March 18, 2022 | Local, Aerospace
June 11, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Security
Canada puts premium on fighter jets’ ability to conduct attacks on foreign soil
The federal government's plan to buy new fighter jets puts greater emphasis on the aircraft's ability to conduct “strategic attacks” in foreign countries than their capacity to defend Canada and North America from enemy incursions, government documents show.
The importance awarded to the new aircraft's offensive and first-strike capabilities abroad, rather than their defensive capabilities in places such as the Arctic, is causing concerns among some companies in the running for the $19-billion contract to replace Canada's CF-18s, industry sources said.
In particular, some manufacturers have told the government they are worried the process will end up favouring the Lockheed-Martin F-35 at the expense of bids from the Boeing Super Hornet, Saab's Gripen and the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is built by a consortium led by Airbus. The industry sources who spoke about the matter were granted anonymity because federal rules prevent them from speaking publicly.
Federal officials said they are aware of the concerns from various aircraft manufacturers and that government experts are reviewing the evaluation grid. The government is planning to launch the competition for new fighter jets by the end of July.
“We are continuing to have discussions with the companies,” said Pat Finn, the assistant deputy minister in charge of procurement at National Defence.
He added that 80 per cent of the technical requirements are related to NORAD and NATO operations, while the rest are needed to be able to respond to government missions in hot spots around the world. “We're in a good spot for a competition,” he said.
Canada's defence policy, which was released in 2017, made it clear that the priority for the new fighter jets would be defending the country's territory.
“The fighter aircraft fleet is a critical Canadian Armed Forces capability necessary to enforce Canada's sovereignty, enable continental security, and contribute to international peace and stability,” the policy said.
David Perry, a military analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said the acquisition process to this point gives the impression that foreign missions are more important than domestic ones.
“At the high level, the optics of the way it is presented aren't very good at all,” he said.
The federal government's assessment grid for the new fighter jets is based on an evaluation of all requirements worth a total of 100 points, with 60 points going to technical capabilities, 20 points to the acquisition and sustainment costs, and 20 points to the package of industrial benefits. The government has shared its draft evaluation grid with potential bidders, a copy of which was provided to The Globe and Mail.
Of the 60 points going to technical requirements, 31.5 points are based on the aircraft's performance on six potential missions: conducting NORAD operations, intercepting a foreign aircraft carrying a cruise missile, carrying missions against maritime targets, detecting and attacking foreign aircraft such as enemy fighter jets, providing “close air support” in an attack against targets on foreign soil and participating in a “strategic attack” against a foreign country.
The first two missions, which are seen to be domestic in nature, are worth a total of 3.5 points. By contrast, the mission worth the most points (12 out of 31.5, or nearly 40 per cent of the points in this category) is the one based on an aircraft's ability to conduct a first-strike “strategic attack” in a foreign country, which is known to be a forte of the F-35.
The evaluation grid has led some companies to complain to the government that the process favoured the F-35 at the expense of their aircraft, industry and government sources said.
Following complaints from the American government, the federal government changed last month the way it will evaluate the 20 points related to industrial benefits. Under a new process, Ottawa will no longer force all bidders to commit 100 per cent of the value of the aircraft's acquisition and sustainment on spending in Canada. Instead, manufacturers will lose points in the scoring system if they do not make this commitment, but they will still be allowed to remain in the competition
Before the changes were made, the F-35 could have been automatically disqualified because the international consortium that builds the aircraft doesn't allow for the provision of traditional industrial benefits.
Of the 20 points that are attributed to the cost of the new aircraft, 10 are determined based on the acquisition costs and 10 are determined based on the sustainment of the aircraft after their purchase.
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February 20, 2018 | Local, Aerospace
Names of aircraft manufacturers on “suppliers list” for Canada’s new fighter jet still a mystery
DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN More from David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen Published on: February 16, 2018 | Last Updated: February 16, 2018 1:40 AM EST Feb. 9 was the deadline for companies to apply to the Canadian government to be on the supplier's list for the new program to provide a fleet of fighter jets. Being on that list is a requirement to be able to enter the competition to provide Canada with 88 new fighter aircraft. Public Services and Procurement Canada was looking at having the list formalized by Feb. 12, at which time they would make it public. The reason for the fast turnaround is because it is relatively easy to be included on the list – essentially a manufacturer has to have a fighter jet currently in production. But the list has yet to be formalized. Procurement Canada said they are still working on the list but offered no explanation about the delay. But expect the major aircraft manufacturers who have indicated previous interest in the competition. They are: Lockheed Martin with the F-35, Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale, and Saab's Gripen. Sources are also indicating that Boeing will join the competition with Super Hornet....perhaps an Advanced Super Hornet? http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/names-of-aircraft-manufacturers-on-suppliers-list-for-canadas-new-fighter-jet-still-a-mystery
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November 19, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
Military Procurement: What the New Cabinet Can Learn From Australia
By Lee Harding The Liberal government announced its new cabinet on Nov. 20—the very same day the Canadian Global Affairs Institute hosted its annual event on the topic of military procurement. Given that an overhaul in that area is sorely needed, Canada can learn a lot from Australia, Ian Mack wrote in a recent report for the institute. Mack is uniquely qualified to make that assessment, having worked with both governments in their process of awarding contracts for military sea vessels. While he believes both countries had an acceptable result, his report, titled “Another Way to Buy Frigates,” suggests the Canadian approach adds work, balloons costs, and delays success. The re-elected Trudeau government should take note. The Liberals proposed significant changes to Canada's defence procurement system during the election campaign, but it will be a tall order to change this process. The land down under is isolated in a less secure part of the globe, without a nearby superpower like the United States to watch its back. So if Australia is far more diligent about defence than Canada, it might be due to necessity. The last time Canada had a proper and comprehensive white paper on defence was 1994. Australia has had three in the 21st century. Australia's effectiveness goes from the top down, something Canada knows nothing of. As Mack explains, “Canada, uniquely among its allies, has multiple government departments and central agencies significantly involved in the minutiae of its major military procurement projects.” These include Defence; Treasury Board; Finance; Public Services and Procurement; Justice; Innovation, Science and Economic Development—and even more. Meanwhile in Australia, the minister of defence is responsible for all aspects of navy shipbuilding. This includes setting operational and technical requirements, securing funds, developing a plan to benefit domestic industries, and satisfying the legal aspects of procurement. Each country had a project management office of roughly the same size, but Canada's was, frankly, less competent. Australia's office had many knowledgeable contractors working alongside the Department of Defence, whereas Canada's team had many from the public service and armed forces with “little or no applicable experience or knowledge,” according to Mack. “In Canada, significant effort was expended on regular reporting to layers of senior governance,” he says in the report. But it was paperwork and process for its own sake, and impractical in its effect. “Despite the onerous reporting demands, only a few key decisions were rendered and rarely in a timely manner. The opposite was the case in Australia.” In seemingly every aspect of development, Canada made things rigid, complicated, and fragmented, while Australia made them flexible, cohesive, and collaborative. Canada made stand-alone contracts for each sequence of the process. Australia worked with contractors to establish “end-to-end accountability.” Canada's initial request for proposal included hundreds of technical requirements that bidders had to prove. Australia had few mandatory requirements, but worked alongside bidders to explore their respective proposed solutions. In Canada, the intellectual property, liabilities, and insurance requirements were debated at length and only decided hours before the request for proposal was made. Hundreds of criteria got a numerical score, and the sum of all scores won the bid. Canada was “preoccupied” about a public appearance of fairness and avoiding lawsuits. (Nevertheless, the controversy over former Vice-Admiral Mark Norman and complaints from Irving Shipbuilding over the bid for a navy supply vessel shows it failed at this.) Shipbuilders bidding in Australia were confident of a fair system without any of those things. The department did not announce its evaluation criteria, nor was the evaluation report the only factor. Instead, the department stated its objectives and worked collaboratively with three potential bidders in their respective approaches. In Mack's words, this left “the competition to be more about assessing apples, oranges, and bananas” than about tallying up numerical scores. Mack says he could not make the Canadian system work like Australia's because the procurement, request for proposals, and resulting contracts were done outside of the Department of National Defence. At the time, he was “simply unaware of the intricacies of the Australian approach” because he hadn't yet been exposed to it. Regardless, he had already surmised that Canadian bureaucrats “did not want changes to their tried and true ways of doing business” and clung to “adherence to prescriptive and traditional methodologies.” https://www.theepochtimes.com/military-procurement-what-the-new-cabinet-can-learn-from-australia_3150065.html