complacency in the continued durability of the system as currently operating. “Cybersecurity challenges will only become more substantial as technology continues to evolve and attackers will always find the weakest link to penetrate a target system,” writes Falco. “Today, space assets are that weakest link. Space asset organizations must not wait for policy-makers to take action on this issue, as there are several steps that could be taken to secure their systems without policy guidance.” The fourth domain of space is more directly threatened by threats traveling through the fifth domain of cyberspace than anything else. To the extent that space requires a specialized hand, it is managing from the start to the launch the specific vulnerabilities of orbital assets, and the points at which they are controlled from the ground. Perhaps the way to address that specific problem is a Space Force framed around the physical and cybersecurity needs of satellites. Raytheon is the contractor tasked with building GPS OCX, the next-generation operational control system for the satellite network. After years of delay in the program, Block 0 of the OCX deployed in September 2017, putting in place a system that could manage the launch and early orbit management of the new GPS satellites. Besides managing the satellites, the control system has to ensure that only the right people access the controls, and that means extensive cybersecurity. Raytheon says that, together with the Air Force, the company recently completed two cybersecurity assessments, including a simulated attack by an adversary. While Air Force classification prevents Raytheon from disclosing the results of that test, the company's president of intelligence, information and services, Dave Wajsgras, offered this: “We've built a layered defense and implemented all information assurance requirements for the program into this system. We're cognizant that the cyber threat will always change, so we've built GPS OCX to evolve and to make sure it's always operating at this level of protection.” Ideally, this massive job of protecting GPS will fall to the Space Force. “One of the big drivers for the Space Force is improving the space acquisitions process, and another is developing better ways to defend U.S. military satellites against attack,” says Weeden. “So, in that context, the Space Force debate could impact the future of GPS.” Yet many of the answers to vulnerabilities in space are not found in orbit, and it's possible that shifting the full responsibility for signal security to a body built around managing satellites would miss the ways greater signal redundancy can be built in atmospheric or terrestrial systems. The Army and Navy are funding GPS alternatives, but that funding is minuscule by Pentagon standards. “The United States should take smart steps to make its space force more resilient,” writes Paul Scharre of the Center for New American Security, “but the U.S. also needs to be investing in ways to fight without space, given the inherent vulnerabilities in the domain.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/satellites/2018/08/29/what-will-top-the-space-force-to-do-list

  • Dynetics seeks closer soft docking of X-61A Gremlins in next flight test

    September 8, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Dynetics seeks closer soft docking of X-61A Gremlins in next flight test

    by Pat Host Dynetics believes it gained enough data from a July flight test of its X-61A Gremlins unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to next time achieve a closer soft docking to the recovery aircraft than the 38 m distance it reached in July. The July flight test was the demonstration of a second X-61A air vehicle as well as the Gremlins airborne recovery system. The X-61A, which weighs 544 kg, flew for a total flight time of 2 hours 12 minutes and flew in formation with a Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft from as close as 38 m back and 38 m below the aircraft. Tim Keeter, Dynetics Gremlins programme manager, told Janes on 27 August that the company needed centimetre-level accuracy and precision to get the air vehicle's engagement arm into the 30 cm stabilised towed docking, or capture, device. This process is known as soft docking. Dynetics, Keeter said, advanced the maturity of the system, its confidence in the air vehicle's behaviour, and downloaded enough data where the company is confident it can close that last 38 m for a closer soft docking event in an upcoming flight test. The X-61A that flew in July was Gremlins Air Vehicle (GAV) Number 3, the first flight for this air vehicle. Keeter said Dynetics launched this air vehicle the same way it launched the first one: from a pylon on a C-130 operated by International Air Response (IAR), which offers C-130 services. Dynetics used the same C-130 for both launch and recovery. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/dynetics-seeks-closer-soft-docking-of-x-61a-gremlins-in-next-flight-test

  • Coopérations dans l'armement : la France peut-elle vraiment faire confiance à l'Allemagne ? (1/3)

    November 7, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    Coopérations dans l'armement : la France peut-elle vraiment faire confiance à l'Allemagne ? (1/3)

    Par Michel Cabirol La France et l'Allemagne ont à l'évidence des enjeux et des objectifs différents. La coopération franco-allemande est-elle assise sur des bases saines ? Pas sûr. La France peut-elle vraiment faire confiance à l'Allemagne en matière de politique de défense et d'armement? Pas sûr si l'on en croit le député LREM du Finistère, Jean-Charles Larsonneur, qui jette un pavé dans la mare avec son rapport sur le programme 146 (Equipement des forces et dissuasion) : "L'approfondissement, sans grande publicité et, pour ainsi dire, à bas bruit, du concept de nation-cadre de l'OTAN, consiste à fédérer autour de l'Allemagne les capacités de 17 « petits » pays, ce qui risque de réduire l'intérêt des Allemands pour nos coopérations bilatérales", a-t-il expliqué le 24 octobre à l'Assemblée nationale. L'Allemagne se place dans une volonté de leadership en Europe dans le domaine de la défense, qu'elle a très clairement exprimé dans son Livre Blanc de 2016 et dans sa stratégie dans le domaine des technologies clés. D'ailleurs, l'un des plus influents think tank d'Allemagne, la Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), synthétise parfaitement la stratégie allemande. Il préconisait en août 2017 que Berlin prenne le leadership militaire de l'Union européenne, et de devenir le pilier européen de l'OTAN en raison du futur désengagement américain. "La Bundeswehr pourrait devenir une épine dorsale de la sécurité européenne à long terme, affirmait la SWP. (...) Cela exige de la volonté du futur gouvernement fédéral d'accepter un leadership politique et militaire dans l'alliance". Un avantage puissant pour l'industrie allemande L'Allemagne a effectivement su se saisir du concept de nation-cadre ("Framework Nation Concept"- FNC) élaboré par l'OTAN à son initiative à partir de 2012. De fait, l'Allemagne, qui a mis en œuvre ce concept, s'est entourée, en tant que nation-cadre, de 19 États membres pour mettre en œuvre des projets de coopération très approfondis, tendant à une véritable intégration pour certains d'entre eux (Pays-Bas notamment). Et pour de nombreux observateurs, ce concept va se révéler être un rouleau compresseur en faveur des intérêts industriels germaniques. C'est un "instrument stratégique qui pourrait servir puissamment les intérêts de l'industrie allemande", a confirmée Jean-Charles Larsonneur. Pourquoi ? Selon Antoine Bouvier, cité dans le rapport du député, l'interpénétration des enjeux capacitaires et opérationnels est profonde. Ainsi, les États partenaires de l'Allemagne ont souscrit l'engagement de porter au standard le plus élevé leurs capacités des chars de combat, ce qui constitue une "formidable opportunité pour KMW ". Cette opportunité est par nature d'autant plus grande que l'intégration des capacités militaires concernées est poussée. Ainsi, l'armée de terre néerlandaise ne pourrait désormais plus être déployée sans la Bundeswehr, tant leur intégration capacitaire est profonde. L'Allemagne, dans ce schéma, tient un rôle d'intégrateur des capacités européennes. Cette ambition s'appuie sur des ressources budgétaires à la hausse : augmentation de 34,3 milliards d'euros en 2016 à 42,9 milliards en 2019 (soit 1,31% du PIB). "Le concept de nation-cadre se constitue de fait comme le pilier européen de l'Alliance ‒ aux yeux d'Américains, mieux vaut voir l'Europe de la défense se constituer dans un cadre de l'OTAN, bien connu, plutôt que dans des constructions européennes moins maîtrisées par eux", a expliqué Jean-Charles Larsonneur dans son rapport. Le SCAF en danger? Un accord politique a été trouvé au plus haut niveau le 13 juillet 2017, formalisé par des lettres d'intention au printemps 2018. Il est convenu que la France aura un rôle prééminent dans la conduite du programme SCAF. Symétriquement, il est entendu que l'Allemagne en aura un dans la conduite du projet de char du futur tout comme elle a obtenu le leadership sur le futur drone MALE européen. Selon Jean-Charles Larsonneur, les industriels français et allemands ne disposent toujours pas d'un cadre réglementaire, ne serait-ce que pour échanger des informations. "Il ressort de mes travaux que la DGA attend des réponses de son équivalent allemand", a-t-il révélé. "Il est donc urgent de poser des jalons aussi irréversibles que possible dans la coopération franco-allemande, tant que le contexte politique le permet", a-t-il affirmé. Jean-Charles Larsonneur est inquiet sur la coopération franco-allemande. "La coopération franco-allemande présente en ce moment quelques signes de flottement", a-t-il estimé à l'Assemblée nationale. Il a cité en exemple la décision des Allemands de décliner la proposition française de développer en commun un missile européen pour le nouveau standard du Tigre, au profit d'un missile israélien, le Spike, comme l'avait révélé La Tribune. Mais selon Antoine Bouvier, le nouveau Spike LR2 n'est qu'au début de son développement et comporte donc des risques technologiques. "Le choix des Allemands pour une joint venture entre Rafael, fabricant israélien du Spike, et RheinMettall ‒ dont le rôle dans ce programme ne paraît d'ailleurs pas être dominant ‒ ne s'explique donc pas principalement par des considérations techniques", a précisé le rapport du député du Finistère. Le concept de nation-cadre permet également à l'Allemagne d'avancer discrètement ses pions dans le domaine des sous-marins. Après avoir fait céder la Norvège (membre du FNC), Berlin tente désormais de séduire la Pologne et les Pays-Bas en vantant un cluster européen sous-marin sous tutelle allemande. Ce qui marginaliserait clairement la France en Europe. En février 2017, la Norvège a commandé quatre U-212 et doit développer avec Berlin un partenariat à vocation mondiale dans le domaine des missiles mer-mer et des systèmes de traitement de l'information. La décision d'Oslo d'interrompre l'appel d'offres et de choisir une évolution du sous-marin en service dans la Marine allemande dans le cadre d'une coopération opérationnelle et industrielle renforcée, risque de faire t'ches d'huile en Europe... La France est en danger. https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/cooperations-dans-l-armement-la-france-peut-elle-vraiment-faire-confiance-a-l-allemagne-1-3-795987.html

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