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April 5, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

Dépasser la politique des petits pas. Pour une défense européenne vraiment assumée

5 AVR 2018 , , ,

(B2) Eurodéfense, une association qui regroupe de nombreuses personnalités militant en faveur d'une autonomie européenne de défense, estime que l'Europe doit changer de braquet, passer à la vitesse supérieure, affirmer réellement une politique de défense européenne, l'assumer et s'attaquer aux questions non résolues depuis des années.

Dans cette tribune, signée par plusieurs officiers supérieurs dont les lecteurs de B2 reconnaitront certainement plusieurs noms, différents principes sont posés dont, en tant qu'observateur, nous pouvons partager plusieurs des constats.

Une Europe de la défense, parent pauvre de la construction européenne

L'époque enthousiaste des pères fondateurs, au lendemain de la Guerre, a posé les bases de l'Union européenne. Si l'Europe économique est devenue une réalité, même imparfaite, l'Europe de la défense a vécu plusieurs échecs. Le traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense en 1950 n'a jamais été ratifié. L'Union de l'Europe occidentale, de 1954 à 2011, est restée une coquille vide. Ce n'est qu'en 1999, après le sommet franco-britannique de Saint Malo, que furent posées les bases d'une politique de défense au plan européen, avec de premiers fruits en 2003, où deux opérations militaires furent lancées sous la bannière bleue étoilée.

Des résultats positifs mais à l'échelle d'un laboratoire

La politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC), bras armé de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC), était née. Elle a donné des résultats plus que positifs, malheureusement insuffisamment connus. En 15 ans, près de 80 000 hommes ont été engagés avec succès dans les opérations de l'Union européenne. Nous avons ainsi célébré le 30 mars les 15 ans de la PSDC opérationnelle, avec l'anniversaire du lancement de la première opération, Concordia, dans l'Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (FYROM). Toutefois, à l'échelle européenne et au regard des besoins, c'est peu. Nous restons à un degré d'engagement de portée limitée, que l'on peut qualifier de « niveau de laboratoire ». De plus, les actions du haut du spectre, envisagées parmi les types de missions élaborées à Petersberg en 1992, n'ont été que très rarement menées. Ces missions, dont l'objectif est le rétablissement de la paix, comportent des modes d'action robustes, incluant l'usage de la force. Continuer ainsi ne suffira pas. Pire, le modèle s'épuisera.

Un monde plus dangereux... ou juste différent

Les besoins ont évolué, face à un monde plus dangereux. Il devient difficile de dissocier action extérieure et sécurité intérieure dans la lutte anti-terroriste. Une défense européenne digne de ce nom se doit de garantir la sécurité de ses citoyens où qu'ils se trouvent, de protéger ses infrastructures et de défendre ses intérêts partout dans le monde. Elle doit pouvoir s'appuyer sur une « base industrielle et technologique de défense européenne » (BITDE) qui soit apte à garantir l'autonomie stratégique européenne, en particulier l'emploi des matériels sans contrainte venant de l'extérieur de l'Europe. Cette BITDE est hélas insuffisante aujourd'hui, en raison notamment du périmètre réduit de la PSDC, maints domaines capacitaires n'étant pas couverts par celle-ci. Il y a là une véritable incohérence.

La complémentarité nécessaire même pour les petits pays

Peu d'États ont la capacité de répondre seuls à l'ensemble des besoins de défense. La complémentarité au niveau européen s'impose. Même la France, qui, en théorie, dispose des moyens d'assurer son autonomie stratégique, fait régulièrement appel à des soutiens extérieurs pour combler ses lacunes, principalement dans les domaines du renseignement et du transport stratégique.

Les limites de la politique des petits pas

La politique des petits pas a montré ses limites, malgré les récentes avancées concrètes que sont le fonds européen de défense, le processus annuel de revue coordonnée des plans nationaux de défense et la coopération structurée permanente. Il faut élever le niveau d'ambition inutilement censuré lors de la création de la PSDC et passer la vitesse supérieure. Une approche globale et collective de la sécurité de l'Europe par les pays européens est désormais indispensable, une approche qui englobe les aspects intérieurs et extérieurs, et qui soit partagée si possible par l'ensemble des États membres de l'UE et à défaut par le plus grand nombre.

Revoir la complémentarité OTAN-UE

Cela implique notamment une réflexion sur la complémentarité entre l'OTAN et l'UE. L'actuelle répartition des rôles entre une OTAN garante de la sécurité collective et une PSDC tournée exclusivement vers l'action extérieure n'est à l'évidence plus pertinente : elle ne permet pas aux Européens d'exercer collectivement leurs responsabilités de défense, en dépit des dispositions volontaristes prises récemment par ceux-ci pour resserrer leur coopération. Même la mesure phare de la complémentarité entre les deux organisations, l'accord dit de Berlin Plus, signé en 2003, qui donnait à l'Union un accès aux moyens de commandement de l'OTAN, n'est plus opérante en raison notamment du différent turco-chypriote.

Assumer une défense européenne

Il est temps de s'engager dans une défense européenne vraiment assumée. La simple relecture des documents européens – le traité de Lisbonne de 2007, la Stratégie européenne de sécurité intérieure 2015-2020, la Stratégie globale pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l'UE de 2016 – fournit suffisamment d'éléments pour faire émerger une telle défense. La capacité d'agir sur l'ensemble du spectre des opérations, de l'assistance humanitaire à l'engagement de haute intensité, comprend, avec les opérations de projection, des opérations de solidarité et d'assistance mutuelle sur le thé'tre européen. Ces dernières qui font partie de la défense collective, sont menées en cohérence avec les engagements pris au sein de l'Alliance Atlantique par les États qui en sont membres. Par ailleurs, les textes autorisent un niveau de flexibilité original : l'article 44 du traité de Lisbonne donne aux instances européennes la possibilité de déléguer la conduite d'une opération à un groupe d'États membres. Et la Coopération structurée permanente, récemment décidée, est le support adapté pour le développement de capacités nouvelles.

Rééquilibrer le pacte atlantique

C'est une politique de défense européenne complète, affirmée, active et opérationnelle qui peut alors se mettre en place. Gr'ce à des Européens stratégiquement plus autonomes, elle devrait avoir pour première conséquence une évolution du lien transatlantique qui, tenant compte de l'histoire et de nos valeurs communes, devra être rénové. Rééquilibré et assumé, le nouveau pacte atlantique devra permettre à l'Europe de devenir un partenaire fiable, crédible et écouté. Restent à définir les voies permettant cette évolution.

Revoir les processus de décision nationale et le financement en commun

Il faudra pour cela affronter les sujets de discordance ou de blocage entre Européens, plutôt que de les passer sous silence, de peur de détruire un hypothétique équilibre obtenu à force de concessions. Les règles d'engagement et les spécificités juridiques, notamment pour l'usage de la force, seront à harmoniser. Les processus décisionnels nationaux nécessiteront dans certains cas la définition de boucles courtes, permettant la réaction dans l'urgence, comme dans les catastrophes humanitaires. Il faudra travailler sur les contributions budgétaires des États pour les opérations, les rendre plus équitables et renforcer l'importance du fonds européen de défense.

Avoir une politique claire vis-à-vis des citoyens

Les principes suivants inspireraient la démarche. D'abord, les citoyens européens doivent recevoir des réponses simples et compréhensibles à leurs besoins de sécurité et de défense. Aujourd'hui, si, selon l'Eurobaromètre de l'automne 2017, les trois quarts d'entre eux continuent à plébisciter l'Europe de la Défense, ils n'ont pas une idée claire de sa réalisation, tant les discours sur les rôles partagés entre l'Alliance Atlantique, la PSDC et la défense nationale sont complexes et indigestes. Quand nos dirigeants se seront engagés résolument pour une défense européenne souveraine, ils pourront apporter de telles réponses.

Tenir compte des différences et de la souveraineté des États

Le principe de la subsidiarité et de la complémentarité avec les États doit être préservé. La subsidiarité est incontournable, le domaine de la défense restant de la responsabilité des États et la souveraineté européenne ne pouvant s'exercer que gr'ce aux contributions de ceux-ci en troupes aguerries et en équipements. Si les menaces et les risques sont perçus avec un degré d'intensité différent selon les États, ils doivent conduire à la complémentarité des actions, basée sur les savoir-faire spécifiques de chacun. Par exemple, certains pays ont une culture de projection développée, comme la France ou l'Espagne, autorisant notamment l'intervention en Afrique. D'autres, comme l'Allemagne ou la Pologne, sont plus tournés vers la défense collective. Cela n'empêche pas chacun d'entre eux de participer aux missions, mais avec des degrés d'engagement différents. Les clauses de solidarité et d'assistance mutuelle entre les États, notamment en cas d'attaque terroriste, telles qu'elles sont décrites dans le traité de Lisbonne, ne doivent pas rester lettre morte ; elles doivent être assumées.

Avoir réellement une autonomie stratégique

C'est à ce titre que cette défense gagnera en souveraineté. Les initiatives lancées par le Président de la République dans son discours de la Sorbonne de septembre 2017, comme le développement d'une capacité d'action autonome, autoriseront la continuité entre les États et l'Europe, comme celle entre missions extérieures et intérieures. L'autonomie stratégique d'une défense aux contours élargis pourra alors être soutenue dans le même périmètre par une BITDE ayant des capacités de recherche et développement complètes et autonomes. Il s'agira de gagner alors la bataille des normes industrielles. Dernier principe, cette Europe de la défense souveraine devra multiplier les partenariats, notamment avec ses voisins immédiats. Elle renouvellera le lien transatlantique, rééquilibré gr'ce à un meilleur partage du fardeau.

Un livre blanc européen nécessaire

Pour tout cela, un Livre blanc, dont EuroDéfense-France est un ferme partisan, s'avère nécessaire, avec l'établissement d'une feuille de route ambitieuse. Ainsi, pourra être construite la défense d'une « Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique » pour reprendre les termes du Président de la République.

Les membres du bureau de l'association EuroDéfense-France : Patrick Bellouard (président d'EuroDéfense-France, IGA 2S), Maurice de Langlois (général 2S, ancien directeur de recherche IRSEM), Jean-Didier Blanchet (ancien DG d'Air France), Jean-Charles Boulat (directeur des affaires UE et OTAN du groupe industriel Naval Group), François Bresson (général 2S, ancien directeur de l'Institut des hautes études de défense nationale-IHEDN), Patrick de Rousiers (général d'armée aérienne 2S, ancien président du comité militaire de l'Union européenne), Michel Desmoulin (président d'honneur de l'Union des associations d'auditeurs de l'IHEDN), Jacques Favin-Lévêque (général 2S, ancien délégué général du Groupement des industries de défense et de sécurité terrestres et aéroterrestres), Patrick Hébrard (vice-amiral d'escadre 2S), Jean-Loup Kuhn-Delforge (ancien ambassadeur), François Laumonier (ancien ambassadeur), Jean-Paul Palomeros (général d'armée aérienne 2S, ancien chef d'état-major de l'armée de l'air, ancien commandant allié transformation de l'OTAN), Jean-Paul Perruche (général 2S, ancien directeur général de l'état-major de l'Union européenne), Claude Roche (ancien directeur de la stratégie défense d'EADS, Vice-président de l'Académie de l'air et de l'espace), Philippe Roger (IGA 2S), Cyrille Schott (ancien directeur de l'Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice) et Denis Verret (président, DV Conseil).

Les propos ci-dessus n'engagent que leurs auteurs. Les intertitres sont de la rédaction. Cette opinion a été publiée également dans le quotidien français La tribune

https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2018/04/05/depasser-la-politique-des-petits-pas-pour-une-defense-europeenne-vraiment-assumee/

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  • Finland’s Air Force chief tackles recruiting challenges and its quest for a future fighter

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    Finland’s Air Force chief tackles recruiting challenges and its quest for a future fighter

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Jokinen spoke on July 21 with Defense News, which traveled to Finland with Goldfein, about the service's readiness challenges and its modernization priorities. Tell me about your conversation here today with Gen. Goldfein. Well, we talked about a lot of interesting topics. We talked about the operation environment and the Finnish Air Force and what we do here, and the cooperation with the U.S. and all that. He obviously was aware of a lot of things, but we went into very good detail about everything like that. We know what's happening here, we are strongly here, we are committed here and everything is running smoothly. You said you talked about the operational environment for Finland right now. Can you characterize that, and is it changing? Well, I think we have been using that word “new normal” after Crimea and after 2014, so activity in the Baltic region and in this region is in a little bit elevated level — let's put it that way. And of course our eastern neighbor is actively doing things in Syria and eastern Ukraine. It has had some effects. It seems that they have this big exercise cycle, [in] running the Zapad [exercise] and how they rotate the different regions. In 2017 we saw again this western Russia exercise, and it was noted. It was at peak activity level. Activity-wise, 2017 was the highlight, and now we are calmed down a little bit, but still we are above the level before 2014. Is it fair to say that the number of intercepts peaked in 2017? Yeah, well, when their activity is high, our activity is high. And of course the Gulf of Finland, which is the international airspace nearby our border, that's one of the areas of interest. You used the word “intercepts,” though; that activity is there. I mean, of course then they are operating also in the other, the northeast and eastern border, but that's a solid border. I mean, obviously they are on their side and we are on our side. Then the international airspace where we meet, OK. The Gulf of Finland is mainly transit for mainland Russia to Kaliningrad and back, and in the southern Baltic Sea, or the Baltic sea down more south, there's more room to maneuver, do stuff like that. Here is the very narrow — long but narrow — corridor that normally there is no operational type of maneuvers, neither side, but it's a transit. But we like to know who is going where and all that. Then obviously one the things are that they do not always use transponders or flight plans. There are no flight plans, so we need to find out who is there. That has improved a bit over the years. The equipment is newer and they have the western transponders and they use them, so it's a little bit better situation that we had a few years back, but it's not 100 percent covered with the flight plans or transponders. As you look across the entire Air Force, what's your No. 1 concern? Is it budget? Is it what you're seeing threat-wise from potential adversaries? Well, I'm not concerned about the adversary. Things are relatively stable. We have good relations in all the directions, all directions there. Defense forces in general has been resourced relatively well. The readiness, of course, requires some money. And of course the Army has had a bigger transition the last few years out of the services, from a training organization into a readiness organization. There's of course a need for more money, for operating money also. And the government has been giving quite good money in the last few years. Now the future is not that bright. I mean, there's some dark clouds there. I'm concerned. Of course, the main procurement program, like the HX [fighter replacement program], seems to be well on track, and I'm very happy about that, and that is their main priority, of course, to keep that in schedule and in budget for the procurement side of the house. People have been — I don't know if “stressed” is the right word — but they have been under pressure for the readiness, and we've also gotten more vacant jobs. We are recruiting people, people on the field and into the practical work— so the aircraft maintenance, the surveillance tasks. It's very important that the recruitment works. Aside from HX, are there other modernization efforts that you're trying to keep on track? Well, we are, before the HX selection, before the HX comes in. Right now we are working on our C4I system. But we have had quite a lot of new pieces there and they are IOC [initial operational capability], becoming FOC [full operational capability]. Then whatever solution or whatever HX candidate is chosen, there is a requirement to be able to process and handle all that [information]. So we are working that before so when selection is done and it's actually coming in, the infrastructure is prepared for that. Obviously we need to then fine-tune it, depending on the selection, at the end of the day, but right now we are working on the basic infrastructure. What has Finland already fielded? What is coming up that is still in the planning stages or in the competitive stages? For the C4 side of house? Well, OK, we've got our sensors, relative new sensors for the surveillance sensors. And our networks and the infrastructure and the servers, kind of like the infrastructure there, both the networks and for the servers. They are relatively new. So it's there, and we are getting that into use as we speak or in the near future. Then it's all about the processes and methods and how to handle the data and how to use the data. So that's something that people in organizations need to learn. Not the hardware, but the people need to learn, so that's something that we are working on. Then, when we get the HX here and we know what it is, then we do the necessary adjustments. And it's obviously platform-specific and [dependent on] the requirements there. In all cases, we need to be able to be better in joint warfare inside Finland with data services and of course maintain the international interoperability portion, whether it's about tactical data links or whether it's other things. Did you discuss interoperability with the U.S. Air Force with Gen. Goldfein? Well, yeah, sure. Technology is one thing. You are interoperable and you can use the data and all that. But the processes [of] how you do it is one thing, but then there's this policy side of the house, that if you don't have the policy or to actually be there — interoperable all the time — then you just need to be prepared for that. We are an independent nation. We are not a NATO member, and we are not doing common planning. We are operating as neighbors here. Our AOR [area of responsibility] and the EUCOM [U.S. European Command] AOR and NATO AOR, they are all overlapping or next to each other. Coordination and deconfliction [are] some things that we need to be ready to do. The policy is important and the SOPs [standard operating procedures] and all that. The U.S. is interested in rapidly generating air power in times of crisis. How can the U.S. better defend its bases or set up new expeditionary air bases if needed? From what I understand, that's something that Finland has the capability to do. Did that come up in conversation, and do you think that there are things that the U.S. can learn from Finland in that area? In Finland, we have our main base. But yes, we can deploy and we can swarm, distribute our assets, and then have them under the command and control, and make centralized effects out of those distributed things. So yeah, that was talked about. Of course, it requires the ability to move and begin to move [your resources from the base]. It requires a good situational awareness and plans [for] how to do it, and then the timely execution of that. We've talked about the general concept, and yes, it was mentioned by Gen. Goldfein that they are looking for a more expeditionary mindset, that huge massive bases that you can generate the air power may not be the thing that you want to stick. Finland is not that small [of an] area. There are smaller nations than us, but still in the global or the U.S. scale, it's still a small area. The thing is to look for the agility and mobility and know what's happening and do the right things from there, either move or disperse. Is that a capability in which Finland continues to invest? Yeah, it's part of the HX program. So now the question is how much. It's good for that fight that you distribute, but the main operation is get out there and do the job, then come back and you can go out again. That is the important thing — that you get the effect in the air, what you're doing from the air or in the air. Then it's nice for the survivability part and all that to be distributed. That's what we are still looking [at]. But then, to what extent? That is to be determined. We will find it out when the HX goes forward. On HX, I understand Finland is looking for some industrial incentives. Has it become clear yet what each company might be willing to offer? We are in the middle of the process. I don't know whether the offers are final. We have the ideas that we are discussing. There is a requirement that we need to be able to do certain stuff in Finland, with the Finnish resources and [people with] Finnish passports. That is a requirement [that] is still there. How do you think Finland will have to balance the cost of this project with the capability it wants? That equation needs to be solved, but we have two years of time to solve it. We have the money — €7 billion to €10 billion. And we need to maximize the capability on that money. Are you making additional investments in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities? There is a desire to have the proper amount of ISR. Obviously the HX is going bring something into it, and we also have a recent area there that we are investigating. Probably when there's better visibility, when we are actually selecting and getting through HX, then we [will] know where the gaps are, and then we are going to fill them in [with] other programs. https://www.defensenews.com/2019/08/09/finlands-air-force-chief-tackles-recruiting-challenges-and-its-quest-for-a-future-fighter/

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