September 26, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land
C'est un budget qui ne connaît pas la crise, malgré le contexte économique. Le budget du ministère des Armées va de nouveau croître en 2020 à 37,5 milliards d'euros, soit +4,5%, conformément à la loi de programmation militaire 2019-2025 (LPM), permettant d'investir dans de nouveaux équipements militaires. Il s'agit du ministère qui bénéficie de la plus forte hausse des crédits dans le projet de loi de finances (PLF) pour 2020.
"L'effort en faveur de la défense, très nécessaire après une dizaine d'années de restrictions très fortes, est assez exceptionnel dans le contexte budgétaire et financier actuel", commentait-on mercredi dans l'entourage de Florence Parly.
Les crédits de la mission "Défense" (nouveaux programmes d'armements, défense spatiale, cybersécurité, nouvelle politique de rémunération des militaires) seront augmentés de 1,7 milliard d'euros l'an prochain après deux années consécutives de hausse.
Hors de ce périmètre, les crédits de la mission "Anciens combattants" baissent quant à eux d'environ 150 millions d'euros. La LPM prévoit que le budget défense bénéficie d'une hausse de 1,7 milliard d'euros par an jusqu'en 2022, avant des "marches" de 3 milliards par an à partir de 2023.
En 2020, les dépenses consacrées à la défense atteindront ainsi 1,86 % du PIB français. L'exécutif s'est engagé à y consacrer 2% du PIB d'ici à 2025. "Les engagements sont tenus", se félicitait mardi soir la ministre Florence Parly au micro d'Europe 1.
L'an prochain, "deux tiers de cette hausse, soit 1,1 milliard d'euros, seront consacrés à l'accroissement de nos capacités" militaires, souligne-t-on au ministère des Armées. En 2020, dans le cadre du programme Scorpion de renouvellement des capacités de combat terrestre, le ministère prévoit de commander 271 blindés lourds Griffon (destinés à remplacer la flotte vieillissante de véhicules de l'avant blindé - VAB), 364 blindés légers Serval et 42 engins de reconnaissance et de combat Jaguar, comme prévu dans la LPM.
Dans la Marine, les sept premiers avions de reconnaissance maritime (AVSIMAR) seront commandés, ainsi que trois avions de guet aérien Hawkeye E2D. L'Armée de l'Air bénéficiera de la rénovation de quatre avions de transport C-130H.
Côté livraisons, les armées recevront en 2020 128 blindés Griffon et quatre blindés Jaguar, le premier sous-marin d'attaque (SNA) de type Barracuda, deux hélicoptères NH90, deux avions ATL-2 rénovés, deux Mirage 2000D rénovés, un avion ravitailleur A330 Phénix ainsi que deux avions de transport militaire A400M.
Les militaires français recevront 12 000 nouveaux fusils d'assaut HK-416 (remplaçant du Famas), dont le nombre dans les forces s'élèvera à 41 300 d'ici fin 2020. Côté ressources humaines, quelque 300 postes supplémentaires seront créés dans les armées en 2020 (contre 450 en 2019), dont 150 dédiés au renseignement et une centaine dans la cyber-défense.
Dans un souci de fidélisation, le ministère consacrera par ailleurs 40 millions d'euros à des "mesures catégorielles", notamment sous la forme de primes. "L'enjeu est de retenir les militaires, alors que l'on recrute 26 000 personnels par an", explique le cabinet de Florence Parly.
Le montant des provisions destinées à financer les opérations extérieures (Sahel, Levant...) sera augmenté l'an prochain à 1,1 milliard d'euros, contre 850 millions en 2019.
April 20, 2021 | International, Land
The Army has picked five innovative small businesses to help improve the rate of fire in artillery systems as it continues to work on an internally funded and developed autoloader for its future Extended Range Cannon Artillery system.
July 25, 2024 | International, Land
May 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace
The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft. By DAVID DEPTULA In American politics people like to talk about third-rail issues, those that kill you when you touch them. For the Air Force, retiring the much-loved and much-misunderstood A-10 Warthog has been a third-rail issue. Army folks, generally not known for their knowledge of aircraft capabilities, LOVE the A-10, largely because it is something Army troops can see results from and it's really loud and looks aggressive, a combination ground pounders appreciate. Key members of Congress have loved the A-10 because it's based in their districts (the late Sen. John McCain) or because their spouse flew the airplane (former Sen. Kelly Ayotte.) OK, and a few really do believe the A-10 should be kept because it is the best close-air-support aircraft. In the 2021 budget, the Air Force is taking a new approach, trying to blend extending the life of most of the A-10 fleet while retiring some. The head of the Mitchell Institute, Dave Deptula, presents a detailed argument in favor of the new approach. Will the Air Force touch the rail or? Read on? The Editor. Some were surprised to see the Air Force again trying in the latest budget request to retire 44 A-10s from, bringing the total force of 281 Warthogs down to 237. Any discussion regarding the status of the A-10—or any other capability in the Air Force's inventory—needs to start with the fact that the Air Force is seriously underfunded. Between 1989 and 2001, the Air Force absorbed the largest cuts of all the services as a percentage of the overall defense budget. Between 2008 and 2011, the Air Force received its lowest share of the defense budget going all the way back to the Eisenhower Administration. On top of those slim budgets, the service does not even receive all that is allocated to it in its total budget. Roughly 20 percent is removed from its control as a budget pass-through to the Intelligence Community. In 2020, that equaled $39 billion—enough to buy 400 F-35As. The chronic deficiencies in Air Force funding were the motivating force behind service leaders releasing “The Air Force We Need,” a plan that calls for growing the number of operational squadrons from 312 today to the 386 required to execute the national defense strategy. While that assessment has yet to be met with funding from the administration or Congress it provides a realistic way to view risk; the difference between what the Air Force needs and what it currently possesses. Because of this disparity, the Air Force is continuously forced to trade existing force structure to pay for modern weapons. It does not matter that the Air Force fields the oldest and smallest aircraft force in its history, or that nearly every mission area is coded “high demand, low density.” The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not actually want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft. With that background, it is important to understand the Air Force's plan to cover the panoply of mission requirements that it faces. Defense leaders today are anticipating a broad array of future threats ranging from non-state actors like the Islamic State and Boko Haram on the low end, North Korea and Iran in the middle, and China and Russia as peer adversaries on the top of the spectrum. The overlapping concurrency of these challenges makes for a difficult balancing act given the chronic underfunding of the Air Force and the fact that dealing with each threat demands a different set of tools. This is precisely why the Air Force wants to retain the bulk of the A-10 inventory. They are planning on doing it in a smart way to achieve two primary goals. First, to assure sufficient capacity to ensure that when combatant commanders need the aircraft the Air Force has enough aircraft so that one squadron can be continuously deployed for combat operations. Second, to assure sufficient capability, leaders are investing in re-winging all the remaining A-10 airframes, funding avionics improvements, and other critical upgrades. Taking these steps will ensure the A-10 can continue to fly and fight into the 2030s. The reason for this is simple: when it comes to effectively and efficiently dealing with certain missions in the low- to medium-threat environment, few aircraft can net better results than the A-10. These aircraft are incredibly precise, efficient to operate, can haul a tremendous load of munitions, and their ability to integrate with other aircraft as well as ground forces is legendary. However, when defense leaders consider operations at the higher end of the threat spectrum, the reality is that A-10 cannot survive. In such environments, commanders select appropriate capabilities rather than risking airmen or mission success. Close air support is a mission—not an aircraft—and it can be executed by many aircraft other than the A-10, particularly in higher threat scenarios. This is why A-10s were not employed over Syria. It would have put them at risk against sophisticated Russian air defenses and combat aircraft. Commanders prudently decided to harness F-22s, F-15Es, F/A-18s, F-16s, and others to secure desired objectives because these aircraft could better defend themselves against those threats. Such sophisticated defenses require continued investment in aircraft like the F-35 and B-21. These are the sorts of aircraft—empowered with fifth generation attributes like stealth, advanced sensors, and computing power—that will be far better equipped to handle mission demands against potential adversaries equipped with the most advanced weapons coming out of China or Russia. Preparing for the future demands adjusting the Air Force's existing aircraft inventory in response to budget realities. Dialing up investment in fifth-generation aircraft is an essential requirement, especially given that too few B-2s and F-22s were procured in the past. The types of combat scenarios that defined the post-9/11 world occurred in permissive airspace at the low end of the threat spectrum. America's interests demand a much more far reaching set of options able to operate and survive in high threat environments. That is why investments in A-10 modernization and newer designs like the F-35, B-21, and next generation air dominance aircraft are so important. However, capacity still matters. The Air Force needs to be properly resourced so it does not have to gut the very numbers that will prove essential in future engagements. No matter the theater in which a fight may erupt, the type of combat action, or the scale of the operation, the need for numbers of airframes is a constant—the same cannot be said for surface forces. It is well past time for leaders in the Department of Defense, the White House and on Capitol Hill to start properly scaling Air Force resources to align for the actual mission demand required by our National Defense Strategy. David Deptula, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Air Force lieutenant general with over 3,000 flying hours. He planned the Desert Storm air campaign, orchestrated air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan and is now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/a-smart-approach-to-retaining-most-of-the-a-10s