Boeing wins $7.5 billion contract from US Air Force for guided bombs

On the same subject

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  July 3, 2023 | International, Land

  Europe’s defense leaders push competing air defense visions

  As European nations rework their plans, the question is whether there is time to keep nursing a purely domestic defense architecture.

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  February 4, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR

  U.S. Air Force Defines Radical Vision For Command And Control

  By Steve Trimble The U.S. Air Force has released the full, sweeping vision for the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), a two-year-old concept that proposes to disrupt modern norms for the service's command-and-control doctrine, military acquisition policy and industrial participation. The newly released ABMS architecture defines not a traditional program of record but 28 new “product lines” divided into six major components. The implementation strategy is not focused around traditional acquisition milestones measured in years, but rather development “sprints” fielding morsels of new capabilities every four months. The rights for much of the technology, including a new radar, communication gateway and software-defined radio, are claimed not by an industrial supplier, but by the Air Force itself. USAF adopts lead systems integrator-like model ABMS architecture built on government ownership The release of the strategy on Jan. 21 comes three weeks before the Air Force plans to release a budget plan that would shift $9 billion over the next five years for a “Connect the Joint Force” initiative. The proposed funding would come from retiring certain capabilities, including aircraft fleets, within the next five years, with a clear implication: The Air Force is willing, if Congress approves, to trade some capability now to obtain the ABMS over time. “I think of it as we're finally building the ‘Internet of Things' inside the military, something that is very overdue,” says Will Roper, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, explaining the ABMS to journalists during the unveiling of the architecture in the Pentagon. The scale of the project's ambition has evolved since the ABMS was first proposed in 2018. Air Force leaders unveiled the concept two years ago as a replacement for the airborne Battle Management and Command and Control (BMC2) suite on the Northrop Grumman E-8C Joint Stars fleet. By September 2018, Roper first suggested the same technology could be applied to replace the aging fleet of Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joints and, sometime in the 2030s, the Boeing E-3C Airborne Warning and Control System. Those aims remain intact, but the revealed architecture clarifies that the goals of the ABMS are far broader. If the system is fully realized, the Air Force will create a “combat cloud” on a mobile ad hoc network, transposing the Internet of Things model from civilian technology to the battlefield. As a result, the nearly four-decade-old concept of a centralized command-and-control center—either ground-based or airborne—would be swept away by a future, decentralized digital network. Using computer processors and software algorithms instead of humans, machines would identify targets from sensor data, select the weapons and platforms to prosecute the target automatically, and finally notify the human operator when—or, crucially, whether—to pull the trigger. Roper compares the ABMS' effect on command and control to commercial services on a smartphone, such as the Waze app for drivers navigating traffic. Waze is not driven by a human staff monitoring and reporting traffic hazards, who then review each request for directions and customize a recommended route. Instead, Waze harvests traffic and hazard data from its users, while algorithms mine that information to respond to user requests for services. The Air Force's command-and-control system is constructed around the human staff model, but Roper wants to move the entire enterprise to the Waze approach. “If it didn't exist in the world around us, you'd probably say it was impossible,” Roper says, “but it does [exist].” The challenge for the Air Force is to defend and, if successful, execute that vision for the ABMS. The Air Force needs to secure the support of the other armed services, whose participation is vital to extracting the benefits of such a system. Moreover, the Air Force needs to sell the concept to Congress, despite a system that lacks obvious employment connections to specific legislative districts, such as future factory sites and operational bases. Roper acknowledges the problem of building support for an architecture, rather than a platform, such as a new fighter, bomber or ship. “Those are easy things to sell in this town. You can count them,” he says. “But the internet is not something that's easy to count or quantify, even though we're all very aware of its power.” The Air Force has briefed congressional defense committee staffs on the ABMS concept, but some remain skeptical. A Capitol Hill staffer familiar with the ABMS program doubts that other services will support the Air Force's vision. The ABMS model also appears unlikely to be embraced by industry, the staffer says. A key point of Roper's plan requires companies to cede some intellectual property rights on key elements of the ABMS architecture to the Air Force. But the Air Force is not waiting. Development of the ABMS started last year, even before an analysis of alternatives is completed. In December, the service staged the first demonstration of four new capabilities: transmitting data on a low-probability of intercept link via a gateway between stealthy Air Force and nonstealthy Navy fighters; connecting a C-130 to the SpaceX Starlink satellite constellation; demonstrating a cloud-based, command-and-control network up to a “secret” classification level; and setting up an unclassified common operational picture display at a remote command center inside a tent. As the second in the planned series of triannual events, the Air Force plans to stage the next ABMS demonstration in April, this time involving U.S. Space Force, Strategic Command and Northern Command. Roper, an Oxford-trained physicist, has little patience for the military's traditional development process, although he has made exceptions for complex, hardware-driven programs, such as the Northrop Grumman B-21 bomber and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. For most other programs, Roper wants to trickle out new features at Silicon Valley-speed. A common refrain by military acquisition reformers for decades has been to emphasize delivering an incomplete, “80% solution” sooner than waiting for a system that meets each of sometimes hundreds of detailed requirements. However, for Roper the timeline for delivering even an 80% solution in certain cases is far too long. “[We should] covet the 10-15% solutions that take the next step forward,” Roper said. “Because the learning in that step is so valuable to keep the velocity.” To execute the ABMS vision, Roper appointed Preston Dunlap last year as the lead architect. Unlike a traditional program executive officer (PEO), the architect is a role introduced to the Air Force by Roper, who previously in his career served as the chief architect for the Missile Defense Agency. The six components and 28 production lines for the ABMS are spread across multiple program offices, rather than consolidated under a single PEO. Thus, the role of the architect is to define the vision and then shape acquisition schedules as the various technologies reach maturity. Under Dunlap's architecture, the ABMS is built around six components: new sensors feeding databases in a cloud-based computing environment using software-defined radios, with new apps fusing the data into a common operational picture and integrated effects allowing cruise missiles, for example, to automatically retask sensors on other platforms during flight. Among the 28 product lines, the Air Force proposes to own the rights to the radar, software-defined radio and communications gateway. The Air Force's role resembles the lead systems integrator (LSI) model used for a series of largely failed acquisition programs 15-20 years ago, including the Army's Future Combat System and Coast Guard's Deepwater. In this case, however, the LSI is the Air Force, not an industrial supplier. Such an approach is not unprecedented. The Navy is using a similar model to manage the MQ-25A program, with Boeing selected as a subcontractor to deliver the air vehicle and Naval Air Systems Command providing the ground station and integrating both on an aircraft carrier. The gateway used in the first ABMS demonstration in December offers an example, Roper says. “We took a radio system that was actually built in concert with Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin to be able to deal with both platforms with the waveforms, and then a Honeywell antenna was able to speak across the frequencies associated with both radio systems,” Roper said. “So we got those three primary vendors working together underneath our government leadership.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/us-air-force-defines-radical-vision-command-control

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  January 13, 2021 | International, Aerospace

  Does Japan Need to Develop a New Fighter Aircraft?

  By Arnaud Sobrero The Japanese archipelago lies in a volatile region rife with historical tensions and territorial disputes. China's defense spending has increased at a double-digit rate annually for much of the past three decades. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has drastically modernized its air capabilities with development of the J-20 fighter and the upcoming FC-31, and has demonstrated consistently assertive behavior, including airspace violations and military buildups in the South China Sea. North Korea, a nuclear power since 2006, has also shown belligerence by firing ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, while Russia has violated Japanese airspace on several occasions prompting Japan to scramble its F-15J fleet. Those geopolitical challenges are clearly stated in Japan's Mid Term Defense Plan and National Defense Plan Guidelines, which define Japan's long-term procurement strategy. To effectively address those security challenges, these documents claim, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) needs to modernize its existing fleet and significantly upgrade its capabilities. Japan's 200-plus-strong F-15J fleet, built under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, has been the backbone of Japan's air superiority for close to 40 years. Nonetheless, they face some obsolescence issues that have led the Japanese defense ministry to purchase a $4.5 billion upgrade package to modernize 98 of them into a “Japan Super Interceptor” configuration equipped with better radar, avionics, and weaponry. The F-2 program, co-developed with Lockheed Martin, has been facing operational challenges and has a staggering unit cost of $170 million. Even though the last F-2 was delivered in 2011, the program faces significant obsolescence issues and will remain in service for a shorter duration than the F-15J. Given the dynamic geopolitical environment Japan finds itself in, the Japanese defense ministry is determined to fill the capability gap created by the old F-15J and the future retirement of the F-2. It has decided to purchase its first batch of 42 F-35As, destined to replace the aging F-4, followed by a second batch comprised of 63 F-35A and 42 F-35B fighters, worth $23 billion. The F-35 is a formidable addition to Japan's military apparatus: it offers stealth, excellent sensor and networking capabilities,and an ability to fuse real-time information for rapid decision-making rather than high speed and pure dogfighting capabilities. From a traditional standpoint, the F-35 scarcely represents the air superiority platform the JASDF wants to counter China's growing fleet of J-11 fighters, or even the more advanced platforms recently deployed by Beijing, such as the Su-35 or J-20. Japan has tried to acquire the F-22 from Lockheed Martin but ultimately failed to do so, given that the aircraft was not designed for export due to its sensitive technologies. The JASDF is still looking to acquire a stealthy, twin-engine, long-range air superiority fighter with a robust payload and advanced networking capabilities, which will provide Japan with a qualitative military edge over growing Chinese air capabilities. ADVERTISEMENT Beyond the requirement of modernizing JASDF's capabilities, maintaining a competitive defense industrial base has been a primary strategic goal for Japan. After the Second World War, Japan spent decades rebuilding its aerospace sector, building U.S. military aircraft under license, including the F-86, F-4, F-15, CH-47, and P-3. Building sophisticated aircraft under license has been Japan's de facto strategy to acquire new technologies and upgrade its industrial base skills. Japan has historically relied on U.S. companies to import military hardware through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework. These imports have increased considerably in the last decade, its proportion of the country's total defense budget rising from 0.9 percent in 2010 to 8.9 percent in 2019 with big-ticket items like the F-35, the MV-22, and the E-2D being procured through the government-to-government route. Outside of servicing those types of equipment, tier 1 and tier 2 domestic companies have not benefited from those FMS programs. Japanese companies face restrictions on sharing some critical software intellectual property and technical data from equipment that has originated in the U.S. original. Even Japan's industrial participation in the manufacture of the F-35 has been a far cry from what the local industry had envisioned initially, when Japanese companies were seeking a larger role in the aircraft's production. Recently, in a blow to U.S. military exports, the Japanese defense ministry has decided to scrap two major programs – the Global Hawk and the Aegis Ashore – due to some price and technical issues. These developments may suggest that Japan is potentially reconsidering its engagement with the U.S. on military hardware and could utilize government funds instead for domestic development to enhance the competitiveness of its defense industrial base and, more importantly, gain full control of defense capabilities, as well as on future upgrades. According to the ministry of defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, Japan is looking to leverage the technologies the industry has captured through license production, as well as the development of the experimental ATD-X stealth aircraft, for the development of an indigenous fighter, known as F-X. This would represent a shift in Japan's long-term procurement strategy and could indicate that Japan is now looking to partner for the design and manufacturing of sixth-generation fighter aircraft technologies. After former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's return to power in 2012, he stopped years of decline in defense spending by boosting investments modestly. After eight years of slow but steady increase, the Japanese defense budget stands at a record of about $51.6 billion with the FY21 budget request. In addition, the Japanese defense ministry decided to “convert” its Izumo helicopter destroyer into a small aircraft carrier capable of accommodating 12 F-35B jet fighters, which will strengthen Japan's offensive capabilities. Following the lift of the ban on defense exports, Japan had seen last year its first successful military export, with the sale of air radar systems to the Philippines. Japan would likewise welcome an opportunity to export the F-X, its future sixth-generation fighter, with the assistance of an international partner – if not to promote military ties with friendly nations, then in order to reduce the tremendous development cost. Of all the challenges the F-X program will face, its affordability will be the most pressing. The F-X program represents a clear continuation of Abe's robust defense doctrine and will further cement its legacy into Japan's long-term military modernization. By bolstering the country's domestic defense industrial base and by enabling technological transfer, the F-X program will help Japan catch up with China and Russia in the stealth fighter market. Based in Asia for more than 10 years, Arnaud Sobrero is an independent writer focused on defense technology and East Asian affairs. https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/does-japan-need-to-develop-a-new-fighter-aircraft/