October 27, 2020 | International, Naval
David Pugliese,
Two reports by the parliamentary budget officer looking into the costs of major Canadian naval equipment projects have been delayed.
The Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates had unanimously passed a motion in June to request the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer undertake a costing analysis of the Royal Canadian Navy's new joint support ships as well as the leasing of the Asterix supply ship from a private firm. The PBO study was to also look at the cost of building the joint support ships in Canada at Seaspan shipyard in Vancouver. The committee asked that the PBO report be provided by Oct. 15.
Another motion from the committee, passed later in June, asked the PBO to examine the $60 billion price tag of Canada's proposed new fleet of warships – the Canadian Surface Combatant or CSC. Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux was tasked to investigate the cost of the CSC as well as examine the cost of two other types of warships: the FREMM and the Type 31. That study was supposed to be presented to the committee by Oct. 22.
But those original motions from the committee expired when Parliament was prorogued. So new motions have to be provided to the PBO.
The Commons committee passed a new motion on Oct. 19 on the Asterix and Joint Support Ship analysis. That analysis is to be delivered by Nov. 30, PBO spokeswoman Sloane Mask told this newspaper. A date for the analysis to be made public has not yet been determined.
“Currently, we are also in the process of confirming the revised timelines for the CSC report,” she added.There is particular interest in the defence community about what the PBO determines is the current price-tag of the Canadian Surface Combatant project.
Last year the Liberal government signed an initial deal on CSC that is expected to lead to the eventual construction of 15 warships in the largest single government purchase in Canadian history. Lockheed Martin offered Canada the Type 26 warship designed by BAE in the United Kingdom. Irving is the prime contractor and the vessels will be built at its east coast shipyard.
Construction of the first ship isn't expected to begin until the early 2020s.
But the Canadian Surface Combatant program has already faced rising costs. In 2008, the then-Conservative government estimated the project would cost roughly $26 billion. But in 2015, Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, then commander of the navy, voiced concern that taxpayers may not have been given all the information about the program, publicly predicting the cost for the warships alone would approach $30 billion.
The overall project is currently estimated to cost around $60 billion. “Approximately one-half of the CSC build cost is comprised of labour in the (Irving) Halifax yard and materials,” according to federal government documents obtained by this newspaper through the Access to Information law.
But some members of parliament and industry representatives have privately questioned whether the CSC price-tag is too high. There have been suggestions that Canada could dump the Type 26 design and go for a cheaper alternative since the CSC project is still in early stages and costs to withdraw could be covered by savings from a less expensive ship.
Canada had already been pitched on alternatives. In December 2017, the French and Italian governments proposed a plan in which Canada could build the FREMM frigate at Irving. Those governments offered to guarantee the cost of the 15 ships at a fixed $30 billion, but that was rejected by the Canadian government.
The other type of warship the PBO will look at is the Type 31, which is to be built for the Royal Navy in the United Kingdom. Those ships are to cost less than $500 million each.
In 2017, then Parliamentary Budget Officer Jean-Denis Fréchette estimated the CSC program would cost $61.82 billion.
The entry of the BAE Type 26 warship in the Canadian competition was controversial from the start and sparked complaints that the procurement process was skewed to favour that vessel. Previously the Liberal government had said only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges if problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating.
But the criteria was changed and the government and Irving accepted the BAE design, though at the time it existed only on the drawing board. Construction began on the first Type 26 frigate in the summer of 2017 for Britain's Royal Navy.
December 7, 2024 | International, Land
The contract also includes continuing the technical and operational evaluation of the equipment and its future use in the Brazilian Army's anti-aircraft artillery units.
September 4, 2019 | International, Aerospace
Steadicopter présente une nouvelle version de son drone Black Eagle 50. A l'occasion du salon DSEI, l'entreprise israélienne Steadicopter présentera une version modernisée du Black Eagle 50. Cet aéronef correspond à un drone VTOL (à décollage et atterrissage vertical), capable de mener des missions civiles et militaires. Il a principalement été mis au point pour la conduite d'opérations ISTAR (renseignement, surveillance, acquisition de cible, reconnaissance). La nouvelle version du Black Eagle 50 repose sur deux nouveautés majeures. D'une part, l'aéronef a été équipé d'un système de navigation inertielle, lui permettant de se déplacer sans accès au signal GPS et de calculer les coordonnées de l'appareil en permanence. Deuxième grosse amélioration apportée au Black Eagle 50, l'appareil a été modifié afin de pouvoir conduire des missions en environnement naval, voire même d'être embarqué à bord d'un b'timent. Le Black Eagle 50 peut ainsi désormais conduire des missions sur terre et en mer. Son endurance, comprise entre 3 et 4 heures, et sa portée, pouvant atteindre les 150 km, lui permettent ainsi de couvrir de large périmètre à chaque mission. Equipé de capteurs permettant de conduire des missions en environnement diurne et nocturne, le Black Eagle 50 peut emporter une charge utile allant jusqu'à 5 kilos, pour une masse à vide de 27 kilos. Sa masse maximale au décollage est de 35 kilos. Par Justine BOQUET http://www.apps-drones.com/nouvelle-version-du-black-eagle-50-126255
January 21, 2021 | International, C4ISR, Security
Andrew Eversden WASHINGTON — Two top national security nominees advocated Tuesday for stronger federal cybersecurity and increased collaboration with contractors in the aftermath of a supply chain breach that infiltrated numerous federal agencies. If confirmed, retired Army Gen. Lloyd Austin and Avril Haines, President-elect Joe Biden's nominees for defense secretary and director of national intelligence, respectively, would start their jobs in the middle of the national security community's assessment of damage from a cybersecurity breach pinned on Russian hackers. They gained access through software from SolarWinds, a major government contractor. “We must elevate cybersecurity as an imperative across the government in order to defend the American people and U.S. critical infrastructure,” Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee in his answers to the lawmaker's advance policy questions. “Additionally, the government must continue to strengthen its partnership with the private sector to foster greater information sharing and collaboration.” So far, federal investigators have discovered breaches at “fewer than 10” federal agencies, though the Pentagon and intelligence community haven't confirmed whether their offices were among the victims. Haines, who served as deputy CIA director and deputy national security adviser to President Barack Obama, found it concerning that the breach first came to light through cybersecurity company FireEye, instead of through U.S. government cybersecurity operators. “[I] absolutely share ... concern that we're actually able to detect these because that's obviously absolutely critical to us protecting against them,” Haines said before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “I think ... it was pretty alarming that we found out about it through a private company as opposed to our being able to detect it ourselves to begin with.” In response to the breach, Austin committed to reviewing the DoD's cyber posture and emphasized that Russia must be punished for infiltrating federal networks. In the advance questions, Austin stopped short of calling the breach an act of war, arguing that designation “requires a case-by-case and fact-specific determination.” “For example, malicious cyber activities could result in injury, death or significant property destruction,” Austin wrote. “These activities would need to be considered in their totality.” An early January announcement from several federal investigators, including the NSA and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, stated that the breach was believed to be an espionage campaign and “likely Russian in origin.” “If that's the case, I think Russia should be held accountable,” Austin said at the hearing. “That's my personal belief.” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., who sits on both SASC and SSCI, called the breach “the greatest cyber intrusion in the history, I think, perhaps, of the world” and said that the stovepiped nature of the U.S. national security apparatus needed to be addressed. Reed said one challenge for Haines will be developing a “more coherent, cohesive, integrated approach” to dealing with cybersecurity threats, particularly from advanced nation-state actors. Under questioning from senators, Haines said the SolarWinds supply chain hack was a “grave threat,” and the government needs new to improve its defenses against such attacks, though she noted that she hasn't received a classified briefing on the intrusion. In 2019, a report from ODNI warned of growing software supply chain hacks that provide an “efficient way to bypass traditional defenses and compromise a large number of computers.” “To prevent a recurrence of this kind of attack, we need to close the gap between where our capabilities are now and where they need to be in order to deter, detect, disrupt and respond to such intrusions far more effectively in the future,” Haines wrote in her questionnaire. “If confirmed as DNI, I will review the expert conclusions from the SolarWinds incident and the current intelligence about supply chain vulnerabilities and what steps may be taken to address any vulnerabilities.” Haines told senators that she would assess how the intelligence community can improve its cybersecurity partnerships with industry and the whole federal government. “I believe that the IC plays an integral role in detecting and warning against nation-state targeting of U.S. networks and infrastructure,” she wrote. “If confirmed, I will examine how better collaboration between the IC and the rest of the U.S. government, coupled with closer partnerships with the private sector and our international allies, can enhance our ability to deter, detect, and mitigate cyberattacks.” Haines will review whether the intelligence community is allocating resources properly to face advanced cyber threats and will examine the adequacy of the IC's existing authorities to protect the digital infrastructure of the United States, she said. Austin pointed to a cyber-threat sharing partnership the department has with the defense industrial base and stated that the department should “continue to look for ways to better integrate with interagency partners and the private sector.” In light of the SolarWinds breach, the senators on SSCI wrote that they are worried about a “lack of mandatory threat information sharing between the private sector and government,” adding that any information sharing from the private sector after the breach is voluntary. Haines would review the relationship. “Information sharing between the IC and the private sector is increasingly important to ensure that our data systems and networks are secure,” she wrote. “If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to reviewing the Intelligence Community's data sharing and information exchange relationship with the private sector, to engaging with IC experts and private sector leaders on what information is currently being shared, and to examining the efficacy of the current framework for sharing threat information.” The incoming Biden administration has signaled that it will prioritize cybersecurity in the aftermath of the SolarWinds breach. The Biden team named Anne Neuberger, the NSA's cybersecurity director who worked to improve information sharing with the private sector, to National Security Council as deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology. Haines wrote that she will “ensure” that the intelligence community has a “robust data sharing and information exchange relationship” with private companies and said that she will be “studying current information sharing to determine how it can be improved and what types of information can be shared to enhance cybersecurity protections.” “The private sector has unique insight and expertise on malicious activity occurring within its networks,” Haines said. “Real-time integration of private sector and government data could lead to more effective prevention and mitigation outcomes.” Cyber norms and deterrence For the last few years, the U.S. government wrestled with the concept of deterrence in the cyber domain, a complex challenge that including resilient defenses, risk management and strong international partnerships. As the SolarWinds breach demonstrated, deterring adversaries from hacking, which is seen as below the threshold of an armed response, is difficult. In response to a question from Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, about how to approach cyber deterrence, Haines pointed to many of the same tenets of current U.S. cyber deterrence, including imposition of costs for malicious actors' behavior, bringing foreign allies together to impose those costs, building resilient systems that are hard to hack, developing norms and creating strong relationship with the private sector. Haines wrote that setting norms should include outlining sanctionable behavior with the agreement from allies. A cornerstone to sanctioning is attributing cyberattacks to actors, a challenging undertaking in the cyber realm. Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., said he wanted Haines to be more forthcoming with attribution of cyberattacks, stating that he found it “extraordinarily concerning” that the “[Trump] White House underplay[ed] attribution on Russia.” Attribution, Haines said, would be a major piece of the ODNI's role in deterrence. “Something we [ODNI] can do is promote the ability to detect when adversaries are engaging in such activity so as then to provide information about attribution, for example. And then hold adversaries to account through that.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2021/01/20/after-huge-hack-biden-security-picks-want-more-cyber-coordination-with-industry